推动全球能源变革，以创造清洁、安全、繁荣的低碳未来。 落基山研究所电力市场 设计研究介绍 2018年10月 推动全球能源变革，以创造清洁、安全、繁荣的低碳未来。

建模分析不同市场化机制在中国的适应性 Modeling Different market designs in China 为了探索符合中国国情的市场化机制，需要利用建模分析对市场结果进行预测，了解不同市场设计对系统整体及利益相关方个体的影响。我们希望通过建模分析帮助中国找到市场改革痛点和相应的解决机制 As Chinese policymakers are exploring different market types, its essential to model it out on real systems. We created a tool for this and tested it out on an example set of generators in Dongbei. In this analysis we… Tested an energy-only market in a representative Dongbei region Built upon State Grid’s dispatch model to assess how this market changes generator dispatch Used generator costs to estimate bidding behavior and the resulting energy prices and payments to generators Assessed how much of generator costs would be covered by energy market revenues. Modeled additional market design scenarios to identify an optimal case that balances reliability, efficiency, and political goals 在此分析案例中，我们…… 对东北典型省份进行单一电量市场的建模分析 基于国网调度模型模拟市场化调度将带来的影响 通过分析各类机组发电成本模拟电厂市场报价行为，分析电力市场的结算价格，评估系统的成本和收益 评估特定市场设计下，单一电量市场可以为多少发电机组提供足够收入以回收运行成本 进一步深化机制设计，找寻协调系统可靠性、成本和社会发展目标的平衡点 The results would help market designers… Estimate system-wide cost and emissions savings Understand shifts in revenues between different generators Identify which generators will likely exit the market Design specific market rules to be put in place to keep necessary capacity online Think through transitions during market rollouts to avoid challenges during implementation 分析结果可以帮助市场设计者…… 进行系统整体经济和环境收益评估 了解发电收入在不同机组间的转移，评估改革对利益相关方的经济影响 发现特定市场机制下的优势和劣势机组，提前定位市场淘汰者 建立针对性市场机制，保证供需平衡，改善供给过度情况，预防过度淘汰 识别出改革实施过程中可能出现的阻碍，制定相依机制细节和政策以保证向市场化的平稳过渡

系统收益 System Benefits 引入单一电量市场可以显著减少排放、降低系统成本 Introducing energy spot markets reduces system costs and emissions by 8-12% 亿元 系统节约的成本 System cost savings 减少弃风弃光 Renewable Integration 提高对高效火电的利用 Thermal efficiency improvement 全部收益 Total

合理的机制设计保证系统资源充足 Meeting resource adequacy 部分机组在市场竞争中被淘汰，剩余存活机组量满足系统资源充足性需求 Market exit is necessary to sustain, exit should be managed through political means, not market mechanisms 退出市场之前 Before market exit Million RMB 11640MW 16060MW 需要额外补偿机制或补助的发电厂 Additional compensation needed to stay in market to meet reliability 在新的市场设计下能够保持自身盈利的发电厂 Remain economic in the energy market MW 为保障电网容量而必须留在市场中的发电厂, Resource adequacy requirement

合理的机制设计保证系统资源充足 Meeting resource adequacy 部分机组在市场竞争中被淘汰，剩余存活机组量满足系统资源充足性需求 Market exit is necessary to sustain, exit should be managed through political means, not market mechanisms Million RMB 退出市场之后 After market exit 16060MW 17630MW 通过设计竞价上限调整系统中可以存活的机组容量 Sufficient revenues to exceed resource adequacy 在新的市场设计下能够保持存活的发电厂 Remain economic in the energy market 为保障电网容量而必须留在市场中的发电厂 Resource adequacy requirement 2190 MW 退出市场 Exit the market MW

各类机组的收益影响 Major types of generators effected 分析显示小型热电联产机组和純凝机组的市场竞争力不足，市场监管者应制定相应机制确保市场淘汰进程与系统发展目标相一致， 并提供安置政策实现平稳过渡 Small CHP and old pure condensing units may select to retire from the market, regulators should align remediation with the expected entrance exits 退出市场之前 Before market exit RMB/MW 折旧 融资成本 启停成本 固定成本 边际成本 供热收入 发电权交易收入/支出 供电收入

各类机组的收益影响 Major types of generators effected 分析显示小型热电联产机组和純凝机组的市场竞争力不足，市场监管者应制定相应机制确保市场淘汰进程与系统发展目标相一致， 并提供安置政策实现平稳过渡 Small CHP and old pure condensing units may select to retire from the market, regulators should align remediation with the expected entrance exits RMB/MW 退出市场之后 After market exit 折旧 融资成本 退出市场 Exit market 启停成本 固定成本 边际成本 供热收入 发电权交易收入/支出 供电收入

电力机组变得更灵活 Generators become more flexible 新的价格机制促使热电联产机组参与市场竞争，在弃电时段与可再生能源竞争发电权 By subjecting CHP to market-based dispatch, plants compete with renewables during curtailment periods Market participating CHP rebidding during potential curtailment periods Potential Curtailment 供热时CHP机组的最小出力 元／MWh Clearing price during curtailment rises above zero when CHP is not a price-taker, benefiting all cleared generators 当允许CHP机组报价不为0时，弃电时刻将以CHP报价出清，提高所有被出清的机组的收益 Clearing Price Cleared CHP Cleared Solar Cleared Wind 市场出清CHP 市场出清风电 市场出清光电 MWh Cleared wind, might buy CHP in the real-time market 市场出清风电，但其发电权可能被CHP购买，由于CHP无法降出力 Energy Output Unobligated CHP that either ramps down, or rebids in the real-time market 按边际成本报价不会被出清的CHP, CHP可以选择降低出力或向出清了的风电购买发电权 The rebidding process allows markets participants determine how costly it would be to ramp down, often times exposing that minimum run rates can be lowered safely and profitably. This would not be discovered if CHP was compensated pay-as-bid at its minimum 该竞价机制可以为机组增加灵活性并降低最小出力提供经济动力，这是直接价格补偿机制不能带来的。一般情况下，机组往往具备更加灵活运行的能力 小时 Sample Day