第十二單元： Problems for acquaintance theories 親知理論的困難 梁益堉 教授

Presentation on theme: "第十二單元： Problems for acquaintance theories 親知理論的困難 梁益堉 教授"— Presentation transcript:

1 第十二單元： Problems for acquaintance theories 親知理論的困難 梁益堉 教授 2012.5.21
Self Knowledge 自我知識 第十二單元： Problems for acquaintance theories 親知理論的困難 梁益堉 教授 【本著作除另有註明外，採取創用CC「姓名標示－非商業性－相同方式分享」台灣3.0版授權釋出】 本課程指定教材為Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge。 本講義僅引用部分內容，請讀者自行準備。 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊，依據Microsoft服務合約及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。

2 4.3.2 Davidson’s challenge Can the presence of a sensation help to justify an introspective judgment about that sensation？ Donald Davidson: NO! 一定要是具備命題結構、具備真假 值的東西才能用來證成信念或判斷。Sensation並不具命 題結構，sensation不能證成信念。 Cause and Reason Davidson: to cause a judgment is not to justify it. Ex: A pain can cause the subject to judge that he is in pain. My pain cannot justify my judgment that I’m in pain. 提供Cause不能用來提供證成。

3 4.3.2 Davidson’s challenge Davidson的主張「only beliefs can justify judgments」 會威脅到the acquaintance theory. 因為the acquaintance theory主張presence或awareness of pain提供證成 ‘I am in pain.’這個信念或判斷。但 awareness並不具命題結構。 presence或awareness of pain是一個事件(event)。 事件只有發生或沒有發生，並沒有真假值。the acquaintance theory 把對心智狀態的內省視為一個 事件，非命題式的狀態(nonpropositional states)。

4 4.3.2 Davidson’s challenge awareness or presence of pain不真也不假，因此不適合作 為論證「我正在痛」的前提。awareness or presence of 兩 者都不能用來證成「我正在痛」。 What do you think? The acquaintance theorist’s response: there must be some alternative way to justify judgments about one’s own states, and allow that beliefs are not the only justifiers. Challenge for the acquaintance theorist: to identify a relation between a pain and the judgment that pain is present that explains how the former, a non-propositional state, helps to justify the latter.

5 4.3.3 Answering Davidson’s challenge
Contemporary ACQ: Introspective knowledge by acquaintance requires that one meet the following three conditions: (i) Through acquaintance, one is aware of an F state (e.g. a pain). (ii) Through acquaintance, one is aware of the judgment F is present (e.g. pain is present). (iii) Through acquaintance, one is aware of the correspondence between the F state and the judgment F is present. (E.g. between the pain and the judgment pain is present.) (p.101) Russell: 滿足 (i) suffices for knowledge by acquaintance. Contemporary ACQ: Introspective knowledge requires conceptualization. Introspective knowledge occurs only when subjects form introspective judgments(也就是 (ii) 和 (iii) ) 以上著作轉載自Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge，101頁，依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。

6 4.4 Problems for acquaintance theories
4.4.1 The speckled hen problem The problem of the speckled hen threatens the acquaintance theory by suggesting that there is an appearance─reality gap even for sensations. you introspectively attend to the first experience. You thereby satisfy condition (i) above. It is unlikely that this direct grasp of your sensation will enable you to recognize it as (judgment)48-speckledness state: you will probably not be able to tell(judgment), through introspection alone, that it involves 48-speckledness rather than, say, 47-speckledness. (p.104) This example shows that the appearance of a phenomenal property sometimes falls short of its reality. The phenomenal reality is 48- speckledness, but our inability to recognize it as 48-speckledness shows that it does not appear this way to an introspective glance. (p.104) 以上著作轉載自Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge，104頁，依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。

7 4.4.1 The speckled hen This threatens the idea that motivated ACQ: the appearance of a sensation directly and completely reveals its reality. 但不可否認的是，對於 sensations而言， appearance is reality. 這是 非常符合直覺的。 How can we reconcile this intuition with the lesson of the speckled hen? Flickr，作者：Marji Beach。

8 4.4.1 The speckled hen ACQ’s response
The puzzle derives from the fact that “appear” has two senses, an epistemic sense and a phenomenal sense. (1) Something’s epistemically appearing a certain way to a subject: 為什麼相信是48個斑點而不是 47個斑點。 (2) Something’s phenomenally appearing a certain way:主觀經驗是什麼。

9 4.4.1 The speckled hen 知態上appear一樣 長，現象上appear 不一樣長。
Ex1: 知道是白牆打 上藍光而不是藍 色牆。 Ex2: Muller-Lyer illusion Flickr，作者： Trisha Weir。

10 版權聲明 頁碼 作品 授權條件 作者/來源 1-10 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊，依據Microsoft服務合約及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。 5 (i) Through acquaintance, …, judgment pain is present.) 本著作轉載自Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge，101頁，依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。 6 you introspectively , …Introspective glance. 本著作轉載自Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge，104頁，依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。 7 Flickr，作者：Marji Beach。 本作品轉載自 2.0 通用版授權釋出。 9 Flickr，作者： Trisha Weir。 本作品轉載自，瀏覽日期2012/5/25。本作品轉載自 2.0 通用版授權釋出。