Purple Parking: Economic Issues 紫色泊车案：经济学问题 China Antimonopoly Forum, Shanghai, 9 November, 2012 中国反垄断法论坛，上海，2012年11月9日 Derek Ridyard, Partner, RBB Economics LLP, London derek.ridyard@rbbecon.com

Overview of Purple Parking case economics Purple 紫色泊车案的经济学概览 Context and theory of harm 背景和损害理论 Market definition and the “SSNIP test” 市场界定和“假定 垄断者测试” Why? 为什么？ How?怎么样？ Obligations on dominant suppliers市场支配地位供应商的 义务

1. Context and theory of harm in Purple Parking 1.紫色泊车案的背景和损害理论 HAL clearly took steps to harm rival valet parking operators at Heathrow. 很明显是 机场采取措施在希思罗机场损害竞争性的代客泊车运营商 But to find an abuse that justifies intervention, it is necessary to assess whether harm to competitors also harmed the competitive process and consumers•但 要想发现滥用并适用反垄断法，就必须要评估对竞争对手的损害是否也损害竞争和 消费者。 Market definition was central to this question市场界定是这个问题的核心: In a broad airport parking market, the impact of HAL conduct on Purple and Meteor does not matter for consumer welfare在广义的机场停车场市场中，HAL 行为对Purple和Meteor的影响与消费者福利无关 But in a narrow valet parking market, exclusion or foreclosure of HAL’s rivals would clearly increase market power and increase risk of consumer harm但是， 在一个狭义的代客泊车服务市场中，HAL排斥或消灭竞争对手将明显增加市场 影响力和增加对消费者造成损害的风险 That assessment is independent of whether we sympathise with the impact on Purple, Meteor这种评估是独立的，无论我们是否同情对Purple, Meteor的影响 This is a typical case where market definition is key to the outcome of the case这 是市场界定影响案件结果的典型案件

2.1 The SSNIP test 假定垄断者测试 The purpose of market definition is :市场界定的目的是 To focus analysis on relevant evidence of competition要将分析竞争集 中到与竞争相关的证据 To focus analysis on main sources of competition要注重分析竞争的主 要来源 To allow the calculation of meaningful market shares要考虑计算有意义 的市场份额 To base assessment on a clear, empirically testable hypothesis评估建 立在明确的、实证检验假设基础之上 SSNIP test is accepted as appropriate framework in EU, US and many other competition law jurisdictions – a “common currency”欧盟、美国和许多其他竞 争法司法管辖区都将假定垄断者测试作为适当分析框架—“通用方法”

A MARKET IS SOMETHING IT WORTH MONOPOLISING 2.2 The SSNIP hypothesis 假定垄断者测试的假设 THE TEST测试 If a “hypothetical monopoly” supplier of X [e.g. valet parking services] were to control all of the supplies of product X, could it unilaterally raise prices by 5-10%? 如果“假设的垄断”供应商X [例如代客泊车服务]控制所有X产品的供应，它可以单方面提高价格5％至10％吗？ X is a market X is NOT a market X是一个市场 X不是一个市场 A MARKET IS SOMETHING IT WORTH MONOPOLISING 市场值得垄断

2.3. How NOT to do it如何不这样做 Purple Parking Judgment illustrates several common errors紫色泊车案判决说明了几个常 见的错误: Failure to apply the SSNIP test framework, despite identifying that this is the correct approach, para 110(iv) •虽然认定假定垄断者测试的正确性，但是没有做这个测试 Reliance on different price levels依赖不同的价格水平 “HVP’s price is very significantly more expensive than the short stay car cark,” para 124“HVP的价格比短暂停车明显更昂贵”第124段 Reliance on “common sense” introspection rather than market evidence依靠“常识”， 而不是市场证据 “It is, in my view, this key characteristic of convenience ... that makes the short stay car park a non-substitute for the purposes of the test I am seeking to apply,” para 120 “是的，在我看来， 在我寻求应用的测试中，便利的关键特性...使得短暂停留的停车场是不可替代物”，第120段 “I consider that if faced with a 5-10% price increase .. Passengers would stay with convenience and not move their custom to the short stay car park”, para 122“我认为，如果 面对的是5-10％的价格上涨..为便利起见，乘客将留在原地，而不是交纳短暂停车费用”，第 122段 Failure to check conclusions against market evidence 无法证实反市场证据的结论 “absence of economist evidence” .. “I am not sure how much such evidence would have assisted”, para 111“没有经济学证据”...... “我不知道有多少这样的证据支撑”，第111段

2.4 How it could have been done (1) – analyse 如何做测试（1）－分析 Para 124 reports the following evidence on the price premium charged by valet parking over short stay car park: 第124段对于短时间停车的费用提供了如下的证据 Days (天) Terminal 航站楼1 Terminal 航站楼3 Terminal航站楼 5 3 54% 51% 40% 8 28% 2% 14% 15 32% -22% -19% These comparisons invite some obvious questions通过比较我们可以发现一些明显的问题: What share of valet parking is done for short (e.g. < 3-day) trips?代客泊车中有多少是短期（<3天）旅行？ Does HVP do a higher share of longer stay business at T3 than at T1?QHVP在3号航站楼长期停留业务的市场份额比1号航站楼高吗？ Are there any long term stays in short stay car parks? (If not, where else does this demand go?) 有长期滞留车辆停在短期停留区吗？（如果没有，什么地方能满足这方面的需求？） But none of these questions is raised in the Judgment但判决中没有分析这些问题

2. 4. How it could have been done. (2) – draw 2.4 How it could have been done (2) – draw lessons from “natural experiments” 如何做测试（2）－借鉴“自然经验” Key lessons might have been drawn from changes in relative price of alternatives over time – hypothetical illustration: 主要思路在于寻找替代品在不同时间相对于价格的变化－假想图 Did valet parking lose sales volumes here? 代客泊车在这里失去客户？ 价格Price (£) Did valet parking gain sales here? 代客泊车在这里获得客户？ Time period时间

2. 4. How it could have been done. (3) – consumer. survey evidence Use existing market research on factors that drive consumer decisions 使用现有的市场研究消费者决策驱动因素 But then supplement that with new questions on但随后补充新问题: Likely response to change in relative prices对相对价格改变可能作出的反应 Events that led to previous changes in consumer choices 导致消费者选择 变化的事件 Develop evidence to discover how consumers would react to a unilateral change in price 寻找证据，并发现消费者是如何对单方价格变化做出反应的

2. 4. How it could have been done. (4) – complex 2.4 How it could have been done (4) – complex econometrics and quantitative analysis 如何做测试（4） - 复杂的计量经济学和定量分析 Application of SSNIP test often associated with complex and time- consuming empirical analysis 假定垄断者测试的应用往往伴有复杂和费时的 实证分析 Demand, elasticity estimation需求，弹性估计 Price correlation analysis价格相关性分析 There are many ways used by economists to assess “what if” questions such as the SSNIP test hypothesis. But: 经济学家使用的方法有很多，评估“如 果…将会怎么样”的问题，就如同既定垄断者测试的假设一样。但是： They can be time-consuming and expensive它们可以是费时和昂贵的 Risk that expert disputes “capture” the process – challenge to judges专家 辩论“俘获”过程风险－挑战法官 Clearly, it makes sense to use these tools when available显然，使用这些可 用工具是有道理的 But the SSNIP test is more about asking the right questions – it does not depend on complex high-tech measurement techniques但假定垄断者测试主 要是提出争取的问题——提出问题不需要复杂高科技的计量..

3 Obligations on dominant firms 支配地位企业的义务 The other big picture issue raised by Purple Parking is whether HAL should be obliged to accommodate rival valet parking operators. Some key issues:紫色停车场 提出另一个设想问题是：HAL是否有义务向竞争性代客泊车服务运营商提供设施。关 键问题包括： Was Court right to reject HAL’s argument that abuse occurs only if competitors are eliminated? 法院是否正确的拒绝了HAL的说法，即只有竞争对手被淘汰时才 会出现滥用？ How to assess whether HAL conduct diminished rivalry from complainants in a manner that mattered to consumers?如何评估HAL消除竞争对手的行为也同时影 响消费者利益？ Would a remedy that required HAL to accommodate rivals confiscate HAL’s property rights? If so, is that a reason not to intervene? 强迫HAL给竞争对手提供 设施是否侵犯了它的财产权？如果是的话，合理性何在？ If HAL is obliged to accommodate rival valet parking operators, what about other facilities provided at the airport? Where does the requirement to “unbundle” end? 如果HAL有义务给竞争对手提供设施，那么我们如何认定机场的其他设施？ 这种“分解”到什么时候为止？

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