Unemployment and Job Search

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Unemployment and Job Search 1 1 Hwei-Lin Chuang, Ph.D. 2014/06/04

OUTLINE Unemployment Types of Unemployment and Their Causes Job Search Inflation and Unemployment

失業率-按年齡分 單位 : % 資料來源:主計處人力資源調查報告 失 業 率 98 99 100 101 102 15 ~ 24歲 項目別 失 業 率 98 99 100 101 102 全部 男性 女性 總  計 5.85 6.53 4.96 5.21 5.80 4.45 4.39 4.71 3.96 4.24 4.49 3.92 4.18 4.47 3.80 15 ~ 24歲 14.49 15.66 13.56 13.09 13.60 12.66 12.47 12.61 12.35 12.69 12.63 13.17 13.25 15 ~ 19歲 13.55 13.38 13.71 10.93 10.97 10.89 11.22 10.68 11.82 9.80 9.90 9.68 9.65 8.62 10.84 20 ~ 24歲 14.67 16.15 13.53 13.51 14.20 12.96 12.71 13.04 12.44 13.28 13.08 13.75 14.13 13.41 25 ~ 44歲 5.93 6.95 4.70 5.35 6.23 4.30 4.46 5.03 4.38 4.88 4.27 4.84 3.61 25 ~ 29歲 8.77 10.26 7.19 8.15 9.40 6.86 7.11 7.86 6.36 7.08 7.72 6.44 7.96 6.25 30 ~ 34歲 5.82 6.76 4.69 5.19 6.04 4.17 4.32 4.67 3.90 4.34 4.86 3.72 4.20 4.91 3.40 35 ~ 39歲 4.64 5.52 3.54 4.10 4.76 3.28 3.32 4.13 2.32 3.37 3.85 2.78 2.72 40 ~ 44歲 4.23 5.31 2.80 3.77 4.79 2.44 3.02 3.67 2.18 2.76 3.38 1.99 2.51 2.97 1.94 45 ~ 64歲 2.64 3.39 4.16 2.16 3.19 1.75 2.31 1.54 2.25 2.69 1.57 45 ~ 49歲 5.07 3.12 3.89 2.50 2.99 3.65 2.07 2.55 3.03 1.89 2.59 3.27 1.69 50 ~ 54歲 4.14 5.02 2.70 3.50 4.26 2.29 2.66 3.22 1.78 2.35 2.89 1.53 2.26 2.65 1.68 55 ~ 59歲 4.43 1.82 3.06 3.83 1.60 3.05 1.31 2.14 1.13 2.15 2.48 1.58 60 ~ 64歲 2.00 2.30 1.50 1.73 0.99 1.83 0.94 2.06 0.80 1.32 1.64 0.57 65歲及以上 0.13 0.18 - 0.19 0.15 0.09 0.17 0.14 0.07 資料來源:主計處人力資源調查報告

1. Unemployment The concept of unemployment is somewhat ambiguous since in theory virtually anyone would be willing to be employed in return for a generous enough compensation package. →Economists define unemployment in terms of an individual’s willingness to be employed at some prevailing market wage. u(unemployment rate)=U/L Government statistic: U (temporary layoff waiting to be recalled , actively search for work in the previous week or month )

Note: Limitations of unemployment rate data →For a number of reasons, they do not necessarily provide an accurate reflection of the economic hardship that members of a group are suffering.

Individuals who are not actively searching for work, including those who search unsuccessfully and then gave up, are not counted among the unemployed. e.g., discouraged worker. Unemployment statistics tell us nothing about the earnings levels of those who are employed. A substantial fraction of the unemployed come from families in which other earners are present and the unemployed are often not the primary source of their family support. Unemployed receive some income support such as government unemployment compensation. Unemployment rate data tell us little about the fraction of the population that is employed.

2. Types of Unemployment and Their Causes (1)Frictional Unemployment D0: Labor Demand S0 : Labor Supply (W0, E0): Equilibrium Wage and Employment Level W Employment S0 D0 E0 W0 Even in a market-equilibrium or full-employment situation there will still be some frictional unemployment, because some people will be “between jobs”. Frictional unemployment arises because labor markets are inherently dynamic, because information flows are imperfect, and because it takes time for unemployed workers and employers with job vacancies to find each other.

(2) Structural Unemployment Structural unemployment arises when changes in the pattern of labor demand cause a mismatch between the skills demanded and supplied in a given area or cause an imbalance between the supplies and demands for workers across areas. W W S0B S0A W1B W0A W0B D0A D0B D1A D1B E0B E1B E1A E0A Employment Employment →Unemployment of E0A – E1A workers would be created in the short run.

Flows Between Employment and Unemployment Employed (E workers) Unemployed (U Workers) Job Losers (  E) Job Finders (h  U) Suppose a person is either working or unemployed. At any point in time, some workers lose their jobs and unemployed workers find jobs. If the probability of losing a job equals , there are   E job losers. If the probability of finding a job equals h, there are h  U job finders.

If wages were completely flexible and if costs of occupational or geographic mobility were low, market adjustments would quickly eliminate this type of unemployment. Note: It has been argued that structural unemployment may also arise if some employers are paying above market-clearing (or efficiency) wages to reduce employee turnover and/or shirking and to increase productivity.

(3) Demand-Deficient Unemployment Demand-deficient unemployment occurs when a decline in aggregate demand in the output market causes the aggregate demand for labor to decline in the face of downward inflexibility in real wages. If real wages are inflexible downward, E fall to E1, and E0 – E1 workers will become unemployed. →Flows into unemployment increase while flows into employed decline. W W0 W2 E S0 D0 D1 E0 E2 E1 One appropriate government response to demand-deficient unemployment is to pursue macroeconomic policies to increase aggregate demand; these policies include increasing the level of government spending, reducing taxes, and increasing the rate of growth of the money supply.

Why employers respond to a cyclical decline in demand by temporarily laying off some of their work force rather than reducing real wages. Rigid money wage: employers are not free to unilaterally cut money wages because of the presence of unions. The asymmetry of the information between employers and employees makes layoffs the preferred policy. In the presence of investments in firm-specific human capital, layoffs affect only the least-experienced workers, the workers in whom the firm has invested the smallest amount of resources. →The firm will find choosing the layoff strategy a more profitable alternative. A system of layoffs in which the newest employees are laid off first provides an implicit contract (a guarantee or form of insurance to experienced workers) that they will be immune to all but the severest declines in demand. →They will be willing to pay for the stability by accepting lower wages.

(4) Seasonal Unemployment Seasonal unemployment is similar to demand-deficient unemployment in that it is induced by fluctuations in the demand for labor. However, the fluctuations can be regularly anticipated and follow a systematic pattern over the course of a year. e.g., Agricultural employee To attract workers to such seasonal industries, firm will have to pay workers higher wages to compensate them for being periodically unemployed. →The existence of compensating wage differentials makes it difficult to evaluate whether this type of unemployment is voluntary or involuntary in nature.

3. Job Search Many theories claim to explain the existence and persistence of unemployment in competitive markets. Any given worker can choose from among many different job offers. Because it takes time to learn about the opportunities provided by different employers, search activities prolong the duration of the unemployment spell. The worker, however, is willing to endure a longer unemployment spell because it might lead to a higher-paying job. In fact, search unemployment is a human capital investment in information.

(1) The Wage Offer Distribution To simplify the analysis, we assume that search activities are conducted only by unemployed workers. The wage offer distribution gives the frequency distribution describing the various offers available to a particular unemployed worker in the labor market. The unemployed worker knows the shape of the wage offer distribution. Search activities, however, are costly. Each time the worker applies for a new job, he incurs transportation and other types of search costs. Moreover, he is also forgoing earnings: He could have been working at a lower-paying job. The worker’s economic trade-offs are clear: The longer he searches, the more likely he will get a high wage offer; the longer he searches, however, the more it costs to find that job.

(2) The Asking Wage The asking wage is the threshold wage that determines if the unemployed worker accepts or rejects incoming job offers. There is a clear link between a worker’s asking wage and the length of the unemployment spell the worker will experience. Workers who have low asking wages will find acceptable jobs very quickly and the unemployment spell will be short. Workers with high asking wages will take a long time to find an acceptable job and the unemployment spell will be very long.

The marginal revenue curve gives the gain from an additional search The marginal revenue curve gives the gain from an additional search. It is downward sloping because the better the offer at hand, the less there is to gain from an additional search. The marginal cost curve gives the cost of an additional search. It is upward sloping because the better the job offer at hand, the greater the opportunity cost of an additional search. The asking wage equates the marginal revenue and the marginal cost of search. Dollars MR MC Wage Offer at Hand The Determination of the Asking Wage $5 $10 $20 $25

(3) DETERMINANTS OF THE ASKING WAGE The worker’s asking wage will respond to changes in the benefits and costs of search activities. Workers with high discount rates are present- oriented, and hence perceive the future benefits from search to be low. A major component of search costs is the opportunity cost resulting from rejecting a job offer and continuing the search. The unemployment insurance (UI) system, compensates workers who are unemployed and who are actively engaging in search activities. Unemployment insurance benefits, therefore, reduce the marginal cost of search.

失業者找尋工作方法-按年齡分 單位 : % 找 尋 工 作 方 法 Item 託親友師長介紹 向私立就業服務機構登記求職 應徵廣告、招貼 年 找 尋 工 作 方 法 Item 託親友師長介紹 向私立就業服務機構登記求職 應徵廣告、招貼 年 年齡 97 100 102 15 ~ 24歲 52.63 55.68 48.13 28.54 29.39 50.78 62.94 63.54 66.97 15 ~ 19歲 77.62 44.30 29.74 19.73 25.93 40.43 66.98 68.02 74.26 20 ~ 24歲 48.36 57.50 50.46 30.05 29.94 52.09 62.25 62.83 66.05 25 ~ 44歲 54.05 51.39 51.12 32.91 39.17 47.28 67.67 68.99 66.04 25 ~ 29歲 46.90 47.38 49.58 35.13 40.13 65.45 64.25 67.11 30 ~ 34歲 59.86 49.21 47.73 33.43 35.54 51.24 70.00 69.40 61.42 35 ~ 39歲 57.52 56.50 50.91 29.19 45.16 47.98 73.20 77.69 66.41 40 ~ 44歲 60.88 60.26 62.62 30.24 36.15 31.65 63.96 71.78 71.49 45歲及以上 66.18 62.52 70.66 27.92 29.38 27.59 61.51 57.29 64.06 45 ~ 49歲 66.02 64.79 66.68 34.47 27.58 37.42 66.33 66.78 65.65 50歲及以上 60.41 73.67 21.58 31.05 20.17 56.85 48.45 62.87 資料來源:主計處人力資源調查報告

失業者找尋工作方法-按年齡分(續) 單位 : % 找 尋 工 作 方 法 (續) Item 向公立就業服務機構登記求職 參加政府考試分發 找 尋 工 作 方 法 (續) Item 向公立就業服務機構登記求職 參加政府考試分發 其 他 年 年齡 97 100 102 15 ~ 24歲 28.70 21.47 27.48 9.87 18.17 14.60 - 0.79 15 ~ 19歲 38.25 29.79 2.53 20 ~ 24歲 27.07 20.14 11.56 21.07 16.13 0.89 25 ~ 44歲 23.73 26.47 22.59 9.34 13.05 11.03 0.44 0.76 0.49 25 ~ 29歲 23.15 23.78 22.82 14.51 20.38 16.15 1.02 1.32 0.34 30 ~ 34歲 21.16 20.74 21.97 10.52 13.19 14.91 0.21 35 ~ 39歲 22.89 32.28 21.36 2.68 5.59 2.84 0.45 1.74 40 ~ 44歲 30.23 36.82 25.00 0.87 1.14 45歲及以上 33.47 38.42 23.54 1.21 1.54 1.71 0.59 45 ~ 49歲 31.33 34.41 24.66 2.51 1.52 50歲及以上 35.54 42.16 22.70 1.56 0.92 0.43 失業者找尋工作方法-按年齡分(續) 資料來源:主計處人力資源調查報告

失業者找尋工作方法-按教育程度分 單位 : % 找 尋 工 作 方 法 Item 託親友師長介紹 向私立就業服務機構登記求職 應徵廣告、招貼 找 尋 工 作 方 法 Item 託親友師長介紹 向私立就業服務機構登記求職 應徵廣告、招貼 年 教育程度 97 100 102 國中及以下 67.33 70.99 69.53 21.36 25.39 19.93 65.54 63.99 65.57 國小及以下 60.59 70.87 80.05 20.64 29.28 2.06 59.50 39.57 40.11 國中 70.26 71.03 66.70 21.67 24.26 24.76 68.17 71.06 72.44 高中(職) 65.01 59.65 60.16 31.59 33.98 48.39 72.52 71.75 73.20 高中 66.11 58.03 62.40 36.30 28.62 49.97 70.79 72.17 79.89 高職 64.64 60.15 59.33 29.98 35.60 47.80 73.12 71.62 70.72 大專及以上 41.17 43.99 44.35 35.70 39.84 50.52 58.66 61.03 61.17 專科 50.92 54.18 63.79 39.82 45.04 56.07 67.16 67.35 71.17 大學及以上 35.82 39.66 37.94 33.44 37.64 48.68 53.99 58.35 57.87 資料來源:主計處人力資源調查報告

失業者找尋工作方法-按教育程度分(續) 單位 : % 找 尋 工 作 方 法 (續) Item 向公立就業服務機構登記求職 參加政府考試分發 找 尋 工 作 方 法 (續) Item 向公立就業服務機構登記求職 參加政府考試分發 其 他 年 教育程度 97 100 102 國中及以下 31.42 26.25 17.05 - 0.43 0.49 0.65 國小及以下 45.41 39.78 26.42 國中 25.36 22.32 14.52 0.56 0.63 0.84 高中(職) 23.32 33.05 27.37 2.09 1.51 0.85 0.62 0.51 0.23 高中 23.74 25.42 30.47 1.78 1.47 0.76 1.67 高職 23.17 35.36 26.22 2.19 1.52 0.89 0.83 0.15 0.32 大專及以上 27.29 23.97 24.00 17.31 24.60 19.75 0.57 0.80 專科 25.78 30.12 32.76 7.03 6.67 8.81 1.68 1.04 大學及以上 28.12 21.35 21.11 22.95 32.22 23.36 1.31 0.10 0.72 資料來源:主計處人力資源調查報告

失業者失業期間-按年齡分 失 業 期 間 年齡 單位 : % Item 1 ~ 2 週 3 ~ 4 週 5 ~ 13 週 年 97 100 失 業 期 間 Item 1 ~ 2 週 3 ~ 4 週 5 ~ 13 週 年 年齡 97 100 102 15 ~ 24歲 13.18 10.32 13.21 12.76 12.10 7.79 32.25 27.48 33.71 15 ~ 19歲 29.44 19.33 19.47 18.04 14.14 15.52 28.69 27.89 23.91 20 ~ 24歲 10.43 8.90 12.42 11.87 11.77 6.82 32.85 27.42 34.95 25 ~ 44歲 8.54 7.00 8.28 8.79 14.61 12.73 24.86 22.57 22.96 25 ~ 29歲 8.36 7.91 8.48 17.25 11.62 26.60 22.61 25.01 30 ~ 34歲 8.23 6.52 9.50 12.90 13.81 23.76 18.60 22.79 35 ~ 39歲 5.68 6.87 2.90 6.77 11.79 12.48 25.50 28.47 19.68 40 ~ 44歲 12.59 5.54 13.13 7.25 13.50 14.05 21.14 22.71 22.40 45歲及以上 11.53 8.55 11.25 13.05 10.78 10.47 25.16 20.47 45 ~ 49歲 10.53 6.45 4.68 7.13 14.40 28.29 21.59 13.36 50歲及以上 12.46 8.62 20.70 13.85 7.72 22.30 19.54 14.12 失業者失業期間-按年齡分 資料來源:主計處人力資源調查報告

失業者失業期間-按年齡分(續) 單位 : % 失 業 期 間 (續) Item 年 年齡 97 100 102 45歲及以上 50歲及以上 失 業 期 間 (續) Item 14 ~ 26 週 27 ~52 週 53 週以上 年 年齡 97 100 102 15 ~ 24歲 14.11 16.45 16.50 22.78 25.17 21.16 4.92 8.48 7.63 15 ~ 19歲 8.66 11.73 6.90 11.47 26.92 30.00 3.69 - 4.21 20 ~ 24歲 15.03 17.19 17.71 24.70 24.89 20.04 5.12 9.83 8.06 25 ~ 44歲 18.24 18.12 18.74 18.02 19.31 17.91 19.57 18.60 25 ~ 29歲 23.43 16.38 14.98 19.46 18.08 20.14 11.72 17.76 19.76 30 ~ 34歲 16.80 20.06 15.79 18.54 20.27 19.04 24.29 21.65 19.09 35 ~ 39歲 18.47 16.53 27.46 18.87 17.12 22.15 24.72 19.22 15.33 40 ~ 44歲 24.53 21.89 17.70 16.95 15.10 13.53 17.54 21.25 19.19 45歲及以上 20.82 22.83 20.28 16.09 19.68 25.96 13.35 17.69 18.23 45 ~ 49歲 20.58 25.89 24.63 20.32 24.32 20.39 15.61 12.60 20.78 50歲及以上 21.04 20.25 17.24 12.22 15.78 29.86 11.28 21.97 16.44 資料來源:主計處人力資源調查報告

失業者失業期間-按教育程度分 單位 : % 失 業 期 間 Item 1 ~ 2 週 3 ~ 4週 5 ~ 13 週 年 教育程度 97 失 業 期 間 Item 1 ~ 2 週 3 ~ 4週 5 ~ 13 週 年 教育程度 97 100 102 國中及以下 12.95 11.33 14.45 8.95 14.44 14.70 26.38 18.35 23.28 國小及以下 10.85 15.35 20.56 9.95 16.33 17.82 29.30 17.53 17.77 國中 13.85 9.91 12.64 8.52 13.77 25.13 18.64 24.91 高中(職) 12.33 8.48 8.41 10.11 15.04 12.22 25.21 26.66 25.04 高中 7.90 5.95 5.05 10.93 12.37 12.38 27.09 21.86 29.29 高職 9.24 9.65 9.83 15.84 12.16 24.57 28.11 23.48 大專及以上 6.49 6.25 9.41 11.88 11.36 9.12 28.04 22.24 23.08 專科 3.94 8.63 4.10 14.78 13.43 11.13 31.20 23.89 26.74 大學及以上 5.24 11.24 10.28 10.49 8.43 26.31 21.54 21.83 資料來源:主計處人力資源調查報告

失業者失業期間-按教育程度分(續) 單位 : % 失 業 期 間 (續) Item 14 ~ 26 週 27 ~52 週 53 週以上 年 失 業 期 間 (續) Item 14 ~ 26 週 27 ~52 週 53 週以上 年 教育程度 97 100 102 國中及以下 22.01 23.32 16.73 14.02 15.11 16.20 15.70 17.46 14.64 國小及以下 15.59 24.28 13.50 15.19 14.63 15.64 19.13 11.88 14.71 國中 24.76 22.99 17.68 13.52 15.27 16.37 14.23 19.41 14.62 高中(職) 19.83 15.58 19.71 17.70 17.15 20.24 14.82 17.10 14.38 高中 20.09 17.89 22.27 19.01 17.11 17.93 14.98 24.83 13.08 高職 19.74 14.88 18.77 17.25 17.16 21.09 14.76 14.77 14.85 大專及以上 17.67 19.63 17.61 23.55 24.07 23.26 12.37 16.44 17.52 專科 12.10 19.47 16.74 22.96 16.88 23.49 15.02 17.69 17.80 大學及以上 20.74 19.70 17.90 23.87 27.11 23.18 10.91 15.91 17.42 資料來源:主計處人力資源調查報告

失業者平均失業期間-按年齡分 失 業 期 間 年齡 單位 : % 年 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 15 ~ 24歲 失 業 期 間 年 年齡 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 15 ~ 24歲 19.89 18.36 18.95 26.06 25.97 23.16 21.41 20.66 15 ~ 19歲 13.44 10.12 13.61 23.28 18.91 18.70 21.50 20 ~ 24歲 20.85 19.57 19.85 27.13 26.42 23.83 21.77 20.55 25 ~ 44歲 26.00 25.54 27.33 27.72 32.13 29.50 28.51 28.94 25 ~ 29歲 22.72 26.41 23.48 29.77 30.76 27.77 29.21 28.89 30 ~ 34歲 24.07 31.31 25.92 34.24 31.25 27.54 29.67 35 ~ 39歲 26.94 25.50 26.13 35.66 30.26 29.93 28.52 40 ~ 44歲 34.14 27.34 27.59 27.88 30.35 27.00 28.26 45歲及以上 30.69 29.37 24.00 27.60 31.44 30.42 28.43 28.81 45 ~ 49歲 27.93 32.90 28.12 28.58 32.43 28.78 25.69 50歲及以上 32.89 26.53 20.24 26.78 30.65 31.81 30.37 29.46 失業者平均失業期間-按年齡分 資料來源:主計處人力資源調查報告

失業者平均失業期間-按教育程度分 單位 : % 失 業 期 間 年 教育程度 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 失 業 期 間 年 教育程度 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 國中及以下 27.78 25.16 25.49 27.37 28.00 27.52 24.35 23.16 國小及以下 28.93 22.86 27.19 27.30 26.20 23.52 22.23 22.65 國中 27.36 25.90 24.76 27.40 28.66 25.08 23.31 高中(職) 23.30 22.85 24.57 26.51 31.19 27.32 24.97 25.14 高中 24.82 22.05 25.01 29.70 32.34 32.15 27.57 24.17 高職 22.87 23.07 24.42 25.51 30.85 25.87 24.07 大專及以上 26.21 26.13 24.54 28.24 31.95 29.60 29.27 29.62 專科 23.98 25.20 25.27 27.23 30.19 28.56 29.69 29.07 大學及以上 28.02 26.80 24.13 28.86 32.94 30.04 29.11 29.81 資料來源:主計處人力資源調查報告

4. Inflation and Unemployment Note: Because our focus is on the labor market, we shall emphasize the price of labor-the wage rate-when discussing the issue of inflation.

(1) The Basic Model of the Inflation/Unemployment Trade-Off Wage E Supply Demand W0 W1 W2 W3 W4 It is reasonable to assume that the speed at which The wage rate changes is related to the extend to which the labor market is in disequilibrium, as measured by the excess demand for labor. i.e., the percentage rate of change of wage ( ) is proportional to the excess demand for labor (X)

W X W=αX W1 X1 Excess Supply X<0 Excess Demand X>0 Excess Demand for Labor (X) U U1 U* Relationship Between the Excess Demand for Labor and the Unemployment Rate Because the excess demand for labor is usually not observable, it is necessary to replace it with an observable variable, such as the unemployment rate. U* is the unemployment rate that exists when the excess demand for labor is zero. i.e., natural or full-employment rate of unemployment.

Trade-off Between Wage Inflation and the Unemployment Rate

(2) The Inflation/Unemployment Trade-Off The negative relationship between unemployment and wage inflation was dubbed the Phillips curve. During the 1970s the relationship appears to have broken down. →An interpretation is that while a trade-off between the rates of inflation and unemployment exists at a point in time, the position of the trade-off curve is determined by a number of other factors that can change over time. Rate of Wage Inflation Unemployment

Rate of Wage Inflation ( ) Unemployment Rate (U) U0 W0 W1 W2 1960s 1970s Early 1980s Progressively higher rates of wage inflation have become associated with any given level of unemployment. It is also possible that the Phillips curve has become much flatter over recent years, so that the decrease in wage inflation accompanying a 1% point increase in the unemployment rate is now smaller than it once was.

就業保險 之 失業給付 (一)失業給付 ─ 請領要件 非自願離職。(註1) 辦理退保當日前3年內,保險年資合計滿1年以上。 有工作能力與繼續工作意願。 向公立就業服務機構辦理求職登記,自求職登記之日 起14日內仍無法推介就業或安排職業訓練。 訂期契約工離職前1年內,契約期間合計滿6個月以上 ,且逾1個月未能就業者。 註1:指凡年滿十五歲以上,六十歲以下受僱之本國籍勞工,被 保險人因投保單位關廠、遷廠、休業、解散、破產宣告離職; 或因勞動基準法第十一條、第十三條但書、第十四條及第二十 條規定各款情事之一離職。

(二)相關法條 ─ 勞動基準法 第十一條 第一款 歇業或轉讓時。 第二款 虧損或業務緊縮時。 第三款 不可抗力暫停工作在一個月以上時 。 第一款 歇業或轉讓時。 第二款 虧損或業務緊縮時。 第三款 不可抗力暫停工作在一個月以上時 。 第四款 業務性質變更,有減少勞工之必要 ,又無適當工作可供安置時。 第五款 勞工對於所擔任之工作確不能勝任 時。 第十三條但書 雇主因天災、事變或其他不可抗力致事業不 能繼續,經報主管機關核定者。

(二)相關法條 ─ 勞動基準法 第十四條 第一項 第一款 雇主於訂立勞動契約時為虛偽之意思表示,使勞工誤信而 有受損害之虞者。 第十四條 第一項 第一款 雇主於訂立勞動契約時為虛偽之意思表示,使勞工誤信而 有受損害之虞者。 第二款 雇主、雇主家屬、雇主代理人對於勞工,實施暴行或有重 大侮辱之行為者。 第三款 契約所定之工作,對於勞工健康有危害之虞,經通知雇主 改善而無效果者。 第四款 雇主、雇主代理人或其他勞工患有惡性傳染病,有傳染之 虞者。 第五款 雇主不依勞動契約給付工作報酬,或對於按件計酬之勞工 不供給充分之工作者。 第六款 雇主違反勞動契約或勞工法令,致有損害勞工權益之虞者 。 第二十條 事業單位改組或轉讓時,依規定期間預告終止契約者。

(三)失業給付 ─ 給付規定 失業給付每月發給1次,按按申請人離職辦理本保險退保之當月 起前六個月平均月投保薪資60%計算。但申請人離職辦理本保 險退保時已年滿45歲或領有社政主管機關核發之身心障礙證明 者,最長發給9個月。 88年1月1日起繳納失業給付保險費未滿1年者,不得請願。 當次離職退保前繳納失業給付保險費滿1年以上者,最長以發放 6個月為限。 失業給付繳費年資,於每次領取6個月失業給付後,歸零重新計 算。 申請失業給付未滿6個月再參加本保險後非自願離職,得依規定 申領失業給付,但合併原已領取失業給付月數及依規定領取之 提早就業獎助津貼,以發給6個月為限。 依規定領滿6個月失業給付者,自領滿之日起二年內再次請領失 業給付,其失業給付以發給3個月為限。領滿3個月失業給付者 ,本保險年資應重行起算。