上海交通大学 国际与公共事务学院教授、博导 林冈

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1 上海交通大学 国际与公共事务学院教授、博导 林冈
台湾政治转型的原因 上海交通大学 国际与公共事务学院教授、博导 林冈

2 1.政治转型的观察视角 Modernization theory (developmental approach)
Economic growth, social equality, and pluralism are three compatible goals Economic growth that presupposes market freedom will lead to information (literacy, education and media) diffusion and social equality (equal distribution of social wealth)

3 现代化理论 social plurality, autonomy, differentiation, specialization
cultural secularization, individualization and rationalization rise of middle class and interest group political mobilization and competition democratic transition

4 Theories of Democratization
Two competitive paradigms (structure-agent debate) School of democratic conditions, or structure-oriented approach, assuming “political actors” face limited choice sets What makes democracy possible, and when? School of democratic process, focusing on the strategic moves of the actors Who wants democracy and how?

5 Socioeconomic Approach
Strengths theoretical elegance methodological measurability empirical verifiability Weakness the exact correlation between socioeconomic development and democratization The Predicting power of per capita GDP Taiwan, SK in 1970s, and Singapore

6 Methodological Problem?
Will a “modern dynamic pluralist society” necessarily lead to democracy? Socioeconomic developments as independent and continual variables Democratization as a dependent and dichotomous (democracy or non-democracy) variable Can we employ quantitative changes in social structure to explain a qualitative breakthrough in the political system?

7 Who Wants Democracy? Bourgeoisie in England and France
Military in Portuguese Organized workers in Poland Students in South Korea Native opposition groups in Taiwan

8 1.政治转型的观察视角 现代化理论（发展理论）的解释 政治过程论的解释 国民党温和派 国民党强硬派 党外温和派 党外激进派
经济增长（工业化，都市化），收入平等，教育水准提升，通讯发达，社会多元，文化世俗化，中产阶级的兴起 政治过程论的解释 朝野互动，内外结合 国民党温和派 国民党强硬派 党外温和派 党外激进派 （郑南榕）

9 Institution as an Independent Variable
Institutional change Institutional modification Political actor Old institution Institution stiffness Structural change

10 2.政治转型前的权力体制 “民有、民治、民享” （“宪政”架构）
Rule of the people, by the people, for the people 军政>>训政>>宪政 (还政于民） 权能分立 “国民大会”(national assembly) “五院” (行政、立法、司法、考试、监察）

11 2.政治转型前的权力体制 《动员戡乱时期临时条款》(Temporary articles during the period of mobilization for pacifying rebellion) 戒严法（martial law), “党禁”、“报禁” 威权统治、一党独大、强人统治、一身两任 “中常会”、“国安会”（太上“内阁”）

12 蒋经国的 “新人新政” 催台青（崔苔箐） Political recruitment (征召）
台湾化(李登辉, 连战, 吴伯雄) 青年化 (宋楚瑜, 马英九, 焦仁和) 选举层次的逐渐提升 （limited elections) 从县市长和省县议员选举到 “国民大会”、“立法院”的补选 (1969) 和增选 (1972)

13 3.外因诱发的合法性危机 一、价值危机与施政危机(performance crisis) 二、政治反对运动的兴起
党外地方势力的崛起(台北和高雄的改制) 雷震与《自由中国》(1960) 《大学杂志》>>>中坜事件>>“美丽岛”事件(1970年代) 许信良 施明德, 吕秀莲 陈水扁, 谢长廷，苏贞昌（寥落去） 党外公政会和编联会(新潮流)的路线之争 社会运动（social movement）的兴起

14 3.外因诱发的合法性危机 蒋经国的权力继承危机(“权威饥渴症”) 李焕(换) 王升(总政治作战部主任>>驻巴拉圭 “大使”)
身兼组工会主任, 革命实践研究院和 “ 反共救国团”三大要职 王升(总政治作战部主任>>驻巴拉圭 “大使”) 江南(刘宜良)事件与蒋孝武外放新加坡 美国国会 “四人帮”(索拉兹, 里奇等) 《蒋纬国报到》>>>兄终弟及??? 《千山独行》（cf.戴安国，戴定国 fm戴季陶)

15 1997年与李焕先生会面

16 三、外部形势的变化 In the beginning of the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations, especially from 1972 to 1982, the U.S. officials had accepted the prospects of peaceful reunification of China because of their strategic needs of “allying China to counterbalance the Soviet Union” (From Lin 2010, pp.27-30)

17 Can the U.S. Accept China’s Peaceful Unification？
The United States expressed its respect and understanding of Chinese interest in national unity soon after the two countries decided to launch the normalization process（始于乒乓外交）

18 Can the U.S. Accept China’s Peaceful Unification？
On July 9, 1971, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai told visiting National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger that “Taiwan Province is an inalienable of Chinese territory which must be resorted to the motherland.” Kissinger answered:

19 Can the U.S. Accept China’s Peaceful Unification？
As for the political future of Taiwan, we are not advocating a “two Chinas” solution or a “one China, one Taiwan” solution As a student of history, one’s prediction would have to be that the political evolution is likely to be in the direction which Prime Minister Chou En-Lai indicated to me One China solution

20 Can the U.S. Accept China’s Peaceful Unification？
In May 1978, U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski told Deng Xiaoping that the United States hoped the Taiwan question would be solved peacefully and eventually one China will become a reality

21 Can the U.S. Accept China’s Peaceful Unification？
On September 30, 1981, Ye Jianying, chairman of National People’s Congress Standing Committee of the PRC, made the “nine-point proposal” on China’s peaceful reunification. U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig openly appreciated it and even suggested Taipei to respond to it positively

22 Conclusion Theoretic hypothesis
The more strategic cooperation between the United States and China in the globe affairs, the more likely that Washington might consider China’s core interests in Taiwan and accept, more or less, peaceful reunification of China (verified)