再生能源躉購電價與競標機制的整合 許志義.

Presentation on theme: "再生能源躉購電價與競標機制的整合 許志義."— Presentation transcript:

1 再生能源躉購電價與競標機制的整合 許志義

2 Selected Indicators Unit 2008 2009 2010 Global new investment in renewable energy (annual) billion USD 130 160 211 Renewable power capacity (existing, not including hydro) GW 200 250 312 (existing, including hydro) 1150 1230 1320 Hydropower capacity (existing) 950 980 1010 Wind power capacity(existing) 121 159 198 Solar PV capacity(existing) 16 23 40 Solar PV cell capacity (capacity) 6.9 11 24 Solar hot water capacity(existing) GWth 185 Ethanol production(annual) billion liters 67 76 86 Biodiesel production(annual) 12 17 19 Countries with policy targets # 79 89 96 States/provinces/countries with feed-in policies＊ 71 82 87 States/provinces/countries with RPS/quota policies 60 61 63 States/provinces/countries with biofuels mandates 55 57 Source:Renewables 2011,Global Status Report,REN 21,P15

3 臺灣再生能源電能躉購費率 項目 型態 級距(kW) 2011費率 (元/度) 2010費率 變動(%) 太陽光電系統 屋頂型
≧1~<10 ＊ (相當於無設備補助 ) -29.34 ≧10~<100 9.1799 -29.23 ≧100~<500 8.8241 -31.98 ≧ 500 7.9701 -28.32 地上型 無區分 7.3297 -34.08 風力 陸上 7.3562 7.2714 1.17 ≧10＊＊ 2.6138 2.3834 9.67 離岸 5.5626 4.1982 32.5 川流式水力發電 -- 2.1821 2.0615 5.85 地熱能 4.8039 5.1838 -7.33 生質能 廢棄物衍生燃料 2.6875 2.0879 28.72 其他 2011和2010年相比，太陽光電躉購費率為下降(由於2011年太陽光電設備成本下降迅速)，風力、川流式水力發電、地熱能、生質能、廢棄物衍生燃料、其他為上升。 陸域風力、離岸風力、水力、生質能與廢棄物之躉購費率均優於99年水準，其中離岸風力發電、廢棄物之躉購費率成長率更分別較99年度提高32%、28%。 陽光電近年來技術進步快速、成本大幅下降，故其費率訂定也反映政府以成本概念，審慎、逐步、有次序、採循序漸進的方式，擇其成本低者、技術相對成熟者優先推動之政策思維。另，考量國際發展趨勢、國土利用、國內土地資源有限等因素，現階段太陽光電以屋頂型為優先發展場址，並區分為4個級距，以住宅所有權人於自有屋頂設置1kW以上不及10kW太陽光電為最優先鼓勵對象(故其躉購費率降幅相較地上型太陽光電系統低)；基於國土整體規劃，地面型太陽光電現階段不鼓勵設置，故在費率水準的訂定也一併加以考量。(資料來源：臺灣中小型風力機發展協會 註＊ :1kW以上未達10kW太陽光電99年公告再生能源躉購費率另提供5萬元/Kw設備補助，100年則不另提供5萬元/Kw設備補助。 註＊ ＊ ：依規定須加裝LVRT者，則費率為2.6574元/度。 Source:經濟部能源局

4 FIT與競標制度(1/2) 對IPP來說，大型發電技術應適用FIT: AC(邊際成本+合理利潤)=P
小型：不同廠商間，每KW平均成本(AC)有差異，因總裝置容量<10KW，整體差異不大。 大型：總裝置容量、每KW平均成本差異大，收購期間長，整體差異很大，不符技術效率和公平原則下，經長時間累積(20年),潛在利潤高。(競租→泡沫化) AC(邊際成本+合理利潤)=P

5 FIT與競標制度(2/2) 制度可能影響小型分散式發電技術推廣，影響裝設意願及連帶產業效益，從而無法發揮”聚沙成塔”效果。 價格搜尋成本。
議價成本。 契約成本。 行政單位監管成本。 交易成本

6 RAM ( Renewable Auction Mechanism)
The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) voted unanimously in December ,2010 California Renewable Auction Mechanism(RAM)，which is a new mechanism to require IOUs to purchase electricity from various renewable technologies with capacity smaller than 20MW. Three largest IOUs in California (SCE,PG&E and SDG&E) would participate in a pilot program to hold two auctions biannually and the bid will be awarded starting from the lowest cost and viable programs until capacity per auction was filled with total program capacity 761 MW in 2 years. The first auction will be hold in the fourth quarter 2011. SCE’s procurement obligation may be reduced by the capacity represented in the 21 contracts it has executed from its 2010 Renewables Standard Contract solicitation. Further more, SEC may elect to submit additional contracts resulting from its 2010 RSC solicitation via a Tier 3 advice letter ,however,these additional contracts and associated capacity will not reduce SCE’s procurement obligations under RAM. Source: CPUC Resolution 4414,P56 IOUs Total Program Capacity(MW) per auction(MW) SCE 259.4 65 PG&E 420.9 105.2 SDG&E 80.7 20.2 Total 761 190.25 Source: visit 2011/08/28 CPUC Resolution 4414

7 RAM Program Overview State California
Eligible Renewable/Other Technologies Solar Thermal Electric, Photovoltaics, Landfill Gas, Wind, Biomass, Geothermal Electric, Municipal Solid Waste, Anaerobic Digestion, Small Hydroelectric, Tidal Energy, Wave Energy, Ocean Thermal, Biodiesel, Fuel Cells using Renewable Fuels Applicable Sectors Commercial, Industrial Authority 1: Date Enacted: CPUC Decision /16/2010 Authority 2: Date Enacted: CPUC Resolution /18/2011 Source: DSIRE website visit 2011/08/27

8 RAM Key Program Elements(1/2)
Key Elements Standard Contract 1.Flexibillity in contract language :Simple, non-negotiable contract approved by CPUC. 2.IOU would sign contract with winner bidders. 3.Minimum contract size (1 MW) and maximum contract size(20MW): projects greater or equal to 500kW can aggregate to meet the minimum criteria as long as they interconnect to the same p-node and contracting size not greater than 5MW. 4.Contract Length:10,15, or 20 years. 5.Length of Time to COD: Project must be online within 18 months of CPUC approval with one 6-month extension for regulatory delays. Sellers can request a contract extension with a 60-day notice in advance to guaranteed commercial operation date(COD). Product Firm( baseload): geothermal and biomass Non-firm peaking(peaking as-available) :solar Non-firm non-peaking(non-peaking as-available) electricity: solar+ wind Project Viability Minimum requirement for participating in the auction: 1.Site control: bidders must show 100% site control through direct ownership, leasing or and option to lease or purchase upon award of RAM contracts. 2.Commercialized Technology. 3.Development Experience: At least one member has completed or begun at least one project with similar capacity and technology. 4.Interconnection Application: proof having filed interconnection application and completed a System-Impact Study, etc. RAM Standard Contract: However,each utility should begin with contracts that has already vetted by stakeholders through another CPUC Program Seller concentration :IOUs could choose to apply a seller concentration limit after the bids are received. PG&E is authorized to apply a seller concentration limit of 20MW per seller per auction. 售電者可選擇全數收購或餘電收購；REC亦適用此制度，用來表示售電者售 電量、電業購買量。 Source: Summarized from CPUC Resolution 4414(2011);G&E advise letters,SDG&Eadvise letters(2011),SCE advise letters(2011)

9 RAM Key Program Elements(2/2)
Bids Selection 1.Market-Based Pricing: Bids will be selected starting with the lowest cost until capacity per auction is filled. 2.IOUs could use approve methods describing in its advise letters implementing RAM to normalize(adjust) bids to place them on an equivalent basis; estimated transmission network upgrade costs should be accounted in ranking bids. Streamlined Procurement 1.Contract must have CPUC staff approval before executing. 2.Price, terms and conditions are non-negotiable. Transparency 1.Annual program forums to collect feedbacks . 2.Project development milestones and annual progress report from the utility, biannual progress report from the developers. 3. Program data is Publicly available. Source: CPUC Resolution 4414,PG&E advise letters,SDG&E advise letters,SCE advise letters

10 Intentions of RAM Purchase price is determined by auction and is non-negotiable price. Developers would bid at a price close to or slightly higher than cost. Reduced Transaction Costs Developers who were awarded bids will sign long-tern contracts with IOUs and electricity generated will be purchased with bid price over a fixed period. Strengthen Policy Clarity Avoid administration costs of regularly adjusting prices and related disputes. Help California to achieve its RPS target more quickly. Encourage developers to offer more efficient generating technologies. Rate is more market-oriented and reflecting generating costs. Avoid administration costs for regularly adjusting prices and possible disputes. Independent Evaluators are hired to ascertain cost -competitiveness and project integrity, their comments are required for CPUC’s approval of bids. Performance Deposits and Development Deposits are required Take Market,Utility,Regulators and Ratepayers into Consideration

11 Differences between RAM and FIT
Under RAM，electricity generated from the same technology could receive different prices while under FIT, they would be purchased with the same price. Three IOUs participating in this pilot program (SCE,PG&E,SDG&E) could reject uncompetitive price or bids susceptible of market manipulation。 Unsubscribed or subscribed amount dropped out of the program would be left for the next auction. RAM relies on: Market-based pricing Utilizes project viability screens Select projects based on least cost rather than on a first-come first-served basis at an administratively determined price. Source: Decision adopting the renewable auction mechanism by CRPSP,P2. Source: Advise letters from PG&E ,P3.

12 Similarities between RAM and FIT
Purchase price could be adjusted by TOD(Time of Delivery) under RAM:sellers will be paid the contract price multiplied by applicable TOD factor in each hour. PG&E: TOD Factors for Each TOD Period Period 1.Super-Peak 2.Shoulder 3.Night A. June-September B. Oct-Dec,Jan&Feb C. Mar-May TOD factors in the table are consistent with factors shown in PG&E ‘s draft 2010 RPS Protocol. Source: Advise letters from PG&E.

13 FIT RAM 交易成本：FIT與RAM比較 行政、監督管制成本高 小用戶價格搜尋成本高 技術進步快，無適當參考價格 一般用戶難分析回收期限
議價成本高 行政監督管制成本低 RAM

14 FIT和RAM相異處 FIT、RPS併行國家 Protection Mechanism：public interests first。
RAM could achieve "competitive market” And ”reduced transaction costs” 考量交易成本和規模經濟，小型發電技術適用FIT制度，大型技術適用RPS FIT、RPS併行國家 對小型再生能源發電計畫(project)，RAM能達成競爭市場和降低交易成本雙目標 保護機制：若IOU認為計劃不利於用電戶利益，可拒絕。 對可進入簡易契約審查的計劃設置裝置容量上下。 Discretion:當發現有操控市場、非競爭價格時，IOU可拒絕此類計畫，即使未達目標容量(authorized capacity)亦無妨。 RAM特別點出競爭市場的原因：加州一些過去案例發現：the market for smaller scale projects appearing robust with a significant number of competing sellers.

15 FIT,RPS和RAM制度比較 項目 FIT制度 RPS制度 RAM 再生能源費率決定 政府主導集合產學界意見決定合理躉購費率
價格取決市場供需且需建立電能或REC憑證交易平台 Bid a price close to or slightly higher than cost 再生能源投資風險 業者可掌握每期現金流量，降低營運風險 投資風險受電力市場價格波動影響。 IOUs purchase electricity with the bid price for a fixed period and bidders would sign a long-term contract with the IOUs. 電業義務 電業具強制躉購再生能源義務 電業具強制配比再生能源義務 Certain capacity was required to be purchased through RAM. 電力市場適用性 無特殊限制 適用電業自由競爭市場 Competitive generating market 電價反應方式 增加成本完全反映至用電戶電費 增加成本依市場機制，由電業與電力消費吸收 Costs would be reflected on bundled consumers. 制度特性 1.按再生能源發電成本訂 定費率。 2.固定費率使業者可掌握每 期現金流量，降低業者 營運風險。 3.利用能量費率及成本標竿， 鼓勵再生能源資源較優 區域及經營效率較佳業 者優先進入市場，並給 予業者提高發電量之誘 因，以提升再生能源經 濟效益。 4.躉購費率定期檢討，據遞 減傾向，引導技術進步 以降低成本。 1.電力市場供需機制 決定收購價格。 2.訂定未達義務罰 則。 3.市場競爭引導技術 進步以降低成本。 4.市場偏好較具經濟 效益之再生能源。 1.Market-based and non-negotiable price(contract). 2.Avoid administration costs for regularly adjusting prices and possible disputes. 3.Performance and Development Deposits was required to protect ratepayers and utilities. 4.Flexibility in constructing its own contracts with some required standard terms. 5.Independent Evaluators are hired to ascertain cost -competitiveness and project integrity, their comments are required for CPUC’s approval of bids. 6.IOUs are generally responsible for monitoring project performance. 7.Experienced Participants. 8. Acceptance of additional voluntary procurement. 9.Adjustment of Procurement Capacity. Source:王勤銓(2011)，國際再生能源推廣制度發展及電能躉購制度，臺灣經濟研究月刊第34卷第7期，p49。 Decision ，

16 結論 再生能源躉購制度vs.競標機制： RPS制度vs.RAM制度： 再生能源收購價格透過市場機制決定，政府干預程度遠低於FIT制度。
加州RAM競標制度先導計畫(Pilot Program)值得密切關注。 RPS制度vs.RAM制度： 再生能源收購價格透過市場機制決定，政府干預程度遠低於FIT制度。 RAM能針對尖離峰不同再生能源發電技術分別進行 SCE already had 19.4% of electricity generated from renewables in 2011 which is the largest share among 3000 utilities in the U.S. Hawaii’s HECO planned to achieve 25%, 40% electricity generated from renewables in 2020 and 2030 respectively. Estimated 300 MW new, firm generating capacity would be needed for HECO to replace lost capacity from 4 generating units to be retired in next 10 years and growing load demand with solicitation for proposals planned in 2011. SCE有20%的再生能源發電。(3000多家發電公司中最高) 夏威夷2020:25%(HECO) 2030:40% Source: