《饗宴篇》中的「愛」與 「理型世界」 國立台灣大學哲學系 苑舉正

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1 《饗宴篇》中的「愛」與 「理型世界」 國立台灣大學哲學系 苑舉正
【本著作除另有註明外，採取創用CC「姓名標示－非商業性－相同方式分享」台灣3.0版授權釋出】 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊，依據Microsoft服務合約及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用

2 《饗宴篇》(The Symposium) 公認是是柏拉圖對話錄 中，最受歡迎的一篇，因為在這篇對話錄中，柏拉圖 處理的是有關「愛」的起源、目的與本質。
在這一篇對話錄中，「愛」這個議題，由七位人士分 別針對「愛」(Eros)發言，並且經由發言的次序，展 現深入討論的層次感，最終符應了柏拉圖的理型理念。

3 這七個人是： Phaedrus （柏拉圖對話錄中的對話角色）, Pausanias （法律專家）, Eryximachus （醫生）, Aristophanes （有名的劇作家）, Agathon（主人與有名的劇作家）, Socrates and Alcibiades（知名的雅典公民，以俊美著稱）。

4 閱讀《饗宴篇》之前，應當注意的幾件事： 因為蘇格拉底的另一位學生Xenophon也寫過《饗宴 篇》，其中Xenophon對於「性愛享受論」提出蔑視的 態度。從這一點，可以說明，古希臘人對於性愛的態 度並非一致，也非想像中那麼「開放」。 EROS不是性愛，而是神話故事中的一位神。 這是飲酒作樂的場合，所以說出來的話，是少數對話 錄中不是以「對話」，而是以「演講」的方式所進行 的結果。 這極有可能是一場虛構的故事，即使該饗宴發生的時 間與地點皆清楚地註記出來。

5 內容重點： 主人Agathon在西元前416年的酒神節，因為慶祝一篇 劇作的成功演出，舉辦一場「饗宴」。 在饗宴中，有人提議讚美愛。
有七個人針對「愛」發表意見。 這個「愛」，基本上是對於年輕男性所展現的「愛」。 蘇格拉底透過一個神媒(Diotima)對他所說的內容，發 展欲、美、理型、永恆與不變的理念。 柏拉圖透過這一連串的對話，有意以形上學的理型， 取代蘇格拉底想要追求美的心理狀態。

6 我們的討論：首先是Phaedrus Phaedrus在一開始引用希臘神話，說Eros是最早的 神，沒有父母。因此，「愛」的唯一功用，就是引 發他所愛的對象之仰慕。例如在戰場中展現英勇的 精神，如此贏得仰慕。這是戰勝所有戰爭的關鍵， 因為相愛的人，會為了愛，甚至犧牲性命亦在所不 惜。Archilles就是一個例子。他為了替愛人 Patroclus復仇，即使知道會犧牲也依然勇往直前。 因此，愛是具有強大力量的神。

7 Pausanias跟著Phaedrus說，與愛結合的美，不是 Aphrodite Pandemos (對於一般人的美)，因為這種美的 對象，往往只是男生與女人。與美結合的愛，是 Aphrodite Urania (天上的美), 完全來自於男性，而且不 包含任何含混。 這種愛的對象通常是針對比較年長的男性。Pausanias認 為有關對於同性戀的態度，各地不盡相同，但他特別提 到雅典的法律，並認為不好理解。主要原因是，雅典的 法律將同性戀中男孩首肯的理由做出具有道德意義的區 分。為了金錢與權力而陷入同性之愛的行為，應予蔑視， 而為了智慧與德行所作的，則無傷人性尊嚴。

8 Eryximachus從醫學的眼光中說，愛是影響健康的 內在因素，是幸福的來源，讓人能夠與高層的人、 聖人、神結合在一起。

9 Aristophanes開始講一個有關為什麼愛讓人覺得 「圓滿」的故事。早先人長的是兩個身軀和在一起 的樣子，具有強大的力量，並有三種性別：男性、 女性與雌雄同體(androgynous)。它們最終冒犯宙斯， 所以遭天打雷劈，從中間分成兩塊，然後從背部縫 起來，成為人。從此，人就到處找尋他的另一半， 因為他們都想恢復原有的本質。

10 Agathon開始埋怨，所以直到他為止的演說，都是 針對愛的特質，但是沒有人針對愛神發表觀點。他 說，愛神是永遠年輕的神，並且對抗老化，適合年 輕的人。

11 Alcibiades直接向蘇格拉底示愛，令蘇覺得有些恐怖， 還要求Alcibiades別因為他坐在Agathon旁邊而生氣。 Alcibiades認為他直接用愛來說明蘇格拉底，他就像是 一具外表醜陋，但內部充滿金像的雕像。他說，聽見 蘇講話時，他得靈魂發生悸動，改變生命的價值，並 覺得慚愧。尤其是，當他認識蘇的內心世界時，他覺 得其靈魂展現只有神才會有的特質，令他立即信服， 言聽計從。當Alcibiades求愛失敗時，他體認他必須作 最好的人才能成功。為了達到這一點，他要蘇格拉底 能夠幫助他、教導他。蘇格拉底的回答是，如果他真 的有用，他願意以真實的印象與Alcibiades的俊美印象 並列。但如果他沒用，就幫不了忙了。

12 Russell says: What is the difference between "knowledge" and ''opinion"? The man who has knowledge has knowledge of something, that is to say, of something that exists, for what does not exist is nothing. (This is reminiscent of Parmenides.) Thus knowledge is infallible, since it is logically impossible for it to be mistaken. But opinion can be mistaken. How can this be? Opinion cannot be of what is not, for that is impossible ; nor of what is, for then it would be knowledge. Therefore opinion must be of what both is and is not. But how is this possible ?

13 Russell says: The answer is that particular things always partake of opposite characters: what is beautiful is also, in some respects, ugly; what is just is, in some respects, unjust; and so on. All particular sensible objects, so Plato contends, have this contradictory character; they are thus intermediate between being and not-being, and are suitable as objects of opinion, but not of knowledge. "But those who see the absolute and eternal and immutable may be said to know, and not to have opinion only."

14 饗宴篇--Diotima May I ask you further, Whether love is the love of something or of nothing? Yet let me ask you one more question in order to illustrate my meaning: Is not a brother to be regarded essentially as a brother of something? And now, said Socrates, I will ask about Love:— Is Love of something or of nothing? Of something, surely, he replied. Keep in mind what this is, and tell me what I want to know — whether Love desires that of which love is. And does he possess, or does he not possess, that which he loves and desires? Probably not, I should say. Very good. Would he who is great, desire to be great, or he who is strong, desire to be strong? No.

15 饗宴篇--Diotima True. For he who is anything cannot want to be that which he is? Very true. Then, said Socrates, he desires that what he has at present may be preserved to him in the future, which is equivalent to saying that he desires something which is non-existent to him, and which as yet he has not got: Very true, he said. Then he and every one who desires, desires that which he has not already, and which is future and not present, and which he has not, and is not, and of which he is in want;— these are the sort of things which love and desire seek?

16 Then now, said Socrates, let us recapitulate the argument
Then now, said Socrates, let us recapitulate the argument. First, is not love of something, and of something too which is wanting to a man? Yes, he replied. And if this is true, Love is the love of beauty and not of deformity? He assented. And the admission has been already made that Love is of something which a man wants and has not? True, he said. Then Love wants and has not beauty? Certainly, he replied. And would you call that beautiful which wants and does not possess beauty? Certainly not.

17 Then would you still say that love is beautiful?
Is not the good also the beautiful? Yes. Then in wanting the beautiful, love wants also the good? I cannot refute you, Socrates And now, taking my leave of you, I would rehearse a tale of love which I heard from Diotima of Mantineia. I must speak first of the being and nature of Love, and then of his works. 1. First I said to her in nearly the same words which he used to me, that Love was a mighty god, 2. Love was neither fair nor good. ‘What do you mean, Diotima,’ I said, ‘is love then evil and foul?’

18 Hush,’ she cried; ‘must that be foul which is not fair?’
‘Certainly,’ I said. ‘And is that which is not wise, ignorant? Do you not see that there is a mean between wisdom and ignorance?’ ‘And what may that be?’ I said. ‘Right opinion,’ she replied; ‘which, as you know, being incapable of giving a reason, is not knowledge (for how can knowledge be devoid of reason? nor again, ignorance, for neither can ignorance attain the truth), but is clearly something which is a mean between ignorance and wisdom.’ ‘Quite true,’ I replied. ‘Do not then insist,’ she said, ‘that what is not fair is of necessity foul, or what is not good evil; or infer that because love is not fair and good he is therefore foul and evil; for he is in a mean between them.’ ‘Well,’ I said, ‘Love is surely admitted by all to be a great god.’ ‘By those who know or by those who do not know?’

19 ‘By all.’ ‘And how, Socrates,’ she said with a smile, ‘can Love be acknowledged to be a great god by those who say that he is not a god at all?’ ‘And who are they?’ I said. ‘You and I are two of them,’ she replied. ‘How can that be?’ I said. ‘It is quite intelligible,’ she replied; ‘for you yourself would acknowledge that the gods are happy and fair — of course you would — would you dare to say that any god was not?’ ‘Certainly not,’ I replied. ‘And you mean by the happy, those who are the possessors of things good or fair?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘And you admitted that Love, because he was in want, desires those good and fair things of which he is in want?’ ‘Yes, I did.’

20 ‘But how can he (Love) be a god who has no portion in what is either good or fair?’ ‘Impossible.’ ‘Then you see that you also deny the divinity of Love.’ ‘What then is Love?’ I asked; ‘Is he mortal?’ ‘No.’ ‘What then?’ ‘As in the former instance, he is neither mortal nor immortal, but in a mean between the two.’ ‘What is he, Diotima?’ ‘He is a great spirit (daimon), and like all spirits he is intermediate between the divine and the mortal.’ ‘And what,’ I said, ‘is his power?’

21 ‘He interprets,’ she replied, ‘between gods and men, conveying and taking across to the gods the prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the commands and replies of the gods; he is the mediator who spans the chasm which divides them, and therefore in him all is bound together, and through him the arts of the prophet and the priest, their sacrifices and mysteries and charms, and all prophecy and incantation, find their way.

22 For God mingles not with man; but through Love all the intercourse and converse of God with man, whether awake or asleep, is carried on. The wisdom which understands this is spiritual all other wisdom, such as that of arts and handicrafts, is mean and vulgar. Now these spirits or intermediate powers are many and diverse, and one of them is Love.’

23 ‘And who,’ I said, ‘was his father, and who his mother
‘And who,’ I said, ‘was his father, and who his mother?’ ‘The tale,’ she said, ‘will take time; nevertheless I will tell you. On the birthday of Aphrodite there was a feast of the gods, at which the god Poros or Plenty, who is the son of Metis or Discretion, was one of the guests. When the feast was over, Penia or Poverty, as the manner is on such occasions, came about the doors to beg. Now Plenty who was the worse for nectar (there was no wine in those days), went into the garden of Zeus and fell into a heavy sleep, and Poverty considering her own straitened circumstances, plotted to have a child by him, and accordingly she lay down at his side and conceived Love, who partly because he is naturally a lover of the beautiful, and because Aphrodite is herself beautiful, and also because he was born on her birthday, is her follower and attendant.

24 And as his parentage is, so also are his fortunes
And as his parentage is, so also are his fortunes. In the first place he is always poor, and anything but tender and fair, as the many imagine him; and he is rough and squalid, and has no shoes, nor a house to dwell in; on the bare earth exposed he lies under the open heaven, in the streets, or at the doors of houses, taking his rest; and like his mother he is always in distress. Like his father too, whom he also partly resembles, he is always plotting against the fair and good; he is bold, enterprising, strong, a mighty hunter, always weaving some intrigue or other, keen in the pursuit of wisdom, fertile in resources; a philosopher at all times, terrible as an enchanter, sorcerer, sophist.

25 He is by nature neither mortal nor immortal, but alive and flourishing at one moment when he is in plenty, and dead at another moment, and again alive by reason of his father’s nature. But that which is always flowing in is always flowing out, and so he is never in want and never in wealth; and, further, he is in a mean between ignorance and knowledge. The truth of the matter is this: No god is a philosopher or seeker after wisdom, for he is wise already; nor does any man who is wise seek after wisdom. Neither do the ignorant seek after wisdom. For herein is the evil of ignorance, that he who is neither good nor wise is nevertheless satisfied with himself: he has no desire for that of which he feels no want.’ ‘But who then, Diotima,’ I said, ‘are the lovers of wisdom, if they are neither the wise nor the foolish?’

26 ‘A child may answer that question,’ she replied; ‘they are those who are in a mean between the two; Love is one of them. For wisdom is a most beautiful thing, and Love is of the beautiful; and therefore Love is also a philosopher or lover of wisdom, and being a lover of wisdom is in a mean between the wise and the ignorant. And of this too his birth is the cause; for his father is wealthy and wise, and his mother poor and foolish. Such, my dear Socrates, is the nature of the spirit Love.

27 The error in your conception of him was very natural, and as I imagine from what you say, has arisen out of a confusion of love and the beloved, which made you think that love was all beautiful. For the beloved is the truly beautiful, and delicate, and perfect, and blessed; but the principle of love is of another nature, and is such as I have described.’ When a man loves the beautiful, what does he desire?’ I answered her ‘That the beautiful may be his.’ ‘Still,’ she said, ‘the answer suggests a further question: What is given by the possession of beauty?’ ‘To what you have asked,’ I replied, ‘I have no answer ready.’

28 ‘Then,’ she said, ‘let me put the word “good” in the place of the beautiful, and repeat the question once more: If he who loves loves the good, what is it then that he loves?’ ‘The possession of the good,’ I said. ‘And what does he gain who possesses the good?’ ‘Happiness,’ I replied; ‘there is less difficulty in answering that question.’ ‘Yes,’ she said, ‘the happy are made happy by the acquisition of good things. Nor is there any need to ask why a man desires happiness; the answer is already final.’ ‘You are right.’ I said. ‘And is this wish and this desire common to all? and do all men always desire their own good, or only some men?— what say you?’

29 版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權圖示 來源/作者 1-29 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊，依據Microsoft服務合約及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。 6-11 Phaedrus在……就幫不了忙了。 《對話錄》＜饗宴篇＞，柏拉圖。 12-13 What is the difference ……opinion only History of Western Philosophy，作者：Bertrand Russell， 出版社：Routledge，出版日期：2004年2月2日，p.122。 依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。 14-28 May I ask you further……?— what say you