Anti-Inland nuclear power plant activists’ media strategies, impacts and challenges A case study on Jiangxi Pengze project and Wang Jiang Si Lao 江西彭澤核電項目“望江四老”的個案研究 DENG, Lifeng 鄧理峰 School of Communication Sun Yat-sen University Guangzhou, China dlfeng@sysu.edu.cn June 9, 2017

Outline The inland nuclear power debate The Case:Wang Jiang Si Lao and the Jiangxi Pengze Project (2012-now) My research: methods and preliminary findings

The inland nuclear power debate Some background information for the case Wang Jiang Si Lao

The State-of-art of China’s nuclear power plants 36 operating and 21 under construction (May 2017) http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/china-nuclear-power.aspx

Newly built units grow fast over the past five years Units operating Units added Units under construction 201705 36 8(?) 21 201612 35 7 201512 28 6 201412 22 5 201312 17

The inland nuclear debates After the Fukushima accident in 2011, several European countries, such as Germany, Italy, Switzerland, etc. chose to phase out nuclear power. In China, there also has been fierce debates on whether or not to construct inland nuclear power plants after 2011. These are called “inland nuclear debates” in China. And the debate centering on the Pengze Project was regarded as the starting point of the inland nuclear debate, which has been going on since 2012.

Anti-Inland nuclear power plant activists in Mainland China

Three types of Anti-Inland NPP activists in Mainland China Based on their distance from the decision power, I try to differentiate three types of activists: Activist type Representative figure or organizations TYPE 1 In-system political, cultural, and technology elites 中國科學院何祚庥院士, He Zuoxiu； 王亦楠研究員 Wang Yinan, Researcher in Energy Policy, State Council’s Think Tank, Development Research Center（highly productive in writing anti-nuclear artilces）； 全國政協委員(NPPCC)、河北遠洋運輸集團董事長高彥明（核電行業的批評者）；-安邦諮詢董事長陳功, Cheng Gong, Chairman, Anbound Consulting Former Vice Minister of Nuclear Industry Ministry 李玉侖（核電非清潔能源,2015）； 北京大學物理學院副教授雷奕安（核電行業的長期批評者）； 原中核集團總工程師溫鴻鈞/核電專家張祿慶（AP1000技術的批評者） ； TYPE 2 Stakeholders of Nuclear Projects 安徽望江縣民意代表“望江四老”（江西彭澤核電項目利益方）； 廣西防城港及北海市人大常委會（防城港/北海核電項目利益方，suspended）； 山東濱州市人大和政協（河北海興核電專案利益方，under construction， another nuclear project located on the inter provincial boundary） TYPE 3 Citizen Activists Blog post “Nuclear Power will ruin China” authored by 吳輝(soil chemistry engineer, Teacher, Hunan Loudi Vocation College) forwarded by more than 1 million times. 湖北武漢“百湖之友”張承建, NGO President, Friends of Hundred Lakes 網友“太極驢老董”（董毅，Retired civil servant, Shenzhen Environment Protection Bureau）  李兆民（湖南益陽，Retired Engineer, CNNC, now lived in Hunan Yiyang, where is close to Taohuajiang Nuclear Project）

Mapping the social network among anti-nuclear power plant activists in China Sharply criticize China’s nuclear policy in 2009 Early opponent of AP 1000 Leading member: The Retiered Business man Active Citizen Smog problem NP little effect on Smog

Continued Development Fierce disputes regarded as one of the main reasons for the inland nuclear power stagnation Summary Table of the progression of inland nuclear debates from 2012-2016 表：(內陸核電爭議事態梳理表（2012-2016） 階段 時間 關鍵節點 具體事態 Emergence 初始階段 2012年2月-2012年12月 2月7日，《關於請求停止江西彭澤核電廠建設的報告》曝光並在網路上流傳。 2月8日，中科院院士何祚庥撰文《堅決反對在內陸建核電站》，公開反對建設內陸核電站。 10月，國務院常務會議通過了《核電安全規劃（2011—2020年）》和《核電中長期發展規劃（2011—2020年）》，明確表示2015年之前將不會建設內陸核電。內陸核電進入“冰封期”。 在這一階段，以望江四老及何祚庥為首的反核派人士，指出彭澤專案在選址、公眾聽證等多項程式上存在問題，並呼籲取消該專案。內陸核電爭議由此拉開序幕。如果說政府決議2015年之前不安排內陸核電項目，那某種意義上也是反核派的階段性勝利。 Development 發展階段 2013年3月-2013年12月 2013年3月4日，全國人大湖南代表團建議“儘早啟動內陸核電項目建設、並將桃花江核電站列為首個內陸示範核電站”。 2013年5月31日，中國核能行業協會組織專家學者公佈內陸核電廠環境影響評估報告，指出計畫建設中的內陸核電項目符合安全標準，不會對環境和公眾健康造成影響，更不會發生類似日本福島的嚴重事故。 該階段，也就是2013年，我國霧霾問題日益加劇，內陸核電重啟呼聲四起。 Climax 高潮階段 2014年1月-2015年3月 2014年1月9日，以“核電和清潔能源發展”為主題的政協“雙周會”召開。何祚庥也應邀出席。會議就核電問題展開討論，但並未取得共識。 2014年3月3日，全國兩會湖南人大代表團再提議重啟內陸核電建設。 在該階段，王亦楠成為新一代反核意見領袖。王亦楠數次公開發文並接受眾多媒體採訪，致使內陸核電爭議於2014年達到輿論的高潮。 2014年4月16日，國務院發展研究中心研究員王亦楠發表文章《內陸核電不適合我國國情》，引起巨大的反響。 Continued Development 繼續發展階段 2015年3月-2016年3月 2015年3月，湖南代表團第三次聯名呼籲重啟內陸核電。 2015年3月9日，何祚庥和王亦楠聯名發表文章《湘鄂贛三省發展核電安全風險不容低估》，該文在網路廣泛傳播。 在該階段，內陸核電重啟的聲音並未止息，以何祚庥和王亦楠為代表的反核派依舊活躍。較以往不同的是，在這個階段，挺核派的回應及發聲開始變得頻繁。雙方話語的爭奪及權力的博弈構成了中國內陸核電特殊的輿論氛圍。 2015年10月12日，王亦楠發表《力主“內陸核電重啟”的專家，王亦楠請你回答十個問題》，文章迅速在網路及社交平臺上火速傳播。 2016年3月4日，趙成昆，周如明，毛亞蔚，翁明輝通過中國核電行業協會網站發佈《就王亦楠研究員有關內陸核電安全的質疑談談我們的看法》，此文針對王亦楠的問題做出了一一回應。 2016年兩會期間，湖南代表團連續第四年，在全國兩會遞交“重啟核電的建議”，呼籲2016年啟動內陸核電建設。

The Case: Wang Jiang Si Lao and the Jiangxi Pengze Project (2012-now)

Jiangxi Pengze Project: The Basics Evolution： In 1982, in the process of nuclear plant siting nationwide, the Pengze site was selected as the “exceptional ideal NPP site”, because of its geographical features (e.g. stable geological formation, away from active earthquake zones, close to large water body, and atmospheric dispersion, etc.) In Dec. 2005, Pengze was recommended as a candidate site with priority by Jiangxi province and China Power Investment Group. In Feb. 2008, National Development and Reform Committee (NDRC) initiated the construction of the inland nuclear power plant, and the Pengze Project became one of the first three pioneer projects, with the other two being the Hunan Tao Hua Jiang, and Hubei Xianing Projects. In Oct. 2010, the Pengze Project began. So far about 3 billion Yuan has been invested. The whole project is estimated to be 100 billion yuan in investment, which would be the biggest industrial project in Jiangxi since 1949. After the Fukushima incident in 2011, China launched a comprehensive nuclear safety inspection nation wide. The Pengze Project has been suspended since then. Reasons for Suspension: Fukushima Accident + Anhui Wangjiang Protest + National nuclear policy adjustment since 2012. Anhui Province Wangjiang County Nuclear Power Plant Pengze County Jiangxi Province

Why research on the Pengze Project? The uniqueness of the Pengze Project: 1. One of the pioneer inland nuclear power plants in China and once regarded to be the first one in China. It has been suspended since 2011. 2. The most disputed project among the pioneer three inland projects, which put it into public spotlight and later the premier made instructions on it Aug. 2012. In Oct. 2012, Executive meeting of the State Council decided to suspend inland NPPs in the 12th Five Year Plan. 4 years later in the formalized the 13th Five Year Plan, this sanction remained and the central government’s position remained unchanged: Although there is active preparatory work for inland nuclear power plants, no new project have been approved。 3.Pengze Project became the benchmark and bottleneck case for inland NPP in China, which undoubtedly will impact the strategic structure and layout of NPP in China. 3 key nuclear power operator and constructor companies in China China National Nuclear Corp. 1 the most powerful Pengze Project China General Nuclear Power 2 the largest one State Power Investment Corporation Grew out of the merge between China Power Investment Corp. + State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation in 2015 3 the newcomer and weakest one

Who are Wang Jiang Si Lao? WJ Si Lao are four senior retired CCP cadres in Wangjiang County, who organized protests against the Pengze Project shortly after the Fukushima incident. Their respective former positions are Chairman of WJ People’s Political Consultation Commission, President of WJ Court, Mayor, etc. As the “WJ Si Lao” label has been used for more than six years, it’s already become a brand name and continues to be used despite the change in its membership Because of health problems, Tao Guoqiang and Wang Nianze were succeeded by another two senior retired cadres in 2016. from left to right: Tao Guoqiang(陶國強), Wang Jinzhou（汪進舟）, Fang Guangwen（方光文）, Wang Niangze（王念澤）

Why the Wang Jiang Si Lao Case? Four reasons: The Pengze Project and WJ Si Lao’s protest was seen as the inception of inland NPP policy disputes in China. The most disputed one among the three pioneer inland NPPs in China. Compared to other anti-nuclear activists in China, the deeds and words of WJ Si Lao were basically more rational and constructive, which are closer to rational public deliberation. And over the past six years, they composed and left behind a large amount of articles, internet posts, and media coverage, which provided our study with a sound basis for in-depth analysis. WJ Si Lao are no ordinary people: they are local political and cultural elites. However, their antagonistic relationship with the corporate investor of Pengze Project means that they are relatively disempowered. This case study will be valuable for us to explore into the important question of inequality in public deliberation, and to identify the institutional and structural constraints that are to be overcome in the context of authoritarian deliberation such as in China.

Research design

Stakeholders：Who Really Matters? Three fundamental questions in stakeholder management： 1) who are stakeholders? (attributes); 2) what are stakeholder’s claims? (ends); and 3) In what way or how did stakeholder get what they want? (means) Responding to these questions, there are two research approaches： Mitchell et al.（1997）on the attributes and salience of stakeholders. These mainly center on how the management assess the salience of stakeholders by their relationship attributes, such as power, legitimacy, and urgency of their claims. Jeff Frooman（1999）on the influence strategies of stakeholders. “主要依據利益方與企業 的資源關係狀態，區分出了四種利益方影響企業的策略，即在低度相互依賴情境下的間 接/資源扣留策略、在高度相互以來情境下的直接/資源使用策略、在企業依賴利益方的 情境下的直接/資源扣留策略，以及在利益方依賴企業的情境下的間接/資源使用策略。” However, if we want to delve into the dynamics and complexity of the stakeholders in their influencing strategies and the process, we will need to combine these two research approaches. Research of this type, and especially those with empirical support remain under researched. This paper is an exploration in this vein.

Stakeholder’s Influence Strategies: An Integrative Analysis Framework Dimensions Definition Evaluation Power A relationship among social actors in which one social actor, A, can get another social actor, B, to do something that B would not otherwise have done.（Pfeffer, 1981） Firm-stakeholder relationship: dependent/independent; Direct/indirect; using resources/ withholding resources Self-empowerment/empowered by others; Legitimacy A generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.（Suchman, 1995） Legitimacy of stakeholder as entity； Legitimacy of stakeholder’s claims； Legitimacy of stakeholder’s actions； Urgency Criticality: 至關重要，不容忽視。 Temporality: 時間緊迫，不容耽擱。 The degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention. No matter power, legitimacy, or urgency, they all are dynamic, not static attributes of stakeholders. Besides that, to the decision makers, stakeholder’s attributes are to some extent a type of subjective perception, which means they are more of a social construction rather than a objective existence Froom,1999；Mitchell,1997；Santana, 2012

Research questions Why the proposed empowering institutions, such as Social Stability Evaluation Act (2012), and Public Participation in Environmental Impacts Evaluation Act (2006), etc. (to name a few…), cannot empowering the WJ Si Lao? On the contrary, these institutions were even used to disempower them? How did WJ Si Lao as the stakeholders of the Pengze Project struggled to be included in the decision-making process? To what extent and under what conditions did they break up the organizational and institutional inequality and earn equal status in the deliberation process? What are the impacts of their protest? And are there any limitations or challenges still to be overcome ? 1 2 3

Research methods

Content and textual analysis methods 本論文將以彭澤核電項目中的利益方“望江四老”作為個案進行考察。之所以選擇“望江四老”，目前影響力比較大，是國家內陸核電政策爭議的發端。是相對理性、建設性的批評者。 Case study In-depth interview 對四老做深度訪談、電話訪談，瞭解他們的行動邏輯、過程、成效，以及成效的邊界與限制； 同時，也對內陸核電爭議中比較活躍且有影響力的其他反方異見群體做深度訪談，比如何祚庥及王亦楠、《核電將毀滅中國》作者吳輝等。 訪談核電工業界的相關人士，以瞭解反方異見群體的社會影響成效、邊界和限制； 為了考察四老作為彭澤核電專案之利益方身份、訴求及行動的合法性，重點分析四老關於彭澤核電專案的兩份陳情書、《核殤之鑒》等文獻，嘗試做內容及話語分析。 主要回答兩個問題：四老作為利益方其訴求的合法性、緊迫性，以及其抗爭行動的邏輯及合法性； Content and textual analysis

Some preliminary findings

An evaluative analysis to WJ Si Lao’s protest strategies Dimensions Evaluative analysis Power In the first phase, the owners of the Pengze Project didn’t have any dependence on WJ Si Lao to start up Pengze project. In this situation, WJ Si Lao was totally a powerless group. Si Lao had to seek for power from other sources. Actually very early on, Si Lao figured out an action map and proposed three path ways: to tame their opponent via public power (官道)，media power (媒道), and lawsuit (訟道). Legitimacy Why is Si Lao a legitimate actor? WJ residents are moral stakeholders to the Pengze Project and Si Lao acted as representatives of public opinion in WJ county. Why is Si Lao’s claim legitimate ? They challenged the legitimacy of Pengze project from the perspective of regulative, moral, and cultural-cognitions. Why are their protest actions legitimate? Si Lao never used street politics as protest strategies which are very sensitive in China. They strived to abide by the law, and act in the framework of law. Urgency 主要兩個面向：危急性（criticality）和時間性（temporality）。 危急性：利益方訴求所涉及社會議題的危急程度、重要程度； 時間性：利益方訴求需要管理者予以立即關注的時間緊急程度。

Si Lao’s protest: the process Phase 1 Try but failed to get noticed Phase 3 Increased media exposure Phase 2 Striving for government support 2011.7 四老將“停建陳情書”廣為發給國務院溫總理、副總理、環保部、安徽、江西、安慶等。無反響. 僅有安慶市政協退休主席回饋。 2011.7.29 通過望江北京同鄉會，方聯繫上了何，並電郵給何“停建陳情書” 2011.8.18 江西省國防科工辦組團到望江調研，遭到冷遇 2011.12.20 四老將陳情書投稿給中國青年報、南方週末等媒體。 2011.8 溫家寶批示了四老的“停建陳情書” 2011.6.16 方光文經過案頭準備，完成了“停建彭核陳情書” 2011.7 方光文檢索到何祚庥“反對核電大躍進”的文章 2011.8.10 何通過中科院領導上報給了溫家寶總理和李克強副總理 2011.8 環保部、安徽省環保廳、安慶市、望江縣等各級政府紛紛回饋四老 2011.11 望江縣長王進簽發《關於請求停止江西彭澤核電廠專案建設的報告》（望政（2011）56號），上報上級政府。 2012.1.12 “停建陳情書”放上了“望江論壇”，後廣被轉發到國內熱門網站，迅速升溫。

Si Lao’s protest: the process Phase 3 Increased media exposure Phase 4 Inland nuclear policy adjustment 2012.3 安徽省政協和人大會議，彭澤核電成為兩會代表熱議話題，並成為安徽省政協熱門提案。激發媒體關注。 2012.3 安徽省長李斌表態，安徽是產煤大省，不著急上核電專案 2016.3 十三五期間，積極開展內陸核電前期論證工作。內陸核電開工建設沒有明確時間表。 2012.2.2 望江縣政府的紅頭公文，由縣科協幹部王志鴻上傳到新浪微博，which igniting the Pengze nuclear Issue引爆了彭澤核電議題。媒體採訪絡繹不絕。 2012.3 全國兩會。雙方兩會交鋒。安慶2位兩會代表提交彭澤核電提案。 2012.10.24 國務院常務會議，決定“十二五”期間不安排內陸核電專案。 executive meeting of State Council ruled that no inland nuclear power project will be approved in the 12th five-year-plan period. (2012-2016) It’s later extended to the 13th 5-year-plan period.

WJ Si Lao protest: evaluative analysis Striving for endorsement and support from local, provincial, and central government. And push the agenda of the Pengze project into public policy process. In August 2011, with help from He Zuoxiu, Academician of the Chinese Academy of Science (Wang Jiang County was his place of birth), Si Lao’s appeal letter for the suspension of the Pengze Project was submitted to the Premier. After gaining instructions from Premier Wen Jiabao in Aug. 2011, WJ Si Lao took advantage of the Premier’s authority and the bureaucratic hierarchical relationship among different levels of government, to indirectly gain power to pressure for policy change. The premier’s written instruction in Aug. 2011 was a turning point in the course of WJ Si Lao’s protest actions. After that point of time, Si Lao received feedbacks from different sources, such as the Environment Protection Ministry, Anhui Provincial Government, Yangtze River Water Resources Protection Bureau, Anqing Municipal Government, etc. Seeking help from the deputy to NPC or CPPCC to push the Pengze Project issue into public spotlight. For instance, in March 2012, deputies to NPC or CPPCC from Anqing submitted a proposal calling for further stricter evaluation of the Pengze Project Site. The Pengze project was also a hotly discussed issue in Anhui PC and PPCC’s annual meeting in March 2012, which stimulated much news coverage. Seeking for POWER and social influence public power Pressure for policy adjustment and change

WJ Si Lao protest: evaluative analysis Competing for access to news media and media power. And continually to bring the Pengze Project dispute into the media agenda by trying to shape and sway public opinion or policy preference on this issue. In fact, Si Lao’s social mobilization was successful that local resident’s negative sentiment to Pengze Project galvanized them and this developed a huge pressure on social stability, which always presented a challenge for local government officials (even keeping them up at night) After gaining feedbacks from local, provincial, and central government in Aug. 2011, Si Lao started to disseminate their originally written appeal letter to the Premier to the news media, and posted it online in Nov. 2011. Due to the follow-up effect of Fukushima incident, there was unprecedented endorsement from the local even central governments, as nuclear safety was a highly sensitive issue after Fukushima, etc., all these factors combined, news media nationwide paid intense attention to WJ Si Lao and the Pengze Project. Media scrutiny on Si Lao and Pengze Project last for about one year from Dec. 2011 to Dec 2012. Using key words “望江 +彭澤核電” we searched out 74 news reports by more than 50 news media and 807 Internet posts. our search was conducted in Dec. 2016, through WiseNews Platform) Seeking for POWER and social influence media power Telling alternative story and try to sway public opinion, shape public’s cognition and attitudes to inland NPPs

WJ Si Lao protest: evaluative analysis Framing their identity, claims, and actions as LEGITIMATE “四老”對於訴求之合法性的建構，主要體現在2011年和2015年的兩份陳情書。 2011年6月《籲請停建江西彭澤核電廠的陳情書》。關鍵字：“停建”。 2015年下半年《關於廢除江西彭澤核電廠的陳情書》。關鍵字：“廢除”。 望江民眾作為彭澤核電廠之利益方的合法性(moral legitimacy) 離彭澤核電廠址近，完全在應急回應的地理範圍之內； 望江縣的兩個開發區的發展空間受制。 這都使得望江縣天然就是彭澤核電的道義利益方。 regulative legitimacy moral legitimacy cultural-cognition legitimacy

WJ Si Lao protest: evaluative analysis Framing their identity, claims, and actions as LEGITIMATE Moral legitimacy of their claims 長江流域的安全隱患、安徽八百里長江、彭澤核電在安徽的長江入口 ，卻在江西的出口等； Regulatory legitimacy of their protest actions Institutionalization of their actions. In 2014, Si Lao established an organization, Wang Jiang Environment Protection Organizaiton, and received financial support from the local government, and organised their actions. Protest within the law. No street demonstration (不上街), no crossing the Yangtze River (不過江), and never accepted interview requests from foreign news media（不接受外媒採訪）; 出版抗爭過程相關文獻的書《核殤之鑒》。出版望江縣環保協會的會 刊《禁核長江》，通過框架整合（frame alignment），將抗爭行動延 伸為對內陸核電的抵制，從而尋求更廣的社會支持，以及與其他抗爭 群體形成聯結行動（connected actions）的可能。 regulative legitimacy moral legitimacy cultural-cognition legitimacy

WJ Si Lao protest: evaluative analysis Bring their URGENT claims into public spotlight 危急性(Criticality)。 severe environmental impacts。液態污染（包括與飲用水源的距離等）；/氣態污染（熱污染、輻射物質等）；/“損人利益”（廠址在安徽長江段的開端，而在江西長江段的末端） Sympathy arousing。The label “望江四老 WJ Si Lao”implicitly implies and annotates rich emotional connotation, and indicates that their protest against Pengze Project will be like a fight between David and Goliath. 時間性（Temporality）。 Safety concerns。AP1000技術世界上尚無首堆經驗，就開始批量建設，隱藏巨大後患；/目前國內的原子能法、核安全法都缺位，核安全監管和應急體系都模糊，而望江地理尚在應急安全圈內，卻因為行政區劃緣故而被排除在外；/質疑核電利益集團挾持國家能源戰略（存疑核電技術專家的利益涉入等）；/指出內陸核電中需要緊急更新升級的決策； timing。福島事故之後；兩會期間；核安全法徵集意見時期；

WJ Si Lao protest: impacts evaluation Framework for evaluating the impacts of Si Lao’s protest Dimension Indicators Impacts on nuclear power policies Did their protest contribute to policy changes? Specifically, if there are any changes related to policy changes or adjustment? Did they stimulate decision-makers to make new commitments on inland NPP? Impacts on the responsiveness of the government and owner of the Pengze Project Did their protest stimulate any changes of actions among different levels of government and the owners of Pengze Project, such as instructions, feedbacks, visits, etc. Social impacts Did their protest entail more news coverage, stimulate other actions, even shape local resident’s cognition and attitudes on inland nuclear power plant?

Si Lao protest: impacts evaluation dimension 評估 Impacts on nuclear power policies 政策層面的成效：直接影響到國家核電戰略之內陸核電佈局的落地實施，間接地影響了國家能源政策中內陸核電的戰略佈局。 2012年10月之後，包括彭澤核電在內的三個內陸核電專案全面停工。 2012年10月24日，國務院常務會議通過《能源發展“十二五”規劃》，以及《核電安全規劃（2011-2020）》和《核電中長期發展規劃（2011-2020）》，決定穩妥恢復沿海核電建設，但不開工內陸核電建設。 2016年11月7日，國家能源局通過《電力發展“十三五”規劃》，對於內陸核電的立場是“深入開展內陸核電研究論證和前期準備工作。認真做好核電廠址資源保護工作。”

Si Lao protest: impacts evaluation 類目 評估 Impacts on the responsiveness of government and owner of the Pengze Project 第一次陳情書的情況 中央政府： 2011年8月，當時國家能源委員會主任委員、時任國務院總理溫家寶做了批示。批示之後，時任副總理、國家能源委員會副主任李克強也做了批示，以及時任安徽省委書記張寶順，均對四老的“停建彭核”陳情書做了批示。 溫家寶的批示：請發改委、環保部、能源局對核電項目的佈局和實踐，要認真研究，拿出意見，以便中央決策。李克強的批示：發改委、環保部、能源局要做好社會穩定的風險評估，聽取有關地方和專家意見，特別是內陸省份更要重視。 地方政府： 2011年8月23日，望江縣政府簽發《關於請求停止江西彭澤核電廠專案建設的報告》（望政[2011]56號），以政府公文形式向安徽省發改委、能源局環保廳提交。 2011年8月，環保部周生賢部長要求安徽省環保廳負責核實，並上報結果。同時，安徽省環保廳核與輻射安全管理處對於四老的行動予以了回應和肯定。 業主企業： 2011年8月18日，江西國防科工辦、彭澤核電廠一行六人到望江調研彭澤核電應急體系建設課題。但望江縣代表“拒絕提供彭澤核電應急體系建設的任何資料”。 第二次陳情書的情況 2015年下半年，對於“廢除彭澤核電”的第二次陳情書，四老先後得到了時任安徽省常務副省長詹夏來、國家信訪局、中共中央政策研究室王滬寧辦公室、國務院辦公廳等機關回饋。 第二次陳情書和《十問彭澤核電的安全論證》等文章，儘管沒有像第一次陳情書那樣，獲得了最高國家領導人的批示，但也通過各種途徑，獲得機會進入了一些領導的辦公室案頭，他們有可能會看到這些文本。至少能引發他們關注四老的意見以及他們意見所反映的內陸核電爭議問題。這種對決策者注意力的競爭，有可能會影響到最終的決策。

Si Lao protest: impacts evaluation 類目 評估 social impacts 2011年12月-2012年12月一年裡先後獲得境內境外超過五十多家媒體 的密集關注，刊發報道74篇，網路媒體轉載量807篇次（據2016年12 月1日慧科檢索資料，關鍵字“望江+彭澤核電”，標題及正文）； 安徽省望江縣的地方網站“望江論壇”，設置了“關注核電”頻道 多年來保持較高的活躍度。成為四老在望江本地開展社會動員的重 要管道。 與國內其他抗爭群體形成聯結行動(network and interaction)。與 《核電將毀滅中國》作者吳輝、何祚庥、王亦楠等內陸核電的異見 群體，形成聯動，影響普通民眾，形成民間輿論，塑造民眾對於內 陸核電的認知和態度。

WJ Si Lao protest: Challenges Si Lao achieved some milestone achievements, but their protest actions are still facing some fundamental structural challenges: First, the success or failure of Si Lao’s protest very much depends on the endorsement from the government. The premier’s instruction facilitated and even pressured different levels of governments to respond to Si Lao’s appeal and was a very important driving factor for Si Lao’s rise in social visibility in the news media. This meant that under the current institutional and structural constraints, Si Lao’s success was probably difficult to be replicated in other situations. However, with the transformation of the social power structure driven by the rise of social media, it is becoming increasingly common for the disempowered to make their protests. Second, Si Lao’s protest still could not have a direct impact on the nuclear power policy process. But it did add up the difficulties to the proposed nuclear power planning that is to come. Third, the limits due to the identity of Si Lao. This means they usually rely upon relative moderate strategies and tactics, which could get unnoticed and receive no response by decision makers. Fourth, Si Lao as NIMBY activists and interest advocators positioned them to be more antagonistic to their counterpart in the government or corporations. They are not quite open to alternative views and deliberation not possible to happen between them and their counterpart.

Sum up: the logics of stakeholder’s protest Seeking for POWER and social influence （更側重分析反核行動者的能動性，關注反核行動者如何通過具體的策略來影響和控制決策者）： In the current political system, gaining endorsement and support from public power (in particular high profile government officials) is still the decisive factor for the success of stakeholder protest. 在望江四老的抗爭案例中，權力比其他兩個因素都更為重要，甚至可以說是決定性的因素。若非中央政府首腦的批示，以及何祚庥王亦楠等文化精英的背書，望江四老的抗爭恐怕很難贏得如此廣泛的關注的社會影響力。 The empowering process is highly rely upon the social cultural network in which the empowering practices operate in. which means it’s will be unproductive if seperating the empowering practices and legitimacy. 合法性與權力的結合之必要性。此外，若僅僅只有權力，而缺乏合法性，四老的抗爭也很難有效地開展社會動員，從而完成自我賦權或他人賦權的過程。

Sum up: the logics of stakeholder’s protest Framing their identity, claims, and actions as LEGITIMATE （更側重分析反核行動的被動性，要受制于社會文化網路的約束）： 利益方合法性的構建策略。望江四老通過三個方面來呈現自己在彭澤核電專案中的合法性，即望江四老代表望江公眾作為彭澤核電項目之重要利益方的合法性、訴求的合法性以及行動的合法性。 常人抗爭如何自我賦權或被賦權。從四老抗爭的過程可以發現，若利益方僅僅有合法性，並不足以引起政府及企業的重視。這也再次證實，當利益方自身無權的情境下，通過間接的方式獲取權力（被他人或組織賦權）的重要性。

Sum up: the logics of stakeholder’s protest Bring their URGENT claims into public spotlight （更側重分析反核行動者與決策者之間的互動過程，及其對於決策者認知和態度的影響）。 how layperson could align with technology expert to produce alternative knowledge and break up knowledge monopoly dominated by the powerful group and empower themselves through knowledge production? 在科技爭議話題中，利益方訴求之緊迫性的建構，往往會有天然的知識門檻或相關科技知識被技術精英所壟斷。而這恰恰是在彭澤核電這類科技爭議事件中常人抗爭（layperson）的軟肋。若他們沒有科技精英在科技知識上的支援和背書，則也容易使得其抗爭缺乏足夠的合法性，以至於損及其抗爭行動的社會動員能力。因此，這種情境下，常人抗爭和科技精英中的同情者之間的結盟與聯動，就成為抗爭成功的一個先決條件。 With the rise of social media, how layperson can build up their protest via connective actions and innovate their protest repertoire? 社交媒體的興起，極大地降低了溝通和社會協作的成本，這為聯結行動鋪墊了基礎。這也意味著抗爭者更有可能突破目前媒體自我審查等結構性約束，從而獲得社會能見度和影響力。

Thanks for your listenning Anti-Inland NPP activists’ media strategies, impacts and its boundary: A case study on Jiangxi Pengze project DENG, Lifeng School of Communication Sun Yat-sen University Guangzhou, China dlfeng@sysu.edu.cn June 9, 2017

Limitations of this research 理論概念有待完善和精細 獲取資料的局限，資料分析也有待完善。