Historical background: Kant and Wittgenstein Self Knowledge 自我知識 第七單元： Historical background: Kant and Wittgenstein 歷史背景:康德與維根斯坦 梁益堉 教授 2012.4.9 【本著作除另有註明外，採取創用CC「姓名標示－非商業性－相同方式分享」台灣3.0版授權釋出】 本課程指定教材為Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge。 本講義僅引用部分內容，請讀者自行準備。 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊，依據Microsoft服務合約及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。

Kant: self-knowledge and rational agency Descartes and Locke Self-knowledge is purely observational. The introspecting subject may be entirely passive. 內省，向內觀察，探照燈。 Kant agential form of self-awareness. 能評估理由藉以修正信念的 agents Flickr，作者：Tim Jagenberg。 第七單元 Historical background: Kant and Wittgenstein 期中考問題解釋 00:00:00 ~ 00:05:32

Kant: self-knowledge and rational agency 不是被動地察覺意識內容。 Combination，運用理性來評估自己的心智狀態 內容，而不是被動地接受。 P. 47 When one is conscious of oneself by, …, “I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination” of “the activity of the self”. The activity of the self: the agency involved here is rational agency. 00:05:32 ~ 00:09:55 以上著作轉載自Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge，頁47，依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。

Kant: self-knowledge and rational agency agential self-knowledge比 observational self-awareness更基本， 創造想法發起動作。 EX: 嫌疑犯有罪。 能被證據修正的才是信念。ACQ 和 INS可能會面臨，一方面相信有 罪，一方面沒有太多證據。 如果不能用後面的理由來修改信 念，就不是一個rational agent 。 理性上的責任。 00:09:55 ~ 00:18:28 Flickr，作者：turkeychik。

Kant: self-knowledge and rational agency Transcendental reasoning: 有self knowledge是事實， 如何使得self knowledge成為可能。 Self knowledge之所以可能是能對信念負責，ought imply can. I am led by reasons to discard or renew a belief. P. 48 the epistemic grounding for agential self-knowledge is not empirical: it is not a matter of evidence gleaned from introspection, or of the reliability of the introspective process. Rather, it derives from our rational nature. 00:18:28 ~ 00:26:54 以上著作轉載自Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge，頁48，依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。

Wittgenstein’s doubts: privacy and epistemic significance 對他人思維的知識是epistemic achievement. 對自己思維的知識是common sense不需要依賴其他方法， 不是achievement(可能獲得或不獲得)。 Wittgenstein’s reasoning The first step: we are ordinarily aware of what we are thinking without needing to rely on the sorts of methods we use to figure out what someone else is thinking. ,…, if self- knowledge qualifies as a genuine epistemic achievement, it must be acquired through the use of some special epistemic method, one that is exclusively first-personal. (P. 50) 00:26:54 ~ 00:34:25 以上著作轉載自Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge，頁50，依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。

Wittgenstein’s doubts: privacy and epistemic significance The second step of the reasoning: Wittgenstein denies that there is an exclusively first-personal method for determining what I am thinking (the Private Language Argument). First person method壓過去相衝突的third person method結果。這樣的就 不可能出錯。 痛這個語詞的指涉是什麼，語言是normative，使用上有對有錯。私有語 言就無法有對錯。 有些哲學家認為報導主觀感受的語詞是private，當事者自己才知道。 Wittgenstein反對私有語言：沒有獨立的判準來評估使用的對錯，那就不 是語言，私有語言不是語言。 Ex: Beatle in the box 。Beatle這個概念有沒有任何指涉就不確定了。 如果first person特別處是private，private是無用的，那first person method 就喪失特殊地位。 00:34:25 ~ 00:46:30

Wittgenstein’s doubts: privacy and epistemic significance Wittgenstein: Whatever is going to seem right to me is right, and that only means that here we can’t talk about “right.” 如果self knowledge有特殊性，必需有gap。 There is no gap between seeming right and being right. But then my claim that I’m thinking about snow does not constitute knowledge of a reality independent of my evidence, and is therefore not an epistemic achievement.(p.51) What do you think? Q:不會錯有什麼不好，為什麼不能作為知識。 00:46:30 ~ 00:54:35 00:54:35 ~ 01:16:55 mental ownership 投影片 以上著作轉載自Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge，頁51，依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。

Body swap illusion (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008) Experimenter wears helmet with two closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV). Subject wears head- mounted displays (HMD). The images from the CCTV were presented to the HMDs. Effect: shift of perspective—the subject visually perceives himself rather than the experimenter. Control Condition: asynchronous squeezing. Illusion Condition: synchronous squeezing. L & L (2011): the subjects misrepresent themselves as squeezing their own hands.

Body swap illusion In this case, the subjects’ agentive experience is mistaken. Although it was really the experimenter who was shaking their hands, the subjects misrepresented themselves as the agent of the action. We can agree that: (1) For every agentive experience there must be a subject who experiences it. (2) Every agentive experience is in principle available to introspection. (3) Every agentive experience is experienced by the one who is currently introspecting it (at least “if the subject reflects”). Again, (1) ~ (3) together do not imply (4) Every agentive experience is, from the first-person point of view, represented as experienced by the one who is introspecting it. (4) does not hold in the body swap illusion, hence IEM fails. Mental ownership is misrepresented.

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 授權條件 作者/來源 1-12 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊，依據Microsoft服務合約及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。 2 Flickr，作者：Tim Jagenberg。 本作品轉載自http://www.flickr.com/photos/timjagenberg/6600327585/sizes/m/in/photostream/，瀏覽日期2012/4/14。本作品採取創用CC姓名標示-非商業性-相同方式分享 2.0 通用版授權釋出。 3 When one is conscious …, of “the activity of the self”. 本著作轉載自Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge，頁47，依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。 4 Flickr，作者：turkeychik。 本作品轉載自http://www.flickr.com/photos/turkeychik/2992674296/sizes/z/in/photostream/，瀏覽日期2012/4/14。本作品採取創用CC姓名標示-非商業性-禁止改作 2.0 通用版授權釋出。

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 授權條件 作者/來源 5 the epistemic grounding, …, our rational nature. 本著作轉載自Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge，頁48，依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。 6 we are ordinarily aware of,…, first-personal. 本著作轉載自Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge，頁50，依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。 8 But then my claim that ,…, epistemic achievement 本著作轉載自Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge，頁51，依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。