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Thucydides and The Peloponnesian War (431 to 404 B.C. )
Lecturer: Wu Shiyu
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1. Products in the Age of Pericles
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Phidias Showing the Frieze of the Parthenon to his Friends
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The Acropolis of Athens
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1. In the Age of Pericles This first democracy in history gave birth to the liberal arts (learning suited to a free individual as defined by Aristotle). Products of the tolerance and freedom of thought and speech
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Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War.
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2.1 Thucydides and History
A product of the Athenian democracy History grew in the Athenian democracy, as a means of educating from the lessons of the past. It is no coincidence that our first true history of Herodotus, although written by a non-Athenian, was written for Athenian audience, and first narrated to them. The second of the great historian of the history is Thucydides.
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2.1 Thucydides and History
He is an Athenian citizen (460~400B.C.). And his history, immortal pages describing the Peloponnesian War, still as timely and as vivid today, as when they were first written.
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Thucydides (460~400B.C.).
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Thucydides
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Herodotus
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2.1 Thucydides and History
Thucydides was born to a wealthy family. He was a partisan of Pericles; he is a tremendous admirer of Pericles. As a youth, we are told, Thucydides heard a reading of Herodotus history at the Olympic Games, and he was moved to tears.
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2.1 Thucydides and History
他生活的时代正值雅典的极盛时期,也是古希腊文化的全盛时期。伯里克利等人的政治演说,埃斯库罗斯、欧里彼德斯、索福克利斯等人的戏剧,诡辩派(又称“智者派”)的哲学,希罗多德等人的历史著作,以及“医学之父”希波格拉底所代表的“实验的”“科学”精神,都对他产生了极大的影响。成年以后,他也像大多数贵族子弟一样,凭借家族的门第和个人的才干而步入仕途。
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2.1 Thucydides and History
In 424, elected general, one of the ten generals for the year, and he was entrusted with an extremely important command in the northeastern part of Greece, around the city of Amphipolis, Amphipolis, an Athenian stronghold, absolutely essential to protect the Athenian grain supply from the Black Sea, its gold very important to the Athenian economy. Assaulted by a Spartan force on the wintry winter night, a cold and stormy night, they seized the bridge;
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2.1 Thucydides and History
Thucydides came as quickly as he could, but too late to prevent the capture of the city. Thucydides was exiled, extraordinarily harsh exile, not a ten-year ostracism(the charge treason). But that exile permitted Thucydides to travel throughout the Greek world during the war, collecting material, interviewing eyewitnesses of the War.
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2.1 Thucydides and History
▲《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》是修昔底德在自己亲身感受的基础上、依靠敏锐的观察力、发挥了卓越的写作才能之后才完成的。这部著作体大思精、前后一贯,是预先订好写作计划之后一气呵成的。因此各个部分上下衔接、首尾相连,其间有严密的逻辑性。
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2.5 His Prediction of the P War
Thucydides began to collect material for his history at his very outbreak of the war, and he was convinced that it would be the greatest war in history. “It was going to be a major war and that it would be more deserving of renown than any previous war.” He understood that it would be a long war, unlike most politicians, and he understood that it would stretch the limits of both combatants, Athens and Sparta, to their utmost.
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2.5 His Prediction of the P War
修昔底德的写作冲动,来自他对伯罗奔尼撒战争的深刻认识。正如他在书中所说的那样:“在这次战争刚刚爆发的时候,我就开始写这部历史著作,相信这次战争是一个伟大的战争,比过去曾经发生过的任何一次战争都更有记载的价值。我的这种信念是依据下列事实得来的:双方都竭尽全力来备战;同时我看到希腊世界中其余的国家,不是参加了这一边,就是参加了那一边;即使那些目前还没有参战的国家,也正在准备参战。这是希腊人历史上最严重的一次大动乱,同时也波及到大部分非希腊人的地区,可以说,几乎全人类都将蒙受其影响……。”
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2.6 Causes of the War in his Eye
He also understood the importance of economics to history. As economies grew stronger, as the commerce and trade grew stronger, nations grew stronger. And so he understood the interconnection between economics and political power. He understood that economics were important motivating force for this war.
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2.2 Thucydides and Herodotus
Herodotus(484 ~425 B.C.) & Herodotus(460~400B.C.) At first glance, rather different as we read the two. Herodotus, on first reading, appears to be a garrulous (饶舌的 ) story teller. There is little of a story teller on the somber pages of Thucydides. Thucydides is the scientific historian. There is little of a story teller on the somber(朴实无华的)pages of Thucydides.
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2.2 Thucydides and Herodotus
修昔底德不失为古希腊杰出的历史学家,他的《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》仍然是西方史学史上的重要里程碑。有人曾评论道:“尽管修昔底德比希罗多德只晚生了25年,但他们两人对历史的理解却大不相同;从希罗多德到修昔底德,史学几乎要进步一个世纪。”这是对修昔底德史学成就的高度评价。
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2.2 Thucydides and Herodotus
Herodotus always has the Gods coming in, intervening, takes oracles very very seriously. The Gods play no factual role in the history of Thucydides. He recalls from time to time an oracle, because men act on the basis of such oracles. But the Gods do not influence the course of history in the mind of Thucydides.
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2.2 Thucydides and Herodotus
Upon deep examination, both historians are profoundly concerned with the moral dimension of history, both Thucydides and Herodotus write out of the conviction that not only do we learn from history, but also that actions have moral consequences, and these moral consequences do work through history.
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2.2 Thucydides and Herodotus
另外,修昔底德与希罗多德在描述雅典民主政治时的情绪和角度也是不同的。希罗多德把雅典的民主政治视为雅典之所以能在希波战争中取胜的基本原因;他对雅典民主政治的颂扬,是与他对专制统治和独裁政治的批判联系在一起的;他在描述雅典的民主政治时,充满了一种自豪、昂扬的情绪。修昔底德对雅典民主政治的颂扬,恰恰反衬出那几个为了自己的私利而使整个希腊民族卷入战火灾难的政客们的可恶,反衬出使这种制度遭受破坏的伯罗奔尼撒战争的可悲,反衬出人们对这种美好制度遭受破坏之后的痛惜。
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2.2 Thucydides and Herodotus
▲修昔底德的这种情绪,使得他在写作手法上也独具特色。他用简练的文笔、精确的词句,通过冷峻、朴实的具体叙述,抒发了自己那种悲天悯人的真切情感,使得整部《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》充满着浓厚的悲剧气氛,加强了作品的内在感染力量。这是他吸取了希腊悲剧发展成果的具体体现。他是想通过这种悲剧效果来强化著作内容在读者头脑中的印象,从而加强对后世的垂训作用。
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2.2 Thucydides and Herodotus
修昔底德不仅在叙述史事时比较成功地克服了个人的情感,做到了“冷漠无情”,而且在评价史事时也能够遵守“客观”原则,按照一般的社会道德标准来判断人事的是非善恶。无论是雅典人还是外邦人,无论是雅典的朋友还是雅典的敌人,无论是对雅典有利还是对雅典不利,修昔底德评判过的人物和事件基本上都是比较公平的。
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2.3 On Thucydides He failed as a general, he was a tremendous success as a historian. His influence has echoed down the centuries. In antiquity, he was regarded as the model of the writing of history. The great Roman figure of Tacitus modeled his history of imperial Rome upon the somber objective truth of Thucydides. In the middle ages, he was read in Byzantium, and he was rediscovered in the Renaissance.
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2.4 Inflences of Thucydides
Thucydides was "the eternal manual statesman“ for the founders of American; John Adams urged to his son John Quincy Adams, to devote himself to the study of Thucydides. "He is far more valuable", said John Adams, "than Plato," "His knowledge of human nature, shows us why history is such an important discipline."
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2.4 Inflences of Thucydides
“Human nature never changes, and where Thucydides describes the politics of the Athenian democracy, you see before you, the future of our own country.” (John Adams) George Marshall, Henry Kissinger have been great admirers of Thucydides and his history.
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2.4 Inflences of Thucydides
用抽象的和永恒的“人性”来解释和理解历史发展。修昔底德认为:“古往今来,人就是人,有不变的人性。因此,过去发生过的事情,在未来会以十分相似的方式重复出现。”这样一来,就容易陷入历史循环论。
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2.7 Scientific History So there's far more of the scientific modern air for the historian Thucydides than to Herodotus. And indeed he’d been called the first truly modern mind. Moreover, he understood the importance of gaining every possible insight, and so he interviewed wherever possible eyewitnesses, balancing one source against another to come up with what he believed was the truth.
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2.8 Thucydides’s History But he also is a rhetorician. He knew the importance of speech. He knew how the Athenian assembly was moved to action by powerful rhetoric. And so, he includes again and again in his history pairs of speeches, in which the argument is given from both sides. And he says "Even when I was not present for a speech, I tried to understand the context in which it would have been given, and deduce from that what men must have said."
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2.11 Thucydides and Machiavelli
Now, for Thucydides, there is little open moral judgment. He appears far more like Machiavelli. Both of them are political failures, Machiavelli is driven from his office, and spends his creative activity in exile on his little farm outside Florence. He will never get back to his political power that so he desire. And he writes about power, writes in the belief that history is the single best way to explore the future.
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2.11 Thucydides and Machiavelli
And Thucydides, like Machiavelli, spends his creative time, in exile, and both of them are concerned with power. Thucydides says that "I have written this work as an eternal document, as a document for all times."
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2.11 Thucydides and Machiavelli
And both of them believe that morality, as it is ordinary expressed, is nothing but hypocrisy. And morality plays no role in the actual decisions of men unless they are fools. There’s no such thing as justice; there’s no such thing as honor; there’s only power, and the eternal desire for power. That is the lesson of both Machiavelli and Thucydides.
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2.11 Thucydides and Machiavelli
Both of them would say, “I do not espouse that it is good to act as though ‘might makes right’, I simply say it is expedient that it is what all men do.”
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2.9 Causes of the War in his Eye
After the Persian Wars, Athens stepped in a position of leadership, creating an alliance, the Delian League, that gradually turned into virtually a maritime empire whose influence began to dominate the other city-states. Many other poleis, including Sparta felt that something needed to be done to limit Athens’ power. Sparta, with the adequate resources and prestige, naturally took the lead. Eventually the war that for long seemed inevitable broke out in 431 B.C. between two coalitions of Greek poleis: Sparta and its allies, mostly located in the Peloponnese, and Athens and its allies, mostly located in and along the coast of the Aegean Sea.
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2.10 Causes of the War in his Eye
He believed that we must separate in examining the history or any event the true cause for a war and what people allege to be the causes. The real cause was the growth of Athenian power, and the fear that this provoked among the Spartans, and so like Pericles, he believed that the war had to come about. Athenian power expanded as the economy of Athens expanded, and this so terrorized the Spartans that sooner or later they must make a war to stop the expansion.
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2. His Prediction of the P War
Thucydides began to collect material for his history at his very outbreak of the war, and he was convinced that it would be the greatest war in history. “It was going to be a major war and that it would be more deserving of renown than any previous war.” He understood that it would be a long war, unlike most politicians, and he understood that it would stretch the limits of both combatants, Athens and Sparta, to their utmost.
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2. His Prediction of the P War
修昔底德的写作冲动,来自他对伯罗奔尼撒战争的深刻认识。正如他在书中所说的那样:“在这次战争刚刚爆发的时候,我就开始写这部历史著作,相信这次战争是一个伟大的战争,比过去曾经发生过的任何一次战争都更有记载的价值。我的这种信念是依据下列事实得来的:双方都竭尽全力来备战;同时我看到希腊世界中其余的国家,不是参加了这一边,就是参加了那一边;即使那些目前还没有参战的国家,也正在准备参战。这是希腊人历史上最严重的一次大动乱,同时也波及到大部分非希腊人的地区,可以说,几乎全人类都将蒙受其影响……。”
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The Peloponnesian War
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3. The Peloponnesian War Few Greek foresaw it would be different from any war It would last twenty-seven years, from 431 to 404 B.C. And cost thousands upon thousands of lives. Undermining the social and political harmony of Athens, Weakening its economic strengths, reducing its population, Turning upside down the everyday life of most its citizens. Altering the world the Greeks knew in many respects. Original assumptions would break down, conventional morality and piety would face many challenges.
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4. Causes of the War in his Eye
Economics were important motivating force for this war; The underlying cause of the war is the Spartan’s fear that Athens, as a growing power, would use its superiority in the naval forces of the Delian League to destroy Spartan control over the Peloponnesian League.
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5. The Process of the War Traditionally, the war divided into three phases: (1)From the Archidamian War and concluded in B.C. with the signing of the Peace of Nicias; (2) Starting from Athenians’ Sicilian expedition, concluded in 413 B.C. with the destruction of the entire force; (3) The final phase is concluded with the Decelea War, or the Ionian War.
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The Three Phases of The War
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5. The Process of the War Both sides have their advantages and disadvantages: For Sparta and its allies, with the exception of Corinth, were almost exclusively land-based powers, in command of large land armies which were very unbeatable. The Spartan infantry with its hoplites(装甲步兵)were very much skillful in set battles. The Athenians, on the other hand, are superior in terms of naval resources and experience. As a maritime empire, its supremacy at sea was subject to no challenges.
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6. Phase I: The Periclean Strategy
Pericles predicts in his speech delivered in the assembly that the war will last longer than most people expect. The Spartans would give full play to their own advantages with their land forces and destroy the Athenian’s crops. But Pericles encourages his fellow citizens that he has great confidence in Athens’ prospects for success in the war: “As long as you maintain control of the seas and as long as you are willing to refrain from further acts of conquest while you are at war and from importing dangers of you own devising…for I am more afraid of our own lapses of judgment than of our enemies’ schemes.”
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6. Phase I: The Periclean Strategy
Encircled their city center with a massive stone wall and also built a broad corridor with a long wall on both sides leading all the way to the Piraeus, a seaport five miles away. People living outside the urban center were persuaded to move into the city and abandon their homes and fields to the devastation of the Spartan army during its regular invasions of Attica each year. With reluctance and great pains that the Athenians diserted their homes and the familiar temples nearby, and moved inside the long walls where only a few were able to find shelter with friends or relatives.
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6. Phase I: The Periclean Strategy
In 431 B.C., as predicted, the Spartans began the war by invading Attica for the first time and destroyed property in the countryside, hoping to force the Athenians into an infantry battle. The country dwellers of Attica became enraged as, standing in safety on Athens’ walls, watching the smoke rise from their burning homes and fields. The Spartan army returned home from this first attack after about a month in Attica because it lacked the structure for resupply over a longer period and could not risk being away from Sparta too long for fear of helot revolt. Never lasted longer than forty days. Funeral Oration by Pericles.
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2.12 The Funeral Oration of Pericles by Thucydides
The Funeral Oration of Pericles, given in the year 430. Thucydides was in Athens; For Thucydides, it represented the values of the Athenian democracy and what made that democracy under Pericles so very special. Listen to the Oration. This speech celebrating the glory of the Athens, and as we have mentioned, making no reference to the gods. By ignoring the gods, this plague came upon Athens.
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2.13 The dialogue between the Athenians and the Melians.
The doctrine that might makes right, that there’s no such thing as words like justice, and the only important thing is success. Thucydides makes this theme the center piece of his dialogue between the Athenians and the Melians. Listen to the Dialogue
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2.13 The Melian Dialogue This passage in the history of Thucydides ( ), called the Melian Dialogue, offers a chillingly realistic insight into the clash between ethics and power in international politics that is timeless in its insight and its bluntness.
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“Man proposes, God disposes.”
7. The Plague “Man proposes, God disposes.” A horrific surprise soon undermined Pericles’ strategy for Athenian victory: In 430 B.C., an astonishing plague attacked and raged for several years with disastrous consequences. Thucydides, who himself fell ill but recovered, took pains to record everything he could about the course and symptoms of the illness. He hoped that it would be possible for readers to recognize the disorder should it ever reappear. He reports the oral bleeding, the bad breath, the painful vomiting, the burning skin, the insomnia, the memory loss, the often diarrhea and goes on to describe the way in which people reacted to the disease: “uncontrollable diarrhea (腹泻 ), and fever and thirst so extreme that sufferers threw themselves into cisterns (蓄水池 )vainly hoping to find relief in the cold water”
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7. The Plague: Its Consequences
The plague brought about devastating consequences to the Athenians: Materially, it devastated their population (it wiped out over 30,000 citizens, roughly one-third of the Athenian population); Politically, it removed their most prominent leader, Pericles, the loss of whose leadership is disastrous which could be seen in the later events; And psychologically, it damaged Athenians’ self-confidence and corroding social and religious norms.
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7. The Plague: Its Consequences
不久,雅典发生了可怕的瘟疫,起初,医生们也不知道如何治疗这种病,又因为他们必须经常与病人接触,导致医生死亡的最多。强者和弱者同样染病死亡,疾病所造成的痛苦似乎不是人所能够忍受的。最糟糕的是,当人们知道自己得了这种病,即陷于绝望,而人的精神一垮,就丧失了抵抗的力量。看护病人的人,很快也染病。雅典城内高度密集的人群,使瘟疫更加难以控制。炎热的夏季里,大批新搬进城里、住在空气污浊的茅舍中的人们,象苍蝇一样地死去。垂死者的身体互相堆积起来,半死的人在街上到处打滚。鸟兽一旦食用了死者的尸肉,也会死掉。瘟疫使人们不再关心宗教和法律条文,雅典开始有了空前违法乱纪的情况。城内的人们在死亡线上挣扎;城外的田地被蹂躏。这期间,伯里克利组织了一支有100条战船的舰队,远征伯罗奔尼撒半岛沿海地区和色雷斯的卡尔西斯及波提狄亚。
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7. The Plague: Its Consequences
必须同时与疾病和敌人作斗争的雅典人,开始对伯里克利不满。他们谴责他劝他们作战,认为他们所遭受的一切不幸都应该由他负责;他们渴望与斯巴达人讲和,但没有结果。完全失望的人们,把所有的愤怒都转到了伯里克利身上,直到他们判处伯里克利一笔罚款,才心满意足。不久,他们迫于形势的需要又选举他作将军,但在战争开始2年又6个月之后,伯里克利竟染病去世了。
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8. Cleon and Diodotus: The Revolt of Mytilene (428-427)
After the death of Pericles, no one man became the unquestioned leader of the Athenians. However, a new politician, named Cleon came upon the political stage. Cleon first appears in the pages of Thucydides in a dramatic debate that took place in 427 B.C.
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8. Cleon and Diodotus: The Revolt of Mytilene (428-427)
In 428 B.C., Mytilene, the largest city of the island of Lesbos and also one of the most important subject-allies of Athens, revolted from Athens. Because of the failure to get the promised aid from Sparta, Mytilene, out of desperation, surrendered to Athens in the end in 427. The angry Athenian Assembly at first voted to punish the Mytilenians by killing the entire male population and enslaving the women and children. The next day, however, some people had second thoughts, and then a debate followed. One of the most famous passages in Thucydides is the set of vivid speeches on the fate of Mytilenians presented by Cleon and another statesman Diodotus.
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8. Cleon and Diodotus: The Revolt of Mytilene (428-427)
Cleon argued against mercy, “I, for my part, have often noticed before that democracies cannot rule over others, but I see it especially now in these regrets of yours about Mytilene…. Taking it (Mytilene) is thought to have been criminal; letting it go would be extremely dangerous” Diodotus, however, spoke against severe punishment as proposed by the original plan. Deterrence, he contended, was not as effective as commonly believed. Furthermore, he argued, there was no merit in killing people even when they had surrendered, for to do so removed any incentive for surrender in future rebellions. Such a marvelous argument grounded in psychology, in the end, won the day.
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9. The End of Phase I: The Peace of Nicias
Thucydides had no love for Cleon, called him “the most violent of the citizens”. Cleon, now the most prominent and influential leader at Athens, was dispatched in 422 B.C. to try to stop Brasidas, the Spartan geneal. As it happened, both he and Brasidas were killed before Amphipolis in 422 B.C. in a battle won by the Spartan army. Their deaths deprived each side of its most energetic military commander and opened the way to negotiations. Peace came in 421 B.C. The agreement made in that year is known as the Peace of Nicias, after the principal Athenian negotiator, Cleon’s old rival.
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10. Phase II: Alcibiades and The Milian Dialogue
A member of one of Athens’ richest and most distinguished families. He was orphaned when his father died in battle against allies of Sparta in 447. He had then been raised in the household of Pericles. When growing older, he became one of the three very celebrated students of Socrates, the other two being Plato and Xenophon. It is said that Plato and Xenophon, even in their youth, were noted for their coolness and right-mindedness, but Alcibiades was very different from them both. As he was handsome, intelligent, and very high-spirited, he was eagerly courted by lovers of both sexes. Alcibiades never did like rules and was such made much of and greatly spoiled. He later became a person of vanity and willfulness.
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10. Phase II: Alcibiades and The Milian Dialogue
By now in his thirties – a very young age at which to have achieved political influence, by Athenian standards; The Melian Dialogue; The peace treaty broken.
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The Peace of Nicias 50年和平条约的签定,只不过是交换了一纸关于“和平”的空文。双方都没有履行他们的诺言,谁也不愿意交出土地。在签约后的几年中,虽然没有进行大的战役,但违犯条约的事时有发生。
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11. Phase II: Sicilian Expedition (415~413 B.C.)
Departed somewhat from Pericles’ conservative, defensive strategy and turned to the more aggressive strategy. They attempted to bring the war to Sparta and its allies. The Sicilian expedition signaled such a major deviation, and just as he had worried, the Athenians suffered severe consequences for this.
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11. Phase II: Sicilian Expedition (415~413 B.C.)
In 415 B.C., word came to Athens that one of their distant allies, Egesta , a Sicilian city was under attack from Syracuse, a prosperous city near the southeastern corner which represented the largest threat to Athenian ambitions. Expansion to Sicily, a rich grain-producing area, had long been a temptation for Athens, a city with a need for grain. The Egestans also encouraged Athens to launch a naval expedition to Sicily by promising the large extent of the resources that they would devote to the military campaign against their enemies on the island.
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11. Phase II: Sicilian Expedition (415~413 B.C.)
In the assembly, preceding the vote on the expedition, a heated debate was held. Alcibiades who hoped to enhance his political career by leading a successful and profitable attack on Sicily argued that the numerous warships in the fleet of Syracuse represented an especially serious potential threat to the security of the Athenian alliance because they could sail from Sicily to join the Spartan alliance in attacks on Athens and its allies. Nicias, the only general who still kept Pericles’ warning in mind sensibly argued passionately against the involvement in Sicily. But Nicias’ arguments for caution failed to counteract the enthusiasm for action that Alcibiades generated with his speeches. The military, the lower classes, and especially the young men for themselves who had not yet experienced the realities of war were convinced by Alcibiades’ speeches that the Sicily would provide the Athenian state with limitless funds and resources.
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11. Phase II: Sicilian Expedition (415~413 B.C.)
公元前415年初,雅典人讨论是否出兵西西里。尼西阿斯陈述利弊,再三劝阻雅典人不要远征西西里。野心勃勃的将军亚西比得(即阿尔基比阿德斯)却煽动民众,通过了远征的决议。几乎每个人都充满了热情。老者对胜利满怀信心;年青人希望开开眼界,看看远地的风光;一般的人知道自己可以在远征期间得到工钱,而且,如果雅典的势力扩大,他们将会获得永久的薪给工作。少数实际上反对远征的人,怕被说成不爱国,也就缄口不言了。狂热的雅典人立即进行出征准备。大奴隶主和大商人们,期望通过远征获得更多的土地和财富。他们不惜花费巨资,使自己装备的船比别人的更漂亮、更快速。
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11. Phase II: Sicilian Expedition (415~413 B.C.)
The assembly finally resolved on a compromise. Alcibiades would indeed be sent west with a large force, but he would be accompanied by two strategoi—Lamachus, an experienced general, and Nicias himself, whose presence they hoped would serve as a check on Alcibiades’ rashness. Thucydides then describes the expedition as “the most lavishly funded and most impressive military force deployed by a single Greek city up to that time.” Thucydides further describes the magnificent spectacle of the fleet’s departure and the unbounded confidence of the Athenian people who witnessed it. No one would expect the utter catastrophe that expedition suffered two years later. Of the many who sailed for Sicily, however, few returned.
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11. Phase II: Sicilian Expedition (415~413 B.C.)
The excessive arrogance of Alcibiades’ private life and his vociferous political ambitions had made him many enemies in Athens, and this hostility came to the fore on the point of the expedition’s dispatch. The Athenians found out that all the statues of their god Hermes, had been shamefully broken. The excited people assembled on the Agora to discuss this event; and all cried loudly against it, for the statues were considered sacred, as they represented a god. Alcibiades was suddenly accused of having participated in sacrilegious events on the eve of the sailing by his enemies. It is said that he had done it after the banquet which he had given to celebrate his departure.
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11. Phase II: Sicilian Expedition (415~413 B.C.)
This was an extremely serious charge of sacrilege and caused an additional uproar. Alcibiades pushed for an immediate trial while his popularity was at a peak and the soldiers who supported him were still in Athens, but, in spite of this urgent request, his enemies cunningly got the trial postponed on the excuse that the expedition must not be delayed. Alcibiades therefore was forced to depart with this cloud hanging over him.
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11. Phase II: Sicilian Expedition (415~413 B.C.)
就在这时,城内的大量赫尔密斯像突然被毁。亚西比得涉嫌此案,但他还是作为将军之一带兵出发了。这次远征是雅典人离开故土最远的一次,已经耗费了巨资并将继续用掉大笔财物。雅典人及其同盟者们共有136艘三列桨战舰,两条五十列桨大船,一条载着30匹马的船。总实力计有:1300名轻装步兵,5100重装步兵,480名弓弩手,700名投石手,共有桨手2.6万人。此外,由30条商船承运面包师、石匠、木工以及谷物和全套建筑要塞的工具。还有100多条征集来的小船和许多自愿随远征军去作生意的小船。
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11. Phase II: Sicilian Expedition (415~413 B.C.)
But it was not long before a messenger was dispatched telling him to return alone to Athens for trial. Alcibiades’ reaction to this order was unforeseen: he defected to Sparta, where he took up his abode. The defection of Alcibiades left the Athenian expedition against Sicily without a strong and decisive leader. And this even served the opposite role. When he heard that he had been tried at Athens, found guilty, and even sentenced to death, Alcibiades, so angered told the Spartans all the Athenian plans, and showed how to upset them.
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11. Phase II: Sicilian Expedition (415~413 B.C.)
亚西比得及其同伙逃到斯巴达,取得了生命和安全保证。他向斯巴达人献媚,和盘托出雅典人的战略计划。他夸大其辞地煽动,激励斯巴达人的战斗情绪,又为斯巴达人出谋划策。在他的蛊惑下,斯巴达人坚定了进攻雅典的决心。他们在征调部队去增援西西里的同时,也在积极准备进攻阿提卡,并采取措施瓦解雅典同盟。
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11. Phase II: Sicilian Expedition (415~413 B.C.)
In 414 B.C., the two generals attempted to besiege Syracuse but failed. Not long after that, the second Athenian commander, Lamachus, was killed. But the Spartans, following the advice of Alcibiades, were determined to prevent the Athenians from conquering Sicily and sent a talented commander, Gylippus, to see what he could do. This reinforcement changed the situation dramatically. Gylippus scaled the Epipolae heights via a pass that the Athenian had carelessly left unguarded – the same pass they themselves had used a few months before. The Syracusans, moreover, had a counter-wall built. This also shattered Athenian chances for a blockade.
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11. Phase II: Sicilian Expedition (415~413 B.C.)
Nicias, sick and suffering from a kidney disease, asked the Athenians to recall him but was refused. Convinced the situation was hopeless, the Athenians sent another general, Demosthenes for reinforcements. When he arrived with the second fleet and immediately suffered a serious battle, Demosthenes advocated withdrawal. When everything was ready for the Athenian’s departure to a more secure location, the indecisiveness and religious anxiety of Nicias led to a fatal delay. Thucydides related: And just as they were about to sail, there was an eclipse of the moon, which happened to be full. The event made most of the Athenians feel uneasy, and they urged their generals to stay; and Nicias, who was too inclined to believe in the interpretation of omens and that sort of thing, refused even to discuss a move until after they had stayed for “three times nine days,” as their seers decreed. This was the reason that Athenians stayed on after all their delays!
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11. Phase II: Sicilian Expedition (415~413 B.C.)
可是,当他们决定撤离时,发生了月食。迷信的尼西阿斯坚持依照预言者说的办,要等到过了3个9天之后,才讨论军队的去向,致使军机延误。叙拉古人却一点也没有放松,他们在自己选好的日子,同时从海上和陆地向雅典人发起进攻,给雅典人造成重大损失。他们再也不怕雅典人了,开始封锁港口,堵死雅典人的逃路。
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11. Phase II: Sicilian Expedition (415~413 B.C.)
On this delay, the size and morale of the enemy forces were allowed to increase. The Syracusans attacked the Athenian fleet and blocked the exit from the harbor. A fierce battle ensued, with some two hundred ships jammed together in a tight space. The din made it impossible to hear the calls of the coxswains(舵手).
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11. Phase II: Sicilian Expedition (415~413 B.C.)
战斗开始了。这是一次比以往任何一次都要激烈的战役。双方的桨手们毫不畏惧,舵手们互相竞争。200多条船挤在一个狭小的水面上。一条船去撞击对方,同时又被敌舰撞击,有时两条或更多的船一起向一条船撞击。船舰互相撞击的声音如雷贯耳,命令声和叫喊声混成一片。甲板上的士兵们把标枪、箭和石头不停地向敌人的船上射去;一旦船舰相遇,两方的士兵都抢着跑上敌舰,跟着就是殊死的肉搏。雅典人拼命要冲出港口,夺取安全回到祖国的机会;叙拉古人全力争取胜利,阻止雅典人逃跑。
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11. Phase II: Sicilian Expedition (415~413 B.C.)
海上战斗在进行时,岸上的军人们也不轻松。他们紧张的情绪随着战斗的形势而转移。忽而大声哀嚎,忽而开始祈祷,忽而觉得达到了安全境界,忽而觉得面临死亡的边缘。战斗进行了很长时间,叙拉古人及其同盟者终于粉碎了雅典人的抵抗。他们大声欢呼着、叫喊着,追逐着丢盔卸甲的雅典人,把他们赶到岸边。岸上的雅典人也乱成一团,他们大声哭嚎或呻吟;清醒一些的人跑去帮助他们的船舰或防守他们的城墙。
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11. Phase II: Sicilian Expedition (415~413 B.C.)
这真是一个悲惨的时刻。全体雅典人都感到耻辱和痛苦。死者没有埋葬,伤员难以带走,全军差不多都在以泪洗面。他们已经遭受了极大的痛苦,不可预料的未来也许还会带给他们更大的灾难。他们忘不掉,当初出发时是多么阔气、多么骄傲,而今又是多么耻辱、多么落魄!没有哪个希腊军队曾经受过这样的惨败。
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11. Phase II: Sicilian Expedition (415~413 B.C.)
将军们尽力鼓舞、安慰自己沮丧的士兵,把4万人的散乱部队整理好。撤退的队伍一路上不时受到阻击,走走停停,进一步,退两步,退却的第5天晚上,雅典人的各种必需品都没有了,不少人在同敌人作战中又负了伤。尼西阿斯和德莫斯提尼决定,尽量多燃一些火把,在夜间出发。他们避开叙拉古人的守卫,向海边走。由于晚间行军,又是在敌人的领土上,而且敌人就在不远的地方,德莫斯提尼的后卫部队发生了混乱,一部分队伍失掉了与大部队的联络。黎明时,主力部队到了海边。天亮以后,叙拉古人才发现雅典人已经走过去了,他们立刻追赶。中午时分,叙拉古人赶上并包围了落在后面的、由德莫斯提尼率领的后卫部队。雅典人被困在一个四面有围墙的地方。在稳获胜利的心理支配下,叙拉古人宁愿保护自己而不想同雅典人展开肉搏战。他们从四面八方把石头射向雅典人,持续了一整天,直到雅典人精疲力竭。德莫斯提尼被迫投降。
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11. Phase II: Sicilian Expedition (415~413 B.C.)
尼西阿斯在确认了德莫斯提尼投降的消息后,曾提出愿意偿付叙拉古战争赔款,作为换取允许他们回国的条件,希望能订立协约。但是,叙拉古人和吉利普斯拒绝了这些建议。他们包围了雅典人,雨点般的石头落在雅典人的头上。一直坚持到晚上,只有300人突围出去。第2天,尼西阿斯带领他的军队继续前进,叙拉古人及其同盟者紧追不舍。又饥又渴的雅典人向河边跑,冲入河中。一切纪律都没有了。每个人都想先渡过河去,他们挤成了一团,互相践踏。有的人被他们自己的矛刺死,有的人被行李纠缠着让水卷走了。河对岸的叙拉古人居高临下,向雅典人射击。伯罗奔尼撒人冲到河里去杀正喝水的雅典人。最后,死者的尸体堆积在河床中,少数渡过河的人也被敌人的骑兵杀死了。尼西阿斯向吉利普斯投降。突围出去的300人也被追上并当了俘虏。被俘的雅典人有7000人之多,其余的人当时就被杀死了。叙拉古人及其同盟者不顾吉利普斯的意见,杀死了尼西阿斯和德莫斯提尼。
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11. Phase II: Sicilian Expedition (415~413 B.C.)
被俘的雅典人及其同盟者,被囚禁在一个没有棚顶的、狭窄的石坑中。白天,秋日的毒热和污浊的空气使他们困苦不堪;夜晚,秋风袭人,无法可以御寒。伤病人员逐日增加,死者的尸体堆在那里,恶臭难当。他们在饥饿困苦中煎熬了2个多月,除雅典人和参加远征军的意大利人及西西里的希腊人外,其余的俘虏都被卖作了奴隶。雅典人在西西里的失败,是完全的惨败,海军、陆军都毁灭了,全军覆灭。他们丧失了近5万人,其中重装步兵1万余人,损失战舰200艘,付出了大笔战费。
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11. Phase II: Sicilian Expedition (415~413 B.C.)
The Athenians had lost tens of thousands of men and accomplished nothing. For them, the outcome of the campaign was so horrific that people at Athens at first refused to believe that appalling news. As Thucydides was later to write, “All was lost. Ships. Men. Everything” . This disastrous outcome proved the wisedom of Periclean Strategy.
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12. The Third Phase of the War
Alcibiades’ defection turned out to cause Athens still more trouble. At Sparta, he had advised the Spartan commanders to establish a permanent base of operations in the Attic countryside. In 413 B.C., under Alcibiades’ instruction, the Spartans took and fortified the small town of Decelea, only twelve miles from Athens. This served the Spartans as a permanent base of operation by keeping an armed force there, ready to raid the Athenian countryside year around instead of forty-day annual invasions as before. They killed farm animals and destroyed farmland as they went, keeping Athens in a perpetual sate of siege. This made agricultural work in the fields of Attica dangerous and forced Athens to rely even more heavily than in the past on food imported by sea.
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12. The Third Phase of the War: Athenian Recover
First, their opponents were severely slow in taking further actions. Corinth and Syracuse were slow to bring their fleets into the Aegean, and Sparta's other allies were also slow to furnish troops or ships. Second, the emergency reserve funds and 100 ships that had been stored on the Acropolis since the beginning of the war to be used only as a last resort turned out to be rather helpful for its revival. Athenian naval forces had revived sufficiently that they managed to prevent a Corinthian fleet from sailing to aid Chio, to lay siege to that rebellious island ally. And to win some other battles along the Athenian coast.
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12. Phase III of the War:The Oligarchic Coup at Athens
In spite of these victories, the financial weakness and political chaos brought about by the Sicilian defeat gave way to a few Athenians men, who had long harbored contempt for the broad-based democracy . Alcibiades again came to the fore. With the hope of returning to Athens, he made the Athenians believe that he would make an alliance with the Persians and seek funds from them for Athens In 411 B.C. the assembly voted itself out of existence and installed the rule of a new, provisional Council of four hundred, which, it was understood, would soon give way to a larger body of five thousand. In fact, however, the five thousand were never chosen, and a Council of four hundred instituted a reign of terror. Yet, the situation for the Athens did not do any better under oligarchic guidance when the peace with Sparta failed to materialize.
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12. Phase III of the War:The Final battle
In 407 B.C., Lysander, the Spartan outstanding general and also an artful diplomat, tried to seek support from Persia. His honesty finally won for him the favor of Cyrus, the son of the Persian king. Lysand and Cyrus formed a union, which altered the total circumstance in the Aegean. With the financial support of Cyrus, Lysander constructed a powerful fleet of 160 ships which became a formidable weapon.
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12. Phase III of the War:The Final battle
In the year of 405 B.C., the Spartan fleet sailed at once to the Hellespont in the northeastern corner of Greece, the spot close to the very spot where Xerxes once crossed from Asia into Europe. This place is the source of Athens' grain and the Athenian fleet then had no choice but to follow. 180 Athenian ships are drawn up under the command of Admiral Conon, facing the Spartan fleet of 200 ships under the command the able, energetic, dynamic Lysander. Like this, the final battle came.
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12. Phase III of the War:The Final battle
Through cunning strategy, Lysander totally defeated the Athenian fleet. Athenians’ suffer is total. And ship after ship after ship is damaged without the Athenians even being able to get on them. The entire Athenian fleet is destroyed. Only a few ships sail away to safety. One of them was the admiral ship of Conon who sailed to Cyprus and was anxious not to face the judgment of the Assembly.
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12. Phase III of the War:The Final battle
And when word of it is brought back to the Athenians in the late afternoon and all through that night, the streets of Athens are filled with people crying, mourning, and weeping. Before their eyes rise the ghost of Melians, and the Athenians know that they will suffer what the Melians suffered, what they imposed upon others in total war and their desire for absolute conquest. And they wait in dread for the arrival of Lysander and the Spartan fleet.
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12. Phase III of the War:The Final battle
In the spring of 404B.C., the Spartan fleet arrives, and the Athenians surrendered and asked for terms. The Thebans and Corinthians who have suffered through these long years of warfare advocated doing to Athens precisely what had been done to Melos, that is, all the male are killed and women and children sold into slavery. And it is what the Athenians expect. But finally, Athens was spared. Lysander declined the advocate of Thebans and Corinthians by recalling Athens’ noble service to Greece during the Persian wars.
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12. Phase III of the War:The Final battle
“At that time when the freedom of Greece stood in the balance, when the Barbarians, Persians came to conquer and slave us, no nation fought more bravely than did the Athenians. Sparta will never allow a nation that once served Greece so well to be destroyed. Men of Athens, you are saved by your past. Your empire is gone; your fleet will be taken away from you, but you will keep your lives, your laws and govern yourself in freedom as members of the Spartan alliance.”
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12. Phase III of the War:The Final battle
But the Long Walls of Athens, the great walls that had made Athenians invulnerable from the sea, were pulled down to the merry accompaniment of flutes, for “it was thought that this day was the beginning of freedom for Greece” (2.2.23; Warner).
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12. Phase III of the War:The Final battle
By doing so the victorious Spartans proved to be the most clement state that fought Athens and at the same time they turned out to be its saviour as neither Corinth nor Thebes at the time could challenge their decision.
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13. Aftermath of the Peloponnesian War
The Peloponnesian war brought about great impacts on the Greek world. It could be said that the war put an end to a Golden Age of Greek, and particularly Athenian culture.
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13. Aftermath of the Peloponnesian War
The Peloponnesian War has and will still fascinate later generations because of the way it engulfed the Greek world. The insight Thucydides provides into the motivations of its participants is deeper than that which is known about any other war in ancient time.
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13. Aftermath of the Peloponnesian War
伯罗奔尼撒战争是一场非常残酷的战争,在战争期间内政与外交息息相联。雅典丧失了其强国地位。但战争的结束也给人们带来了许多新的希望,尤其人们希望和平和自由。色诺芬是这样来描述雅典的投降的:“雅典接受和平条约后赖山德尔进入比雷埃夫斯。那些被流放的人回到了他们的家园,在笛子音乐的伴随下大家欣乐地开始拆除城墙,因为大家相信,从这一天开始希腊的自由开始了。”“长墙”被拆除,提洛同盟被解散。雅典的舰队除12条船外全部被交出。在雅典一个亲斯巴达的寡头政权上台(不过这个政权在前403年就又被取消了)。
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13. Aftermath of the Peloponnesian War
在爱琴海上到处都设立了亲斯巴达的政府,斯巴达在各处驻兵。虽然科林斯和底比斯希望摧毁雅典,但雅典没有被摧毁,因为斯巴达不希望留下一个力量真空。斯巴达也有它自己的困难:它以自由和自主为口号介入战场,但却向波斯出卖了小亚细亚的城市。现在它又不想将这些城市让给波斯了,因此它不得不与波斯作战。波斯是这场战争中最大的得利者。波斯与斯巴达的战争一直到前386年才结束。这场战火从西西里岛到小亚细亚、牵涉了该地区所有国家的“古代世界大战”过后希腊的经典黄金时代也结束了。
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13. Aftermath of the Peloponnesian War
伯罗奔尼撒战争是希腊历史上的一个转折点。希腊的城市国家此前就已经不稳定的均衡关系彻底被打破了。前4世纪雅典虽然能够重建提洛同盟,但这个同盟与第一个同盟相比就逊色多了。但斯巴达的霸权也只持续了数十年,但此后战前的形势也未能被恢复。在这个发展规程的最后出现了雄心勃勃的马其顿国王腓力二世。
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13. Aftermath of the Peloponnesian War
伯罗奔尼撒战争中,交战的双方都是非正义的。在争夺霸权的这场较量中,斯巴达能够获胜,只不过因为其内部矛盾比之雅典相对小些、简单些罢了。雅典人对自己的同盟者压榨过甚,也为他们自己埋下了祸根。斯巴达人用解放他们的口号,轻而易举地就争得了许多支持者。伯罗奔尼撒战争给希腊世界带来了空前的破坏。当敌人还在德凯利亚时,所有的雅典人都不是在城墙上,就是在各个岗位上,站在武器的旁边。阿提卡农村的被占领、财产被掠夺、人力大批丧失,是雅典势力衰落的主要原因之一。
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13. Aftermath of the Peloponnesian War
战争对小农经济的毁灭性打击,摧毁了希腊文明的基础。作为城邦支柱的公民兵制度随着小所有者的设落而衰退,希腊城邦的末日已经不远,真是“天时不如地利,地利不如人和”斯巴达人为了称霸希腊,不惜牺牲希腊的长远利益,同宿敌波斯联合对付提洛同盟,加速了雅典的失败,但因此而留给自己的日子也不多了。
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13. Aftermath of the Peloponnesian War
在这次战争中,加强海军力量,争夺海上优势是一个突出的战略问题。雅典人曾把自己的命运押在他们的强大舰队上,从而忽略了阿提卡农民的利益,最终把自己置于困境。斯巴达人首次与雅典人进行海战时,连在风浪中使船的技术都不具备,可是在经过多年的战争之后,却在羊河口海战中一举挫败了在海上称霸几十年的雅典人,为最终的胜利奠基。叙拉古人在战争中学到了作战的知识,他们用特殊加固的船头去撞击雅典人的船头,又以标枪配合,破了雅典人的传统海战战术,给敌人造成了极大威胁。固守城垣和攻城掠地的事,在此次战争中屡见不鲜。这是古代战争的一大特点。雅典人在开战之时,全国的人向雅典城集中,欲以坚守不出同斯巴达人对抗。而挖地道、断水源、放火烧,长时间包围乃至以攻城机强攻或利用内奸里应外合捣毁城池,都是各方常用的破城手段。
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13. Aftermath of the Peloponnesian War
战争中,及时捕捉战机比什么都重要。公元前429年,福密俄趁斯巴达人尚未熟悉水性之际,利用风浪给敌人造成的困境,立即发动攻击,获得胜利。其后,斯巴达人略施小计,把雅典人引入圈套,眼看胜利唾手可得,不料得意忘形,坏了大事。雅典人不失时机反戈相击,反败为胜。公元前424年的安菲波里之战,雅典主战的克里昂不去想如何作战,而先考虑撤退,撤退中又将弱点暴露在敌人面前,正好给了想要出奇制胜的斯巴达人以可乘之机。斯巴达人仅以损失7人的代价,换得雅典损兵折将600人的胜利。
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13. Aftermath of the Peloponnesian War
如此巨大的反差,给人们留下了深刻的印象。雅典人在战争初期的信心,不能不说在很大程度上依仗他们当时的财力;而在战争后期,斯巴达人的长期围困,使雅典人失去了土地和牲畜,内有奴隶叛逃,外有盟邦造反和强敌在侧,雅典人危在旦夕。在叙拉古时,雅典人远离故土,不免常被补给困难所扰,而终于遭到了全军覆灭的厄运。斯巴达人在派罗斯失陷后,组织救援不力,又有后院起火,希洛人造反,以致雪上加霜,终于失利。由此可见,进行战争时,有一个强大而巩固的后方是多么重要。
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谢 谢!
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