Bank Safety and Liquidity Provision 银行安全性和流动性供应 Philip H Bank Safety and Liquidity Provision 银行安全性和流动性供应 Philip H. Dybvig 大顽童 Washington University in Saint Louis and SWUFE 华盛顿大学.圣路易斯、西南财大 Chengdu June 29, 2012 成都 2012年6月29日

Overview 主要内容 What do banks do? 银行的职能 Bank regulation pre-Basel 巴塞尔协议之前的银行监管 Regulation under Basel 巴塞尔协议下的银行监管 Shadow banking 影子银行 Financial crisis 金融危机 Current regulation 当前监管 Suggestions looking forward 对未来的建议

What Banks Do　银行的职能 Asset Side Services (e.g., originating and servicing loans) 资产方服务（例如,提供贷款与维护贷款服务） Liability Side Services (e.g., accepting deposits and providing cash) 负债方服务（例如,吸收存款与提供现金） Transformation Services (creation of liquidity) 转换服务（创造流动性） Diamond and Dybvig (1983): liquidity creation by banks　 Diamond and Dybvig (1983):银行流动性创造 　

Traditional Bank Regulation传统银行监管 Bank Examiners银行的审查者 – examined the loan documentation and lending practices审查贷款文件与贷款业务 – formed an opinion of the safety and soundness of the bank对银行的安全稳健性做出判断 Glass-Steagall格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案 – separated investment banking from commercial and mortgage banking将投资银行从商业与抵押银行系统中分离出来 – limited deposit insurance umbrella to a short list of activities存款保险的作用受限

Regulation under Basel巴塞尔协议下的监管 Designed to create a level playing field 试图设计创造出一个“公平的竞争环境” Capital requirements based on coarse aggregates基于粗糙总量的资本需求 – based on punishment in a repeated game 以重复博弈中的惩罚为基础 – game not repeated if the bank blows up! 如果银行倒闭，博弈停止 No Glass-Steagall: government insures hedge funds etc.废除了格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案，政府得承担保护对冲基金的责任

Shadow Banking影子银行 Huge unregulated repo market巨大的监管空白下的回购市场 Some possible causes可能的原因 – regulatory arbitrage监管套利 – limits on deposit insurance对存款保险的限制 – restrictive regulation under Basel巴塞尔协议下有限的监管

Financial Crisis (simplified and partial view)金融危机（简化与部分观点） Collapse of shadow banking影子银行崩溃 US real estate small compared to shadow banking美国房地产业与影子银行业相比规模较小 Bank commercial paper, MMFs, too big to fail, etc.银行拥有商业票据、货币市场基金，大而不倒 Basel regulation failed巴塞尔监管失败 – simultaneous bank failures in many countries许多国家的银行在同一时期倒闭 – coarse risk measures easy to game粗略的风险评价让银行容易钻空子

A Surprisingly Accurate Quote from 1986 早在1986年做出的令人惊讶的正确预测 Proposals to move toward 100% reserve banking would prevent banks from fulfilling their primary function of creating liquidity. Since banks are an important part of the infrastructure in the economy, this is at best a risky move and at worst could reduce stability because new firms that move in to fill the vacuum left by banks may inherit the problem of runs. 迈向全储备银行的建议，将妨碍银行创造流动性这一主要功能。银行是经济基础设施的重要组成部分，这一建议充其量是一次冒险，最坏的结果是降低经济的稳定性，因为新的公司将填补银行职能的空白，但是他们同样会面临挤兑的问题． Diamond, Douglas W., and Philip H. Dybvig, 1986, Banking Theory, Deposit Insurance, and Bank Regulation, Journal of Business 59

How to Eliminate Bank Failures Completely怎样完全消除银行倒闭 If we want to avoid the problem of banks blowing up, it is simple: just make banking illegal.　如果想避免银行倒闭的问题：最简单的是宣布银行业不合法。 Of course, this destroys whatever benefits we get from banks.但是，这样也湮灭了银行给我们带来的所有益处

Big Questions几大问题 Is liquidity provided by banks important? 银行提供的流动性重要吗？ Is liquidity provided by shadow banks important? 影子银行提供的流动性重要吗？ Will increasing deposit insurance limits and regulation shrink shadow banks? 提高存款保险的限制和监管力度能否遏制住影子银行？ Will Basel start becoming effective in controlling risk? (I doubt it.) 巴塞尔协议能否有效的控制风险？（我很怀疑）

My Recommendations我的建议 Eliminate Basel and bring back the bank examiners.取消巴塞尔协议，重回传统银行审查 Reinstate Glass-Steagall.恢复格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法 Eliminate the limits on deposit insurance (in process?).取消存款保险限制（正在进行？） Move towards narrow banking if bank liquidity provision can be shown to be surplus (doubtful at this point).如果能证明银行提供流动性是多余的（这一点也值得怀疑），则应该重回狭义银行的方向。

Thanks! 谢谢！ These slides and a lot of other current papers can be found at: http://phildybvig.com/somepapers.html