SOCⅠ130099.1 西方社会思想史 于 海 复旦大学社会学系

7. 启蒙运动

本章重点 启蒙时代又被称为“理性时代”，何为启蒙理性？康德给出一个定义，两百多年后，福柯再次回答“何为启蒙理性”，重新阐释启蒙问题，包括理性、批判、现代性、人文主义等。本章以启蒙理性议题连接起社会思想史上两位经典学者，把握启蒙理性的要义，特别是辨析若干重要概念，为本章教学的重点。 本章从康德的批判理性开始，终于福柯的考古学和系谱学，了解两人的相同点，特别是两人的不同点，是本章学习的关键。由当代学者阐释学科史范畴，令先辈思想家的得失和意义更为显豁，是思想史学习的方法之一。

启蒙理性的进步和自然概念 进步概念 启蒙学者全都相信人类持续进步的前景。历史进步的基础是理性，推动力是理性所能掌握的无限积累的知识，进步理论最好地表达了理性主义的意识形态。这种历史进步观本质上却是反历史主义的。因为进步只是（或主要是）知识的进步，且是为永恒不变的人性（理性）所保证的；这样，社会历史的进步、倒退或停滞全然取决于理性是否被人所发现和发扬。 自然概念 自然概念，包括其所有的派生概念,(如自然秩序、自然法、自然状态、自然人性、自然体系等)在理性思想中是一关健概念。启蒙学者继承了自然法学派的自然概念，赋予自然一词更多人文的、政治的及社会的涵义。自然的就是善的，反自然的就是恶的。

启蒙理性的利益和秩序概念 利益概念 启蒙学者依感觉主义、人文主义观点肯定个人的权利和利益。但他们都强调人们追求私利应当是合理的或开明的，他们力图用功利主义原则统一自身利益与公共利益。理性已经消除了除公共利益外的所有超个人的价值，功利主义的原则又将公共利益视为用理性指导与调和而实现的自身利益及其满足的总和，这样启蒙学者就在利益概念中发现了社会价值的合理基础，发现了个人价值与社会价值的内在联系，并发现了唯一有意义的行为规范准则。 秩序概念 理性的批判已将过去的一切世界观和社会制度抛进垃圾桶里，这要求以新的秩序取而代之。这种秩序应该用世俗的、经验的观点，而非宗教神学的和思辩哲学的观点来阐述。

Enlightenment Characteristics of the Enlightenment: 1) Reason should control your actions, not dogma. Don't believe something just because it's traditional. 2) Doubt everything, lead to Locke's concept of political rights. 3) Linked to development of modern science, e.g., Immanuel Kant. 4) Important figures - Descartes, John Locke, Leibnitz, John Stuart Mill, David Hume, Adam Smith, John Milton. The Enlightenment defined and celebrated modern ideas about reason and rationalism

Rousseau 安放在巴黎先贤祠的卢梭的棺柩。中国人有盖棺论定的说法，又说“仁以为己任，不亦重乎？死而后已，不亦远乎？”但这些说法全都不适于卢梭。他无论生前死后，都是毁誉参半，从无论定。即便躺在墓室，似也不安分，还从棺木伸出手臂高举一柄火炬，他是想继续启蒙人类？还是想让后人铭记不忘？ 于海：《西方社会思想史》

Montesquieu 孟德斯鸠在巴黎的居所，位于巴黎最古老的旧城区，他在这里写作和会客，“谈笑有鸿儒，往来无白丁”，多少日后塑造时代精神的鸿篇巨制在这里诞生。今天该居所的底层已经改作为酒吧，它寻常得与巴黎成千上万的酒吧一样，若不是酒保的善意提醒，顾客们再有想象力，都不会想到他们的头上曾经涌动过影响历史进程的思想风暴。 于海：《西方社会思想史》

巴黎先贤祠与它的朝圣者

十八世纪精神：理性与知识分子 对比十七世纪：演绎理性（Descartes）和本体论个人主义（Hobbes & Locke）； 启蒙运动的理性：作为能力的理性（对比先验理性）；作为分析和建构的理性，分解一切对象至于最简单的成分，并据以建构对象的整体；作为批判的理性，确立理性为最高及最后的标准，将一切事物置于理性的法庭上加以审判，以能动的人的理性取代任何其他的权威。 知识分子：作为知识的生产者、传播者和世界秩序的立法者，世俗知识分子第一次在教会外形成为独立的知识群体和阶层（沙龙、咖啡馆等）。

人性的知识 休谟: 人性的科学是一切科学的首都和心脏.一旦掌握了人性以后,我们在其他各方面就有希望轻而易举地取得胜利了.从这个岗位,我们可以扩展到征服那些和人生有较为密切关系的一切科学.任何重要问题的解决关键,无不包括在关于人的科学中间;在我们没有熟悉这门科学之前,任何问题都不能得到确实的解决.因此,在试图说明人性的原理的时候,我们实际上就是在提出一个建立在几乎是全新的基础上的完整的科学体系,而这个基础正是一切科学唯一稳固的基础. 卢梭:人类的各种知识中最有用的就是关于人的知识。

Kant: What is Enlightenment? 什么是启蒙？启蒙就是人从由他自己造成的不成熟状态中走出来．不成熟是指一个人若无他人指导便不能运用他自己的理智．如果不成熟的原因不是由于缺少理智，而是由于若无他人指导便缺少运用理智的决心和勇气，这种不成熟就是由他自己所造成的．因此，启蒙运动的格言是：有勇气运用你自己的理智．

理性的公开运用和私下运用 这一启蒙运动除了自由而外并不需要任何别的东西,而且还确乎是一切可以称之为自由的东西之中最无害的东西,那就是在一切事情上都有公开运用自己理性的自由. 理性的公开运用,指任何人作为学者在全部听众面前所能做的那种运用.一个人在其所受任的一定公职岗位或者职务上所能运用的自己的理性,为私下的运用. 以上康德各页见康德《历史理性批判文集》22-31

Foucault: What is Enlightenment? Kant indicates right away that the 'way out' that characterizes Enlightenment is a process that releases us from the status of 'immaturity.' And by 'immaturity,' he means a certain state of our will that makes us accept someone else's authority to lead us in areas where the use of reason is called for. Kant gives three examples: we are in a state of 'immaturity' when a book takes the place of our understanding, when a spiritual director takes the place of our conscience, when a doctor decides for us what our diet is to be.

Private Use and Public Use of Reason What constitutes, for Kant, this private use of reason? In what area is it exercised? Man, Kant says, makes a private use of reason when he is 'a cog in a machine'; that is, when he has a role to play in society and jobs to do: to be a soldier, to have taxes to pay, to be in charge of a parish, to be a civil servant, all this makes the human being a particular segment of society; he finds himself thereby placed in a circumscribed position, where he has to apply particular rules and pursue particular ends. Kant does not ask that people practice a blind and foolish obedience, but that they adapt the use they make of their reason to these determined circumstances; and reason must then be subjected to the particular ends in view. Thus there cannot be, here, any free use of reason. On the other hand, when one is reasoning only in order to use one's reason, when one is reasoning as a reasonable being (and not as a cog in a machine), when one is reasoning as a member of reasonable humanity, then the use of reason must be free and public. Enlightenment is thus not merely the process by which individuals would see their own personal freedom of thought guaranteed. There is Enlightenment when the universal, the free, and the public uses of reason are superimposed on one another.

Enlightenment and Critiques I believe that it is necessary to stress the connection that exists between this brief article and the three Critiques. Kant in fact describes Enlightenment as the moment when humanity is going to put its own reason to use, without subjecting itself to any authority; now it is precisely at this moment that the critique is necessary, since its role is that of defining the conditions under which the use of reason is legitimate in order to determine what can be known, what must be done, and what may be hoped. Illegitimate uses of reason are what give rise to dogmatism and heteronomy, along with illusion; on the other hand, it is when the legitimate use of reason has been clearly defined in its principles that its autonomy can be assured. The critique is, in a sense, the handbook of reason that has grown up in Enlightenment; and, conversely, the Enlightenment is the age of the critique.

Modernity: an Attitude not a Period Thinking back on Kant's text, I wonder whether we may not envisage modernity rather as an attitude than as a period of history. And by 'attitude,' I mean a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task. A bit, no doubt, like what the Greeks called an ethos. And consequently, rather than seeking to distinguish the 'modern era' from the 'premodern' or 'postmodern,' I think it would be more useful to try to find out how the attitude of modernity, ever since its formation, has found itself struggling with attitudes of 'countermodernity.'

philosophical interrogation I have been seeking, on the one hand, to emphasize the extent to which a type of philosophical interrogation -- one that simultaneously problematizes man's relation to the present, man's historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an autonomous subject -- is rooted in the Enlightenment. On the other hand, I have been seeking to stress that the thread that may connect us with the Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but rather the permanent reactivation of an attitude -- that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era.

Enlightenment: as an Historical Event and Process This permanent critique of ourselves has to avoid the always too facile confusions between humanism and Enlightenment. We must never forget that the Enlightenment is an event, or a set of events and complex historical processes, that is located at a certain point in the development of European societies. As such, it includes elements of social transformation, types of political institution, forms of knowledge, projects of rationalization of knowledge and practices, technological mutations that are very difficult to sum up in a word, even if many of these phenomena remain important today. The one I have pointed out and that seems to me to have been at the basis of an entire form of philosophical reflection concerns only the mode of reflective relation to the present.

What is Humanism? Humanism is something entirely different. It is a theme or rather a set of themes that have reappeared on several occasions over time in European societies; these themes always tied to value judgments have obviously varied greatly in their content as well as in the values they have preserved. Furthermore they have served as a critical principle of differentiation. In the seventeenth century there was a humanism that presented itself as a critique of Christianity or of religion in general; there was a Christian humanism opposed to an ascetic and much more theocentric humanism. In the nineteenth century there was a suspicious humanism hostile and critical toward science and another that to the contrary placed its hope in that same science. Marxism has been a humanism; so have existentialism and personalism; there was a time when people supported the humanistic values represented by National Socialism and when the Stalinists themselves said they were humanists.

Enlightenment and humanism in a state of tension rather than identity Now in this connection I believe that this thematic which so often recurs and which always depends on humanism can be opposed by the principle of a critique and a permanent creation of ourselves in our autonomy: that is a principle that is at the heart of the historical consciousness that the Enlightenment has of itself. From this standpoint I am inclined to see Enlightenment and humanism in a state of tension rather than identity.

critical question today has to be turned back into a positive one This philosophical ethos may be characterized as a limit-attitude. We are not talking about a gesture of rejection. We have to move beyond the outside-inside alternative; we have to be at the frontiers. Criticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits. But if the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits knowledge has to renounce transgressing, it seems to me that the critical question today has to be turned back into a positive one: in what is given to us as universal necessary obligatory what place is occupied by whatever is singular contingent and the product of arbitrary constraints? The point in brief is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression.

Genealogy and Archaeology This entails an obvious consequence: that criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with universal value, but rather as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying. In that sense, this criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that of making a metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method. Archaeological -- and not transcendental -- in the sense that it will not seek to identify the universal structures of all knowledge or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events. And this critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think. It is not seeking to make possible a metaphysics that has finally become a science; it is seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.

福柯的考古学和系谱学 批判不再以寻求具有普遍价值的形式结构为己任，而更像是对各种事件的历史调查，正是这些事件，导致了对我们自身的建构，并认可我们自己正是我们之所为、之所思和之所言的主体。在此意义上，这种批判并不是超验的，其目的不在于使形而上学成为可能。就其旨趣而言，批判是谱系学的，就其方法而论，批判是考古学的。所谓考古学，而非先验学，是指：批判并不试图发现有关一切知识和一切可能的道德行为的普遍结构，而是力求去分析将我们的所思、所言和所为的一切都叙述为纷繁历史事件的种种话语。批判所以是谱系学的，是在于它无意从我们现在之所是的形式中推断出什么是我们不可为的和不可知的，而是从使我们成为我们之所是的偶然机缘中，分析出不再是我们之所是、不再做我们之所做或不再思我们之所思的那种可能性。批判不再追求使一种形而上学成为可能，并最终使之成为一种科学，而是竭尽全力地给自由事业以新动力。 《福柯集》539

参考书和本章问题 参考书 本章问题 休谟:《人性论》，第6-10页； 康德:《历史理性批判文集》； Foucault: What is Enlightenment? 《福柯集》，“何为启蒙”？ 本章问题 康德的批判理性与福柯谱系学的区别何在？