第十一單元：Contemporary acquaintance theories 當代親知理論 梁益堉 教授 2012.5.14 Self Knowledge 自我知識 第十一單元：Contemporary acquaintance theories 當代親知理論 梁益堉 教授 2012.5.14 【本著作除另有註明外，採取創用CC「姓名標示－非商業性－相同方式分享」台灣3.0版授權釋出】 本課程指定教材為Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge。 本講義僅引用部分內容，請讀者自行準備。 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊，依據Microsoft服務合約及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。

4.2 Russell’s acquaintance theory Problems of Russell’s acquaintance theory Problem 1: Sense data are ontologically problematic. When one is looking at the table, one’s sense datum is purportedly brown and rectangular. But the only brown and rectangular thing in the situation seems to be the table. So where is this brown, rectangular sense datum? Nor does there seem to be anything brown and rectangular in one’s brain. (p.92) Problem 2: 概念化問題。It is hard to understand how one could know one’s sense data simply by being aware of them. Knowledge of an object seems to require thinking about the object, which in turn involves some way of thinking of it. (p.92) 以上著作轉載自Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge，92頁，依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。

4.2 Russell’s acquaintance theory Russell’s response to Problem 2: distinguishing between “knowledge of things” and “knowledge of truths”. Knowledge of truths: propositional and requires concepts. Knowledge of things(knowledge of sense data): 這類的知識不需 對該對象有概念。 (not involve any conceptualization of the thing known) Ex:聽古典樂，說不出的感動？ What do you think? Objection: William James holds that this connection between appearance and reality does not yield an account of introspective knowledge.

4.2 Russell’s acquaintance theory James: 如果要算是知識的話，光 是察覺到還不夠，有知識必須是 能記得，能對其反思、命名分類。 沒有相關概念能力就沒有知識。 就算是對sense data，也需要概念 能力，才能構成知識。沒有 knowledge of things。察覺是一回 事，察覺成什麼是另一回事。 Mere awareness of a state— Russellian “knowledge of things”— does not constitute self-knowledge. What do you think? Flickr，作者： pfv.。

4.3 Contemporary acquaintance theories 4.3.1 The acquaintance thesis Contemporary acquaintance theorists 1. Not committed to the existence of sense data. 當代ACQ論者把把心智狀態當成 是性質。 Ex: I am in pain is to say that I instantiate the property pain. 2. Metaphysically direct access to (some of) one’s own mental states provides strongly justified, noninferential judgments concerning those states. Flickr，作者：gusset。

4.3.1 The acquaintance thesis How it really is v.s. How something appears 關於physical object有實在(reality)與表象(appearance)的區分， 但實在與表象的區分在sensation上不存在，經歷成綠，就是綠。 我們會經歷綠色的錯覺或幻覺，但外界並沒有綠色的東西存在。 但綠色的錯覺或幻覺本身就是這樣呈現出來，沒有實在表象的 區分。 Phenomenal greenness: the characteristic feel that typically occurs when you see something green. It constitutes “what it’s like” to see something green, in paradigmatic cases. Ex: not paradigmatic cases: inverted spectrum 如果你的知覺有phenomenal greenness那麼你就真的( really)有 這樣的知覺。

4.3.1 The acquaintance thesis Christopher Hill:“there is no appearance/reality gap in the case of sensations”. What do you think? This suggests that your relation to your sensations can be epistemically secure and metaphysically direct. When one’s judgment about one’s own mental state exploits the metaphysically direct relation of acquaintance, it can be more epistemically secure than other empirical judgments.(p.96) But this is not to say that they are entirely immune from error (and so infallible) or that we are aware of all of our mental states (and hence omniscient).(p.96) 以上著作轉載自Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge，96頁，依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。

4.3.1 The acquaintance thesis The core of any acquaintance theory 1. some introspective knowledge involves acquaintance. 2. mere acquaintance with a mental state does not suffice for introspective knowledge of it. Acquaintance 是形上學上的關係，沒有直接的知識論上的蘊含。 內省知識是 knowledge of a truth. 當代ACQ不同意有knowledge of things。 如果要成為知識的話，內省的當事者必須形成適當的判斷 (judgment)。當代ACQ論者必須要能解釋how acquaintance with a mental state can justify the corresponding introspective judgment。Ex: that pain is present.

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 授權條件 作者/來源 1-9 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊，依據Microsoft服務合約及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。 2 When one is, …, thinking of it. 本著作轉載自Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge，92頁，依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。 4 Flickr，作者： pfv.。 本作品轉載自，瀏覽日期2012/5/18。本作品轉載自，http://www.flickr.com/photos/pfv/2739621207/sizes/o/in/photostream/。本作品採取創用CC姓名標示-非商業性 2.0 通用版授權釋出。 5 Flickr，作者：gusset。 本作品轉載自http://www.flickr.com/photos/gusset/7194487782/sizes/m/in/photostream/，瀏覽日期2012/5/18。本作品採取創用CC姓名標示-非商業性-相同方式分享 2.0 通用版授權釋出。 7 When one’s judgment , …, states (and hence omniscient). 本著作轉載自Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge，96頁，依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。