哲學概論 授課教師：王榮麟 單元 25：自由意志與決定論 【本著作除另有註明外，採取創用CC「姓名標示－非商業性－相同方式分享」台灣 3.0 版授權釋出】 本作品轉載自 Microsoft Office 2003 多媒體藝廊，依據 Microsoft 服務合約及著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用

Patricia 的案例 1974年，美國報業鉅子赫斯特（Hearst）的女兒派翠西亞（Patricia）就讀加州大學時，被一群叫「共生」解放軍的激進份子綁架。 他們以派翠西亞的生命為要脅，命令赫斯特按照他們的指示，把指定的金額樂捐給幾個特定的慈善機構。 赫斯特一一照辦，只求女兒能平安釋回。

這批激進份子果然遵守諾言，要釋放派翠西亞。 但派翠西亞卻不肯離開。她認定共生解放軍是一群有理想的青年，她敬佩他們的所做所為，並愛上了其中的一位首領。 她加入了他們的組織，跟著他們一起搶劫銀行。

起初，赫斯特透過傳播媒體辯稱他的女兒是無辜的，參加搶劫是受脅迫的，而不是出於她的自由意志。 然而，洛杉磯一家銀行的錄影機卻非常清楚的錄下派翠西亞的搶劫實況：她手持長槍，非常主動而兇猛，不像受脅迫而勉強行動的樣子。 後來，共生解放軍全部被警方擊斃或緝獲。派翠西亞被檢察官起訴，經法院宣判定罪。

在訴訟期間，她的父親請最好的律師為她辯護，並請到加州大學一位專門研究洗腦的心理學教授為她做心理測驗，證明她曾受洗腦。 她的律師就根據此項測驗的結果，辯稱她的搶劫行為並非其自由意志決定的，因而不必為該行為負法律責任。

問題 Patricia該不該為她搶劫銀行的行為負法律責任？

問題的進一步分析 問題1：只要是受洗腦的影響而做出的行為，就不是出自自由意志的決定而做的行為嗎？ 問題2：只要不是出自自由意志之決定而做的行為，就不必負法律責任嗎？

問題1的正方回答 洗腦即是清除舊有的信念—如「美國社會是個公平的社會」—而灌輸新的信念—如「以暴力劫富濟貧乃是正當的行為」。 信念會強烈影響行為，甚至具有決定性的作用。在洗腦之後，行為者的行為乃是別人所促成的，而非自己所能控制的。 既然不是自己所能控制的行為，當然就不是他的自由意志所決定要做的行為。

問題2的正方回答 有關責任的一個基本原則即是：對於自己無法控制的事故或行為，不必負任何責任。 例如：中彈倒地的刑警，未能阻止眼前的歹徒殺人。 又如：酒醉或神智不清時所犯下的罪行可減輕或免除法律刑責，便是基於這樣的一條原則。 對於並非出自自由意志所決定的行為，一個人既然無法加以控制，則根據上述原則，他就不必為該行為負擔任何責任。

反方答覆 果真如此，不僅Patricia不必為她的搶劫行為負責，就連共生解放軍的其他成員，包括執行洗腦工作的人，也都不必負任何法律責任。 因為他們之所以有這些信念，也不是他們自己能夠控制的，而是取決於他所受的教育、生長的環境、所能接觸到的資訊….等等。所有這些都不是他自己能夠決定的。 有時，所有這些甚至還是整個社會不公所造成的。對於這些未受良好教育或生長在惡劣環境或未能取得正確資訊而犯下罪行的人，我們不但不應判刑，反而應該予以同情而諒解。

結果 進一步推論下去，可得結論如下：由於任何人的行為都不是他自己的自由意志所決定的。因此，任何人都不必為其行為負任何責任。

決定論vs.自由意志 何謂決定論？ 每一事件都有原因。一個事件之所以發生，必有促使其發生的原因。很難想像一個事件沒有任何原因，它自己無緣無故就發生了。 例如：一個剛做過全身健康檢查的運動員突然暴斃。若醫生一口咬定沒有原因，這絕對很難令人接受。 同樣地，對於五股金紙店爆炸事件的調查，若是檢警的結果報告竟是沒有原因，也絕對無法令社會大眾信服。

既然每一事件都有原因，則促使某一事件發生的原因本身也有其所以發生的原因。 例如：高速公路上某一件車禍的原因是濃霧以及駕駛人酒醉駕車。 當時當地之所以有濃霧必有其地形上或氣象上的原因；而駕駛人之所以酒醉駕車，也是有原因的。 明顯地，若每一事件都有原因，則如此層層相因，一定可以追溯到事件發生之前非常久遠的年代。換言之，該車禍至少在多年前已種下遠因：

駕駛人之所以酒醉開車是因為到高雄和當兵時的弟兄聚餐，而又必須趕回台北和客戶談生意。他每年定期與軍中同袍聚餐，且不醉不歸，已經有好幾年了；而他投身商界，經常南北奔波接洽客戶，也有多年歷史。 如果每一相關細節都追究其原因，把它們串成互相關聯的複雜因果網絡，則我們可以說該起車禍事件早在幾年前就注定要發生。

我們之所以認為某些事原本是可以避免的，那是因為我們忽略了整個因果網絡中的層層相因的環節。 一旦我們把所有相關因素都考慮在內，我們會發現：原本以為可以避免的事件其實是無法避免的，一切已發生的事件都是早就注定非發生不可的。

對決定論的初提問 真的每一事件都有原因嗎？ 若一切事件都是早已注定而不可避免的，那還有所謂的自由意志嗎？

自由意志？ 我們通常認為很多行為是我們自己決定要做的，沒有任何人強制或逼迫我們非做不可。 例如：在周末時，你有充分的自由可以任意選擇要看電影、喝咖啡、逛書店。結果你選擇去喝咖啡。 請注意：在這種情況下，並沒有任何人慫恿或勸阻你做其中的任何一件，也沒有任何外在情況阻礙或逼迫你做某種選擇。 在這種情況下，我們說你具有自由意志，你的選擇是基於自由意志所做的決定。

「人不必負責任」的三項主張 三項主張導出「任何人不必為其行為負任何責任」： 1、決定論是正確的。一切事件（包括人類的一切行為）都是早就注定會發生而無法避免的。 2、對於注定會發生而無法避免的行為，行為人沒有決定要不要做的自由意志。（決定論與自由意志不相容） 3、行為人對非其自由意志所決定的行為，不必負任何責任。（自由意志是負責任的必要條件） 你接受如此的結論嗎？

第一項主張是否正確？ 即使「每一事件都有原因」，是否表示「每一事件都是早就注定非發生不可」？ 回想一下你喝咖啡的例子。本來你猶豫良久，無法在喝咖啡、看電影和逛書店三者間作出選擇。後來你回想起電視上純「萃」喝咖啡的廣告，發覺自己已很久未曾悠閒地喝個咖啡，再加上街邊咖啡店傳來的陣陣香氣，你終於決定喝咖啡。 在這種情況下，可以說你早就注定非喝咖啡不可嗎？其實你當天有可能不喝咖啡而看電影，在你未作決定之前，很難說已注定你會做什麼。

反對決定論 你之所以去喝咖啡，這當然有原因—回想起電視上咖啡的廣告，發覺自己已很久未曾悠閒地喝個咖啡，再加上街邊咖啡店傳來的陣陣香氣—但這就表示你注定會去喝咖啡嗎？似乎不然。 原因固然會促使某一事件發生，但似乎不會使某一事件非發生不可。即使上述的原因都到位，仍須你作出決定，你才會選擇喝咖啡，也才會真的去喝了咖啡。所以原因促使你做出喝咖啡的選擇，但並沒有使你的選擇（喝咖啡）非發生不可。倘若你沒有作出決定，你也不會有喝咖啡的選擇。就此而言，你並沒有注定會選擇喝咖啡，也沒有注定會喝咖啡。

決定論者的答覆 你選擇喝咖啡的「決定」，只有兩種可能性： （一）該決定本身也是被決定的—只不過不是被上述原因給決定，而是被上述原因聯同某些未被你明列出來的其他因素給共同地決定。一旦把其他那些因素都列出，你就會發現你的（選擇喝咖啡的）「決定」其實也早就被決定了。換言之，你的（選擇喝咖啡的）「決定」只是乍看之下不被決定，但其實它早就被決定了。 （二）該決定本身並沒有被決定，在這種情形下，你的（選擇喝咖啡的）決定就是隨機的—你斟酌考慮了半天，結果卻是隨機地「決定」選擇喝咖啡。你的決定既然帶有隨機性，怎麼能算是你在下決定呢？ 「隨機的決定」根本就是個奇怪的說法，它根本就說不通。

以文天祥為例 文天祥可以選擇投降而享受榮華富貴，他也可以選擇保存志節而犧 牲生命。他並非毫無選擇的空間。 然而，根據決定論者，文天祥的行為早就被決定會發生而無法避免。儘管表面上看起來好像是他自己決定要正氣長存，其實他只有一條路可走，別無選擇的餘地。 這指的是，文天祥的天生性格和他所受的教育，以及當時的環境等等，早就決定他會把志節看得比生命重要，把忠義看得比榮華富貴重要，因而早就注定他不會投降而會慷慨就義。

那些主張文天祥並非注定會慷慨就義的人，往往認為文天祥的選擇或多或少是隨機的，但以隨機性來保全自由意志的作法真的比較適當嗎？ 首先，從反面來看這個問題： 假定文天祥的行為不是早就注定的，即使天生的性格、後天的修養或其他因素都不足以促使他慷慨就義；他的一切令後世景仰的行為其實是在深思熟慮之後，在下決定前的最後關頭之際隨機的、沒有原因的、無緣無故的、莫名其妙發生的。

在這種情形下，我們很難認定這樣的行為是文天祥自己決定要做的行為，更談不上是其自由意志所決定的行為。 就此而言，沒有被原因決定的行為和有原因促使其注定會發生的行為，兩相比較，前者比後者更難被認定為自由意志所決定的行為。 由此可見，「有原因」、「被決定而發生」、「自由意志決定」等概念之間的關係，沒有我們原先所想像的那樣單純。

其次，值得注意的是，行為人的「決定」本身也是促使行為發生的原因之一。沒有行為者的決定本身，行為也不會發生。 即使該決定本身也是受先前的諸多因素所影響，並不表示該決定就不是行為者所做出的決定，也不表示該決定並非促使行為發生的原因。 一項行為只要是由行為人的決定所促成的，則該行為就是行為人所決定的行為。

就此而言，Patricia受洗腦影響而參加搶劫是她自己決定的行為：這個決定既然是在她的腦中做成的，又是由她的性格、 習慣、 慾望、 信念、 客觀環境等等所促成的，我們憑什麼理由說這個決定不是她做的？ 同理，一個人在槍口逼迫下簽字也是他自己決定的行為。 然而，假如搶匪強加受害人的拇指在偽造的借據上蓋指印，則此行為就不是受害人決定的行為。

當然，有些行為雖然是出自意志所做的決定，但卻不是出自自由意志所做的決定。例如，在槍口脅迫下簽字。 但明顯地，並非只要出自意志決定的行為都不是出自自由意志決定的行為。 總之，注定會發生的行為不見得不是行為者之意志決定的行為。而行為者之意志決定的行為不見得不是出自行為者之自由意志決定的行為。 無論如何，即使是注定會發生的行為，也不見得不是出自行為者之自由意志的行為。

決定論者的結語 無論如何，根據決定論者，你的（選擇喝咖啡的）決定本身終究也是被決定的，終究是注定會發生的。既然你注定會選擇喝咖啡，你就注定在周末那個時刻，在那條街上喝咖啡。 你認為決定論對嗎？

現在，讓我們針對第二項主張，即決定論和自由意志不相容的主張，繼續分析下去。

Classical Compatibilism According to one strand within classical compatibilism, freedom of the sort pertinent to moral evaluation is nothing more than an agent's ability to do what she wishes in the absence of impediments that would otherwise stand in her way. For instance, Hobbes writes that a person's freedom consists in his finding “no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do.” According to ~ in her way http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/#3 no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do. http://www.literature.org/authors/hobbes-thomas/leviathan/chapter-21.html

Hobbes' brief remarks represent an exemplary expression of the classical compatibilist account of freedom. It involves two components, a positive and a negative one. The positive component (doing what one wills, desires, or inclines to do) consists in nothing more than what is involved in the power of agency. The negative component (finding “no stop”) consists in acting unencumbered or unimpeded. Typically, the classical compatibilists' benchmark of impeded or encumbered action is compelled action. Compelled action arises when one is forced by some foreign or external source to act contrary to one's will. Hobbes' brief remarks ~ a negative one http://www.freethought-forum.com/forum/showthread.php?p=1100099 The positive component ~ the power of agency http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/ The negative ~ one’s will

Now, free will is the unencumbered ability of an agent to do what she wants. It is plausible to assume that free will, so understood, is compatible with determinism since the truth of determinism does not entail that no agents ever do what they wish to do unencumbered. Now ~ she wants http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/ It is plausible ~ to do unencumbered

Is the classical compatibilist account of free will OK? How convincing is the classical compatibilist account of free will? As it stands, it cries out for refinement. To cite just one shortcoming, various mental illnesses can cause a person to act as she wants and do so unencumbered; yet, intuitively, it would seem that she does not act of her own free will. For example, imagine a person suffering from a form of psychosis that causes full-fledged hallucinations. While hallucinating, she might “act as she wants unencumbered,” but she could hardly be said to be acting of her own free will. Since the classical compatibilist account of free will is not convincing, we need to consider alternative accounts. How convincing is ~ her want free will http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/ For example ~ her own free will

Free Will and the Challenge from Causal Determinism We naturally think of ourselves—“normal” adult human beings—as “free.” That is, we take it that we have a certain distinctive sort of control. Let’s use “free will” (or “freedom of the will”) as an umbrella term to refer to the sort of freedom or control we presuppose that we human beings possess, and that is connected in important ways to ascriptions of moral responsibility. Note that “free will” in this sense need not entail that we have a special faculty of the will, but only that we have a certain kind of freedom or control. But what is this freedom? We naturally think of ourselves ~ moral reponsibility http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwFischer2.html

What is freedom？ It is extremely natural and plausible to think that the typical adult human being has freedom in the sense that we often (although perhaps not always) have the freedom to choose or refrain from choosing a particular course of action (where “course of action” can refer to an omission as well as an action, narrowly construed) and to undertake or refrain from undertaking this course of action. It is extremely ~ thins course of acion http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwFischer2.html

That is, we take it that we often (although perhaps not invariably) have “alternative possibilities”: although we actually choose and undertake a particular course of action, we had it in our power (or “could have”) chosen and undertaken a different course of action. That is ~ different course of action http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwFischer2.html

Of course, we recognize that sometimes we are “coerced” or “compelled” to choose or act as we do; and some individuals never have control over their choices and actions (because of significant mental illness, brain damage, and so forth). But we assume that the typical adult human being, at least sometimes, has more than one available path. That is, we assume, in Borges’s phrase, that the future is a garden of forking paths. Of course ~ and so forth http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwFischer2.html

Challenge from Causal Determinism But there are various skeptical worries or challenges to the intuitive notion that we have free will in the sense that involves alternative possibilities. One of the most important such challenges comes from the doctrine of causal determinism. Causal determinism is the thesis that every event (and thus every choice and bit of behavior) is deterministically caused by some event in the past; thus, every choice and bit of behavior is the result of a casual chain, each link in which is deterministically caused by some prior link (until one gets to the beginning, if there is a beginning). But there are ~ alternative possibilities http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwFischer2.html Causal determinism ~ if there is a beginning

Causal Determinism More specifically, causal determinism is the doctrine that a complete statement of the laws of nature and a complete description of the facts about the world at some time T entail every truth about the world after T. That is, if causal determinism is true, then the past and the natural laws entail a unique present and future path for the world. More specifically ~ the world after T http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dwFischer2.html That is, ~ for the world

Note further that if someone had available to her the description of the past and the statement of the laws, she could with certainty say what happens in the present and what will happen in the future. But it does not follow from the truth of the metaphysical doctrine of causal determinism that anyone actually has access to the relevant truths about the universe or its laws.

No human being currently knows whether or not the doctrine of causal determinism obtains. Certain physicists believe that the study of physical phenomena at the micro level renders it very plausible that causal determinism is false (and thus that `indeterminism' is true). But other physicists (and philosophers) cling to the view that causal determinism is true, and that what appear currently to be genuine metaphysical indeterminacies reflect mere inadequacies in our knowledge of the world (Honderich, 1988). Certain physicists ~ is true http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwFischer2.html But other physicists ~ the world Honderich, 1988

Since we cannot be certain at this point that causal determinism is false, it is perhaps worthwhile to think about what would follow, if it turned out that causal determinism is true. It is troubling that there is a very potent argument, employing ingredients from common sense, which appears to show that if causal determinism indeed turned out to be true, then no human being would have free will in the sense that involves alternative possibilities. The following is an informal and intuitive presentation of the argument:

Why free will is not compatible with causal determinism? Suppose I make some ordinary choice C at time T2. If causal determinism is true, then the total state of the universe at T1 together with the laws of nature entail that I make C at T2. Thus, it was a necessary condition of my making a different choice at T2 that either the state of the universe at T1 have been different from what it actually was or some proposition that expressed a natural law would not have expressed a natural law.

But, intuitively, I cannot—do not have it in my power—at any time so to behave that the past would have been different from the way it actually was. And, similarly, I cannot at any time determine which propositions express the natural laws. Intuitively, the past and the natural laws are “fixed” and not “up to me.” It seems to follow from the foregoing ingredients that I could not have chosen otherwise than C at T2, if causal determinism turned out to be true.

This argument for “incompatibilism”—the incompatibility of causal determinism and the sort of free will that involves alternative possibilities—has been the focal point of much discussion. Indeed the argument is controversial, and it can be resisted in many ways.

如果不相容論是對的，那會怎樣？ Now, despite the fact that the argument for incompatibilism of free will and determinism is controversial, let’s assume that the argument is sound and explore the implications of this assumption.

Deliberation and Practical Reasoning One of the most central aspects of human “persons” is that we can engage in significant deliberation and practical reasoning. In deliberating, we consider and weigh reasons for (and against) various courses of action. We seek to “figure out what is best to do” and to act in accordance with this sort of judgment about what is best, all things considered. We are fallible in our judgments, of course, and certainly we sometimes fail to act in accordance with our judgment about what is best to do, all things considered. But in any case, the process of deliberation (or practical reasoning) involves identifying and weighing reasons with an eye to figuring out what we have sufficient reason to do.

Richard Taylor’s argument Some philosophers have argued that it is a conceptual truth that I cannot engage in deliberation if I do not believe that I have free will, in the sense that involves alternative possibilities. Richard Taylor : “I cannot deliberate about what to do, even though I may not know what I am going to do, unless I believe that it is up to me what I am going to do” He goes on to argue that the relevant notion of “up to me” is incompatible with causal determinism; on this notion, an act's being “up to me” implies that it is up to me whether or not I do it.

你覺得Taylor的論證有道理嗎？即若我不相信有其他選項可選（若我不相信有自由意志， 或說若我相信決定論是對的，並且它與自由意志不相容），則我根本就不能有所斟酌考慮？

Why Taylor’s argument fails As long as I do not know what I will in fact choose, it seems that there is a perfectly reasonable point to deliberation; after all, I still need to figure out what I have sufficient reason to do and to seek to act in accordance with this judgment. This purpose of deliberation would not disappear, in a world in which I knew that it is not “up to me” (in the sense that involves alternative possibilities in which the actual past and natural laws are held fixed) what I will choose.

Note that it may still be true, even in a causally deterministic world, that in a particular context I would choose a course of action if and only if I were to judge it best. Further, it does not follow simply from causal determinism that there is some special sort of obstacle to my choosing a particular course of action; causal determinism does not entail that I have some kind of phobia or compulsion that would rule out my choosing a certain sort of action.

And if one insists that it is a conceptual truth that my process of weighing reasons would not count as “deliberation,” then so be it: call it “deliberation*” or simply “figuring out what it would be best to do,” and there can be a clear point to such activities even in a world in which I know that I have only one path that is genuinely available into the future.

Peter van Inwagen’s argument Peter van Inwagen holds a view that is similar to, but slightly different from, Taylor's. On van Inwagen's account, an agent who believes that he does not have free will (in the sense of alternative possibilities) can deliberate, but in so doing he would be contradicting himself.

Van Inwagen says: “In my view, if someone deliberates about whether to do A or to do B, it follows that his behavior manifests a belief that it is possible for him to do A—that he can do A, that he has it within his power to do A—and that it is possible for him to do B.” Thus, an individual who sincerely believes that he lacks free will (understood as earlier) would be contradicting himself in deliberating—he would be holding an inconsistent set of beliefs. Whereas this is not impossible, it is certainly undesirable; for example, holding inconsistent beliefs guarantees that at least one of one's beliefs is false.

Inwagen: “Anyone who doubts that this is indeed the case may find it instructive to imagine that he is in a room with two doors and that he believes one of the doors to be unlocked and the other to be locked and impassable, though he has no idea which is which; let him then attempt to imagine himself deliberating about which door to leave by.”

Problems with Inwagen’s argument Is it correct to say that deliberation manifests the belief in free will? I agree that it would be odd to think that I could deliberate about which door actually (or “successfully”) to open. But surely in such a case I could deliberate about which door to choose to open. That is, I could weigh reasons and come to a judgment about which door it would be best to seek to open, and I could form an intention—choose—to act in accordance with my judgment.

How Inwagen might reply But van Inwagen may reply that the apparent lack of oddness in supposing that I could deliberate about which door (say) to choose to open stems precisely from the fact that I can suppose that I am able either to choose to open door A or choose to open door B.

Problems with Inwagen’s argument However, it is doubtful that this is the right explanation of the asymmetry in our intuitions between deliberating about which door to open and deliberating about which door to choose to open.

Suppose I do in fact choose to open door A. Now if causal determinism is true and the argument for the incompatibility of causal determinism and free will (understood as involving alternative possibilities) is sound, then it turns out that, unbeknownst to me, just prior to my choice I did not have it in my power to choose to open door B. Further, it seems to me that I could know that causal determinism is true and that the incompatibilist's argument is sound, and thus that whichever choice I make is the only one I actually can make.

This knowledge does not eliminate the point of deliberation (the need to figure out which door it would be best to choose to open); and I do not have any hesitation in supposing that, even with the knowledge that whatever door I choose will be the only door I in fact can choose to open, I can deliberate about which door to choose to open. Thus I do not believe that the asymmetry in our intuitions between deliberating about which door to open and deliberating about which door to choose to open stems from an asymmetry in our beliefs about alternative possibilities.

In a causally deterministic world (and given the incompatibilistic argument), every choice and action would be such that, if I make it (or perform it), I could not have made another choice (or performed another action). But it seems to me that there could still be a perfectly reasonable point to deliberation, and that I need not contradict myself in accepting the truth of causal determinism, the soundness of the argument for incompatibilism, but nevertheless deliberating.

All that is required is that I have an interest in figuring out what I have sufficient reason to choose, and that I do not know which course of action I will in fact choose to take (and take). Further, van Inwagen has not produced an example in which it is obvious that this yields an odd result.

John Searle’s argument John Searle has argued for a point related to the claims of Taylor and van Inwagen, but it is slightly different. Searle‘s contention is that there would be no point to practical reasoning or deliberation, if I knew that causal determinism were true. Searle says: “The gap can be given two equivalent descriptions, one forward-looking, one backward.

Forward: the gap is that feature of our conscious decision making and acting where we sense alternative future decisions and actions as causally open to us. Backward: the gap is that feature of conscious decision making and acting whereby the reasons preceding the decisions and the actions are not experienced by the agent as setting causally sufficient conditions for the decisions and actions. As far as our conscious experiences are concerned, the gap occurs when the beliefs, desires, and other reasons are not experienced as causally sufficient conditions for a decision (the formation of a prior intention ... ).”

Searle goes on to say: “I am advancing three theses here. 1. We have experiences of the gap of the sort I have described. 2. We have to presuppose the gap. We have to presuppose that the psychological antecedents of many of our decisions and actions do not set causally sufficient conditions for those decisions and actions. 3. In normal conscious life one cannot avoid choosing and deciding.

Searle’s argument for 2 and 3 If I really thought that the beliefs and desires were sufficient to cause the action then I could just sit back and watch the action unfold in the same way as I do when I sit back and watch the action unfold on a movie screen. But I cannot do that when I am engaging in rational decision making and acting. I have to presuppose that the antecedent set of psychological conditions was not causally sufficient.

An additional argument for 3 Even if I became convinced of the falsity of the thesis of the gap, all the same I would still have to engage in actions and thus exercise my own freedom no matter what. ... For example, there is a kind of practical inconsistency in maintaining the following two theses: (1) I am now trying to make up my mind whom to vote for in the next election. (2) I take the existing psychological causes operating on me right now to be causally sufficient to determine whom I am going to vote for.

The inconsistency comes out in the fact that if I really believe (2), then there seems no point in making the effort involved in (1). The situation would be like taking a pill that I am sure will cure my headache by itself, and then trying to add some further psychological effort to the effects of the pill. If I really believe the pill is enough, then the rational thing to do is to sit back and let it take effect.”

Is Searle’s argument convincing? It seems that Searle's view about deliberation falls prey to the same objections as the views of Taylor and van Inwagen: I believe that there would be a clear point to deliberation and practical reasoning, even if I were to reject the gap: I would still have an interest in—and deeply care about—figuring out what I have reason to do, and seeking to act accordingly. Even if the gap thesis is false, and antecedent psychological states are causally sufficient for my decision, and I know this, it does not follow that I know what decision I will make and what action I will perform.

Hence, insofar as I care about acting in accordance with what I have, all things considered, reason to do, there is a clear point to engaging in deliberation.

Recall that Searle says that there is a practical inconsistency in maintaining the following. (1) I am now trying to make up my mind whom to vote for in the next election. (2) I take the existing psychological causes operating on me right now to be causally sufficient to determine whom I am going to vote for. He says holding these two theses would be like “taking a pill that I am sure will cure my headache by itself, and then trying to add some further psychological effort to the effects of the pill.”

But in Searle's analogy, you know that the pill will cure your headache; in contrast, I am not assumed to know whom I will vote for in the next election. If I did know whom I would vote for, I agree that the point of making up my mind would appear to vanish.

Suppose I know that my decision about the next election is causally determined by my current configuration of mental states (desires, beliefs, and so forth). Still, I can also know that my decision will depend on my practical reasoning in the following sense: if I were to judge it best, all things considered, to vote for candidate A, I would vote for candidate A; but if were to judge it best, all things considered, to vote for candidate B, I would vote for candidate B.

Further, I can know that nothing distorts or impairs my practical reasoning—my ability to recognize the reasons there are, and to weigh them with an eye to making an all things considered judgment as to what is best. That is, nothing in the doctrine of causal determinism entails that the counterfactuals (that specify the relevant sort of dependency) are false, and nothing in this doctrine entails that I have any special sort of impairment of my capacity to engage in practical reasoning—certain phobias, compulsions, mental illnesses, and so forth.

And, finally, nothing in the doctrine of causal determinism entails that I do not care about choosing and acting in accordance with my judgment about what is best to do. So there is a clear point to deliberation, even if I believe that antecedent mental states are causally sufficient for my decision.

Imagine, to make the point dramatically, that there are two doors in front of you, and you must choose which door to open. You know that behind door 1 is a million dollars, and behind door 2 is a den of rattlesnakes. Imagine, further, that you know that causal determinism is true, that causal determinism rules out alternative possibilities, and that causal determinism in itself does not entail that one has any physical paralysis or impairment of the human capacity for practical reasoning (no intense phobias, compulsions, paranoid schizophrenia, and so forth).

Would Searle really not deliberate Would Searle really not deliberate? What would he do—flip a coin, act arbitrarily, or what? Would he simply “sit back and watch the action unfold”? It would seem perfectly reasonable (at the very least) to take into consideration what is behind the doors, and to choose and act accordingly. Having collected the million dollars, you might pause to reflect that it turns out that that was the only thing you could have done (as long as this thought would not unduly delay the celebration!).

回到第三項主張 現在讓我們考慮第三項主張： Some philosophers have argued that if we lacked free will (in the sense that involves alternative possibilities), then we could not legitimately be considered morally responsible agents.

為何第三項主張有道理 As said above, we naturally think that the future is a garden of forking paths—that we at least at some important points in our lives have more than one path branching into the future. If this intuitive picture turned out to be false, then it would seem that we could not legitimately be held morally responsible for our behavior. After all, if I don't have free will in a sense that involves alternative possibilities, then I have to choose (and do) what I actually choose (and do). And if I have to choose what I do in fact choose, then presumably I am compelled so to choose, and cannot fairly be considered morally responsible for my choice.

It is very plausible, then, to accept something like the “principle of alternative possibilities” (PAP), according to which an agent is morally responsible for (say) an action only if she could have done otherwise. If PAP is true, then moral responsibility requires free will (in the sense that involves alternative possibilities); and if causal determinism rules out such alternative possibilities, it would thereby rule out moral responsibility.

van Inwagen’s defense of PAP “If we do not have free will, then there is no such thing as moral responsibility. This proposition, one might think, certainly deserves to be a commonplace. If someone charges you with, say, lying, and if you can convince him that it was simply not within your power not to lie, then it would seem that you have done all that is necessary to absolve yourself of responsibility for lying. ...

[W]ithout free will there is no moral responsibility: If moral responsibility exists, then someone is morally responsible for something he has done or for something he has left undone; to be morally responsible for some act or failure to act is at least to be able to have acted otherwise, whatever else it may involve; to be able to have acted otherwise is to have free will. Therefore, if moral responsibility exists, someone has free will. Therefore, if no one has free will, moral responsibility does not exist.”

PAP questioned But whereas PAP might appear to be an obvious truth, it has been questioned by some philosophers. These philosophers contend (in one way or another) that what matters for moral responsibility is how the relevant choice or action is brought about, not whether the agent has alternative possibilities available to him. In contemporary philosophy, Harry Frankfurt has helped to focus the case against PAP with a set of examples with a characteristic structure.

These examples contain fail-safe mechanisms that (allegedly) both make it the case that the agent has no (relevant) alternative possibilities and also play no role in the agent's actual choice and action. Frankfurt says that if something plays no role in the agent's choice and action, then it cannot be relevant to his moral responsibility; thus, it would follow that the mechanisms in question both make it the case that the agent has no alternative possibilities and do not thereby threaten the agent's moral responsibility.

A version of `Frankfurt-type case' Jones is in a voting booth deliberating about whether to vote for the Democrat or the Republican. After weighing reasons and deliberating in the “normal” way, he chooses to vote for the Democrat. Unbeknownst to him, Black, a neurosurgeon with Democratic sympathies, has implanted a device in Jones's brain that monitors Jones's brain activities. If he is about to choose to vote Democratic, the device does not intervene. If, however, Jones were about to choose to vote Republican, the device would trigger an intervention that would involve electronic stimulation of the brain sufficient to produce a choice to vote for the Democrat and an actual vote for the Democrat.

If Jones is about to choose at T2 to vote for the Democrat at T3, he shows some involuntary sign—say a blush, a furrowed brow, or a neurological pattern in his brain readable by some sort of “neuroscope”—at T1. If it detects this, Black's device does not intervene. But if Jones is about to choose at T2 to vote Republican at T3, he shows a different involuntary sign at T1. This would trigger Black's device to intervene and cause Jones to choose at T2 to vote for the Democrat and actually to vote for the Democrat at T3.

It seems that Black's device is precisely the kind of fail-safe device described earlier: it plays no role in Jones's deliberations, choice, or action, and yet its presence renders it true that Jones could not have done otherwise than choose and vote Democratic. Indeed, it seems that in this case Jones freely chooses to vote Democratic, freely does so, and can be considered morally responsible for his choice and action, even though he does not have alternative possibilities (given the presence of Black's device).

This suggests that there is a kind of freedom or control—corresponding to choosing and acting freely—that does not require alternative possibilities, and that this sort of control (and not the alternative-possibilities control) is the freedom-relevant condition necessary for moral responsibility. There seem to be two kinds of freedom or control, and the Frankfurt-type examples help us to prize them apart. It appears, then, that we have a counterexample to PAP.

第三項主張正確嗎？ 只要不是出自自由意志所決定的行為，就無須為此行為負責嗎？ 若自由意志指的是有alternative possibilities，則即使一個決定或行為並非出自自由意志，行為者仍應負責。 此外，即使一項行為並非出自自由意志所決定，仍然有可能是出自意志所決定。換言之，行為者對於這樣的行為仍然有控制力，而非完全不可控制。 例如：被俘將軍在敵人威脅下簽署一道密令，致使己方全軍覆沒。這樣的行為雖非出自自由意志決定的行為，卻仍然是出自意志決定的行為。故他仍需為此行為負責。國法仍會制裁他。

事實上，國法的制裁會使將軍在下決定時多一層顧慮，因而減低亂下命令的可能性。使決定者對其所能控制的決定負責，不但合情合理，更能促使他在做決定時慎重考慮，從而減少錯誤決定。

你／妳認為自己有自由意志、或者是被決定的呢？ 

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 22 30-1 30-2 30-3 63-1 維基百科 / User: Hannah。 http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Wen_Tianxiang.jpg 本作品已超過著作財產權存續期間，屬公共領域之著作。瀏覽日期：2014/3/18 。 30-1 維基百科 / Unknown 。 http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AThomas_Hobbes_by_John_Michael_Wright.jpg 30-2 According to one strand …in her way Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Compatibilism http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/#3 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2014/3/18 。 30-3 no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do Thomas Hobbes, ‘Chapter 21 - Of The Liberty Of Subjects’ , Leviathan http://www.literature.org/authors/hobbes-thomas/leviathan/chapter-21.html 63-1 WIKIPEDIA / Original uploader was Matro http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:John_searle2.jpg 本作品以創用CC「姓名標示－相同方式分享」3.0版授權釋出。瀏覽日期：2014/3/18 。

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 31 Hobbes' brief remarks … to one's will. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Compatibilism http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/#3 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2014/3/18 。 32-1 free will is the … do what she wants. . 32-2 It is plausible to…to do unencumbered. 33 How convincing is …own free will.

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 34 We naturally think … of moral responsibility. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12-Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195147790.001.0001/acprof-9780195147797-chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2014/5/16 。 35 It is extremely …course of action. 36 That is, we take …course of action. 37 Of course…of forking paths.

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 38 But there are …is a beginning). David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12-Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195147790.001.0001/acprof-9780195147797-chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2014/5/16 。 39 More specifically…for the world. 40 Note further that …or its laws. 41-1 No human being …indeterminism' is true).

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 41-2 But other physicists …of the world Honderich, Ted. 1988. A Theory of Determinism. 2 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。 42 Since we cannot …of the argument Fischer, John Martin. 1994. The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control. Oxford: Blackwell. Fischer, John Martin. 1999. “Recent Work on Moral Responsibility.” Ethics 110: 93–139. Ginet, Carl. 1990. On Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. van Inwagen, Peter. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 43 Suppose I make …a natural law. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12-Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195147790.001.0001/acprof-9780195147797-chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2014/5/16 。 44 But, intuitively…out to be true.

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 45 This argument for…of much discussion. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12-Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195147790.001.0001/acprof-9780195147797-chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2014/5/16 。 47 One of the most …reason to do. 48-1 Some philosophers… possibilities. 48-2  I cannot deliberate  …going to do Taylor, Richard. 1983. Metaphysics. 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 48-3 He goes on to …not I do it. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12-Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195147790.001.0001/acprof-9780195147797-chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2014/5/16 。 50 As long as I... will choose. 51 Note that it…sort of action. 52 And if one insists …into the future.

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 53 Peter van Inwagen … be contradicting himself. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12-Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195147790.001.0001/acprof-9780195147797-chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2014/5/16 。 54-1 Van Inwagen says…him to do B.” van Inwagen, Peter. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。 54-2 Thus, an individual … beliefs is false. 55 Anyone who doubts …which door to leave by.

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 56 I agree that …with my judgment. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12-Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195147790.001.0001/acprof-9780195147797-chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2014/5/16 。 57 But van Inwagen may…open door B. 59 Suppose I do in …I actually can make. 60 This knowledge does …alternative possibilities.

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 61 62-1 62-2 63-2 In a causally deterministic …nevertheless deliberating. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12-Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195147790.001.0001/acprof-9780195147797-chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2014/5/16 。 62-1 All that is required …take (and take). Bok, Hilary. 1998. Freedom and Responsibility. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。 62-2 Further, van Inwagen …an odd result. 63-2 John Searle has argued…determinism were true.

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 63-3 The gap can be…one backward. Searle, John R. 2001. Rationality in Action. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。 64 Forward: the gap is that…of a prior intention ... ). 65 Searle goes on to say:…choosing and deciding. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12-Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195147790.001.0001/acprof-9780195147797-chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2014/5/16 。 66 If I really thought …not causally sufficient.

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 67 68 69 Even if I became …to vote for. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12-Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195147790.001.0001/acprof-9780195147797-chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2014/5/16 。 68 The inconsistency comes …let it take effect. Searle, John R. 2001. Rationality in Action. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。 69 I believe that …I will perform.

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 70 Hence, insofar as …to engaging in deliberation. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12-Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195147790.001.0001/acprof-9780195147797-chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2014/5/16 。 71 Recall that Searle says …effects of the pill.” 72 But in Searle's analogy…would appear to vanish.

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 73 74 75 Suppose I know …for candidate B. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12-Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195147790.001.0001/acprof-9780195147797-chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2014/5/16 。 74 Further, I can know …,and so forth. 75 And, finally…for my decision.

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 76 77 78 Imagine, to make… and so forth). David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12-Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195147790.001.0001/acprof-9780195147797-chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2014/5/16 。 77 Would Searle really…delay the celebration!). 78 Some philosophers have…responsible agents.

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 79 As said above…responsible for my choice. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12-Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195147790.001.0001/acprof-9780195147797-chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2014/5/16 。 80 It is very plausible…moral responsibility. 81 If we do not …responsibility for lying

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 82 [W]ithout free will …does not exist. van Inwagen, Peter. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。 83-1 But whereas PAP …available to him. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12-Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195147790.001.0001/acprof-9780195147797-chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2014/5/16 。 83-2 In contemporary philosophy... characteristic structure. Frankfurt, Harry G. 1969. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.” Journal of Philosophy 66: 829–839. 84 These examples contain … moral responsibility.

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 85 Jones is in a …for the Democrat. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12-Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195147790.001.0001/acprof-9780195147797-chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2014/5/16 。 86 If Jones is about …for the Democrat at T3. 87 It seems that …Black's device).

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 88 This suggests that …counterexample to PAP. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12-Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195147790.001.0001/acprof-9780195147797-chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2014/5/16 。 1-110 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2003多媒體藝廊，依據Microsoft服務合約及著作權法第46、50、52、65條合理使用。